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The court dismissed the impaired driving appeal, finding no Charter breaches during the roadside stop.
Ms. Smith appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit, alleging breaches of her Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).
The trial judge had rejected her evidence regarding these breaches and found no Charter violations.
On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the trial judge properly evaluated the conflicting evidence and that the officer had reasonable grounds for the stop and ASD demand.
The court also affirmed that the right to counsel is suspended during a valid highway traffic stop and that Ms. Smith did not request specific counsel at the police station.
Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
The court dismissed the appeal against the assault convictions and sentence, finding the reasons adequate.
The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm, and the imposed sentence of 18 months incarceration.
The appellant argued that the trial judge's reasons for conviction were inadequate or unreasonable, and that the sentence was excessive.
The court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate for appellate review and reasonable based on the evidence.
The court also found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's criminal record and the aggravating circumstances of the offences.
Consent order requiring attorney to pass accounts cannot be varied without recognized Rule 59.06 grounds.
The moving party sought an order vacating or varying a prior consent order requiring her to pass her accounts as attorney under a continuing power of attorney for an incapable person.
She argued the order was unnecessary because expenses for the incapable person were paid from a joint bank account.
The court held that the circumstances did not fall within Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and that consent orders may only be varied under Rule 59.06 in limited situations such as fraud or where the order fails to reflect the parties’ intentions.
The evidence did not establish any such basis, and the existence of a joint account predated the consent order.
The court concluded that the moving party remained obligated to pass her accounts and dismissed the motion.
