Lois B. Roberts

The appellant appealed convictions for assault causing bodily harm, kidnapping, and two counts of breach of probation, as well as seeking leave to appeal sentence.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant and three others arrived at the complainant's apartment, demanded return of allegedly stolen property, threatened violence, and subsequently assaulted and confined the complainant, causing severe injuries.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual findings.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that although the trial judge did not expressly address the appellant's history of childhood sexual abuse as a mitigating factor, this omission did not affect the fitness of the sentence imposed.

The appellant, a small family-run grocery store, was convicted of operating food premises in a manner permitting a public health hazard contrary to Ontario Food Premises Regulation 562.

The Justice of the Peace imposed a fine of $6,255.

The appeal concerned sentence only.

The Crown conceded that the sentence was based on a misapprehension of evidence regarding the duration of the violation.

The parties jointly requested a reduction to $1,500 payable over two years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the justice of the peace had misapprehended the evidence, ignored the fact that the store had been sold, failed to consider the appellant's ability to pay, and lacked information about previous convictions.

These consolidated appeals arise from related class actions certified in 2012 concerning bingo license and administration fees charged by two municipalities.

The appellants, charitable organizations, sought to amend their pleadings after the opt-out period expired to claim disgorgement of all allegedly illegal fees received by the municipalities, including those paid by persons who had opted out of the class.

The Court of Appeal quashed appeals of interlocutory orders lifting protective orders that had shielded the identities of opt-outs during a reconsideration period, and dismissed appeals of orders refusing leave to amend the statements of claim.

The court held that the proposed amendments would fundamentally alter the nature of the certified claims and lacked reasonable prospect of success.

A condominium corporation appealed from a damages award of $18,000 and sought leave to appeal a costs award of $17,000 made under section 134(5) of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The respondent unit owners had leased their condominium to tenants who vandalized common elements.

The corporation claimed $33,381.28 in damages and $52,637.56 in costs.

The application judge found certain repair expenditures disproportionate and reduced the damages award.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in assessing security camera installation costs and in conflating two distinct types of costs under the Act.

The damages award was increased to $25,458 and the costs award was increased to $34,000.

The appellant, a lawyer, sought payment of a 15 percent referral fee from the respondent lawyer in relation to a personal injury judgment obtained for a client whom the appellant had referred.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the appellant's action.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the respondent breached contractual obligations of good faith by failing to obtain the client's consent to the referral fee at the time of retainer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the referral fee arrangement did not comply with Rule 2.08(7) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which requires that referral fees be reasonable, not increase the total fee to the client, and that the client be informed and consent.

The client did not consent to the amount claimed and would only consent to a lesser amount, which was paid and found reasonable.

The appellant mortgagee appealed a motion judge's decision granting summary judgment for default under a mortgage but ordering that the judgment be held in abeyance until September 15, 2017, subject to the mortgagors making specified payments.

The appellant contended the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to impose such conditions.

The Court of Appeal found that the order amounted to a stay of execution, which is an interlocutory order from which there is no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The court determined that jurisdiction properly lay with the Divisional Court.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for damages arising from a municipal tendering process and termination of an agreement of purchase and sale.

The trial judge found that while the respondent Town breached its tendering process by accepting a non-compliant bid, the appellants failed to demonstrate they would have been awarded the contract.

The appellants did not meet their burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that the contract would have been awarded to them, as the trial judge found it more probable the Town would have re-tendered.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding it was open to the Town to reject all bids and re-tender with different specifications.

The agreement of purchase and sale was also properly terminated in good faith for legitimate business reasons.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment that found a binding agreement for the purchase and sale of their Brampton home and ordered specific performance.

The appellants argued the application judge erred in concluding there were no material facts in dispute, that the respondents' offer was null and void, and that there was no evidence supporting a finding of counteroffer.

The Court of Appeal rejected all arguments, finding that the appellants' signing and returning of the offer, combined with subsequent conduct consistent with a binding agreement (accepting a deposit cheque and restricting home revisits to those permitted by the offer terms), established a binding contract.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed from an order dismissing their motion to strike claims for usurious interest and unlawful commissions in actions brought by the trustee in bankruptcy of the promoters of an alleged Ponzi scheme.

The appellants argued the order was final because it determined a question of law regarding whether the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory, not final, and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court found that the motion judge did not formally invoke the applicable rule for determining questions of law, the formal order simply dismissed the motion without making a binding determination, and the motion was premature as pleadings had not closed.

This is a costs endorsement following a partial appeal in a family law matter.

The appellant was successful in reducing the quantum of spousal support on appeal but was wholly unsuccessful on the equalization payment issue and failed on several other grounds relating to spousal support.

The court affirmed the trial costs and awarded the appellant partial costs of the appeal in a fixed sum, reflecting his limited success.

The appellants appealed the motion judge's order striking their statement of claim without leave to amend on grounds of being time-barred and constituting an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal found that while most of the claims were properly struck as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, the motion judge erred by not separately considering paragraph 39 of the statement of claim, which alleged a new claim arising from the dissolution of a corporate defendant in 2013.

The court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the order with respect to paragraph 39 and remitting the matter for further consideration.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal decision released on May 8, 2017.

The appellants were successful on appeal and the cross-appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sought partial indemnity costs in the amount of $38,105.67, including disbursements and HST.

The respondent did not dispute the quantum but argued that no costs should be awarded or alternatively that costs should be left to the application judge or awarded in the cause.

The court awarded costs to the appellants in the full amount requested, applying the ordinary practice that the successful party on appeal receives reasonable, fair and proportionate partial indemnity costs.

An aerodrome operator appealed an order requiring it to file a permit application under a new municipal by-law for fill and site alteration work performed before the by-law was enacted.

The court considered whether the by-law could be applied retroactively to work completed under a prior regulatory regime.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the by-law had no retroactive effect and could not be applied to work performed before its enactment.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to antipsychotic and mood stabilizer treatment.

The board had granted an adjournment to allow the appellant to obtain counsel, but when the hearing resumed, the appellant appeared without counsel.

The majority held that the board did not breach procedural fairness because the appellant did not refuse legal representation but rather indicated he was prepared to represent himself.

The dissent argued the board failed to follow its own guidelines requiring a mini-inquiry to determine whether the appellant was making an informed decision to proceed without counsel, and that the board should have intervened when the appellant's condition deteriorated during the hearing.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment declaring them in breach of the trust provisions of the Construction Lien Act and ordering them to pay $216,662.84 to Airex Inc. Ben Air System Inc. had entered into a subcontract with Omico Mechanical Ltd. to perform HVAC work on a TTC facility and ordered equipment from Airex.

The appellants argued that Ben Air had paid out more money on the project than it received, and therefore had not breached the trust provisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the appellants failed to file evidence of sufficient weight to support their position.

The evidence was contradictory, lacked documentary support, and was delivered late.

The court found that once Airex established it was a subcontractor owed money and that Ben Air had received trust funds, it was Ben Air's burden to show the trust monies had been properly applied.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his wrongful dismissal action.

The appellant was employed as a production supervisor and was terminated for cause after approximately 19.5 years of continuous employment.

The termination was based on his allowing 1,500 defective camshafts with roping marks to be processed during his shift and subsequently lying about the incident.

The trial judge found that the appellant's failure to supervise, combined with his dishonesty, constituted just cause for termination.

The appellant argued the trial judge reversed the onus of proof and demonstrated bias.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the application of the just cause test and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

A minor plaintiff catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident in 2007 sought to add a municipality as a defendant in 2015.

The municipality argued the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and that notice was not given within the required ten-day period under the Municipal Act, 2001.

The motion judge allowed the amendment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the two-year limitation period did not bar the claim (as it began running when the mother held herself out as litigation guardian in June 2014), the ten-day notice requirement was not satisfied.

The mother, as litigation guardian, had no reasonable excuse for failing to give notice within ten days of the accident, and the claim against the municipality was therefore barred.

The appellant was convicted of 40 counts including drug trafficking, criminal organization offences, weapons offences, proceeds of crime, extortion, and criminal interest rate offences.

He was sentenced to 19 years imprisonment with a 9.5-year parole ineligibility period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld most convictions but allowed the appeal in part.

The court found no Charter violations regarding search and seizure or trial delay.

However, the court quashed convictions for entering into criminal interest rate agreements, finding the trial judge erred in applying a presumption of knowledge without requiring proof of mens rea.

The court also reduced the sentence from 19 to 15 years and set aside the parole ineligibility order except for criminal organization convictions.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice in which the trial judge determined that the site occupied by the appellant belonged to the City of Toronto and that the appellant was not authorized to place his property there.

The appellant raised substantially the same arguments on appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's determination regarding ownership of the site was a question of fact and that no palpable and overriding error had been committed.

The conclusion that the City had the authority to remove and destroy the appellant's property was well-founded.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs awarded.

The appellants appealed an application judge's order declaring an Order to Remedy Unsafe Building null, void, and inoperative.

The respondent cross-appealed seeking an interim injunction to prevent demolition and a declaration that the building was not unsafe.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge made two errors: first, in finding that service of the Order to Remedy was defective when it was properly served on the owner by registered mail in compliance with the Building Code Act; and second, in finding that the Order to Remedy lacked the required specificity.

The Court held that the Order to Remedy contained sufficient particularity to enable the respondent to understand the case it had to meet and the deficiencies requiring remediation.

The appeal was allowed, the cross-appeal dismissed, and the issues of interim injunction and whether the building was unsafe were remitted to another application judge.