Jeremy Streeter

The Crown sought to cross-examine the appellant's former trial and appellate counsel, now a Superior Court judge, on his affidavit evidence submitted in support of a fresh evidence application on appeal.

The appellant and the intervening judge opposed cross-examination, arguing that it would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice and proposing written interrogatories as an alternative.

The Court of Appeal granted the Crown's motion for cross-examination, holding that judicial immunity does not apply to conduct undertaken prior to judicial appointment and that cross-examination is the norm for affidavit evidence in appellate proceedings.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered an application by Raymond LeBlanc, who appealed convictions for robbery, forcible confinement, theft, theft of a motor vehicle, and possession of stolen property, as well as his sentence.

The appeal was adjourned to allow the applicant to pursue an application for production under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court also granted a s. 684(1) order appointing counsel for the limited purpose of this application, now characterized as a motion for directions.

The court determined that, due to complex privilege and confidential informant issues, the other grounds of appeal should be determined first.

The matter was converted to a solicitor appeal, with Michael Lacy appointed as counsel.

The Associate Chief Justice will case manage the matter as necessary.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered three applications related to a previous application by David Swaine, the respondent on a Crown appeal.

Swaine sought orders under sections 682 and 683 of the Criminal Code, including cross-examination of prosecuting Crowns and production of documents from the Executive Legal Officer of the Superior Court of Justice.

Two applications to intervene were brought by the Office of the Chief Justice of the Superior Court of Justice and the Ontario Superior Court Judges’ Association, both raising concerns about the administration of justice and judicial independence.

The Crown also sought a sealing order for future materials.

The Court granted leave to intervene to both proposed interveners and dismissed the Crown’s application for a sealing order, finding it inapplicable to the materials at issue.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Osama Filli’s appeal from his conviction for manslaughter in the stabbing death of Nahom Berhane.

Filli, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder after trial, challenged the trial judge’s findings on self-defence, the use of mental health evidence, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The appellate court found no error in the trial judge’s assessment of the threat, the opportunity to retreat, or the use of mental health evidence, and held that the verdict was supported by the evidence and reasoning.

The applicant, a police officer acquitted of failing to provide the necessaries of life, brought an application to cross-examine the prosecuting Crowns and obtain documents from the Executive Legal Officer and the retired trial judge.

The Crown had appealed the acquittal based on the trial judge's failure to provide reasons.

The applicant sought this evidence to support a fresh evidence application, alleging that ex parte communications by the Crown with the Executive Legal Officer led to the trial judge being prohibited from sitting, which prevented the delivery of reasons.

The Court of Appeal granted the request to cross-examine the Crowns, finding it relevant to the fresh evidence application, but adjourned the requests for document production pending submissions on potential privilege claims.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm-related offences, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter challenge to the search warrant for his home.

The appellant contended there were no reasonable grounds to believe the firearm seen in a video would be found in his home or car.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the issuing justice could reasonably infer as a matter of common sense that the appellant would store the firearm in a comparatively private location like his home or car, given he did not know he had been videotaped with it four days earlier.

The appellant, Harris Nnane, appealed his first-degree murder convictions, seeking to introduce fresh evidence from Alexander Fountain, who identified a third man, Jaiden Jackson (now deceased), as the shooter.

Nnane also argued the verdict was unreasonable regarding identity and planning/deliberation, and that the trial judge erred in jury instructions and by not conducting a post-verdict juror inquiry.

The majority dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding it not credible due to collusion, and upheld the convictions, concluding the verdict was reasonable and no errors occurred.

The dissenting judge would have admitted the fresh evidence and ordered a new trial, finding Fountain's evidence reasonably capable of belief.

The appellant, a former police officer, appealed his convictions for bribery, attempting to obstruct justice, breach of trust, and trafficking cocaine, as well as his 13-year sentence and a $250,000 fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The convictions arose from a corrupt relationship with a drug trafficker, from whom the appellant accepted bribes for protection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's jury instructions on reasonable doubt and credibility, admission of evidence, or handling of late disclosure.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the 13-year sentence fit given the gravity of the police corruption.

The fine in lieu of forfeiture was upheld, but the time to pay was varied to one year from the date of the appellant's release from custody.

The appellant, Lance Burkhard, appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a co-accused's statement to police, specifically regarding the handling of prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instruction to the jury on prior consistent statements was incorrect and exacerbated the risk of the jury using them for a prohibited purpose, namely to bolster the co-accused's credibility on the central issue of who stabbed the victim.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, Daniel Tiessen, appealed his conviction for conspiracy to kidnap and related offences, and his three-year sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the admissibility of intercepted communications, arguing that initial investigative orders (tracking, number reader, data recorder warrants) were improperly made due to inadequate Information to Obtain (ITOs) and that evidence derived from them should have been excised from the wiretap application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the motion judge's findings that the initial orders met the "reasonable grounds to suspect" standard, the wiretap order met the "reasonable grounds to believe" standard, and the "investigative necessity" requirement was satisfied.

The court found no error in the motion judge's assessment of the ITOs or the trial judge's sentence.

A jury found the appellant, a private investigator, guilty of wilfully attempting to obstruct justice.

The trial judge sentenced him to 18 months' imprisonment and three years' probation.

The appellant appealed the conviction and sought leave to appeal the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions regarding intent or reasonable doubt, or the use of the Code of Conduct for private investigators.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, finding the trial judge overemphasized general deterrence and imposed a disproportionate sentence.

The Court substituted the imprisonment with a two-years-less-one-day conditional sentence, including 12 months of house arrest followed by a curfew, recognizing the appellant's first-offender status and the collateral consequence of losing his private investigator's license.

The appellants, convicted of first-degree murder and attempted murder, appealed their convictions and sentences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals for first-degree murder convictions, ordering a new trial due to the trial judge's error in restricting routes to liability and failing to leave included offenses (second-degree murder and manslaughter) to the jury.

The court found that the murder and attempted murder charges were not inextricably linked.

The appeals on the attempted murder convictions were dismissed, and leave to appeal the life sentences for attempted murder was granted but the appeals were dismissed, finding no error in principle in the sentencing.

The applicant, Marcia Motayne, sought bail pending an application for leave to appeal her fraud conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada.

She was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and sentenced to six years and six months imprisonment, with her appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario having been dismissed.

The motion judge dismissed the bail application, finding that while the proposed ground of appeal (jury instruction on motive) was not frivolous, her continued detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court balanced the high enforceability interest of the sentence against the low reviewability interest of the appeal, given the seriousness of the offence and the unlikelihood of leave being granted by the Supreme Court.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court of Justice order granting certiorari, which overturned a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the appellant on charges of impaired operation and dangerous operation of a conveyance causing bodily harm, and instead committed the appellant for trial.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the reviewing judge's finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional errors in discharging the appellant and upheld the decision to commit the appellant for trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Marcia Motayne, appealed her conviction for fraud over $5,000, stemming from a large-scale payroll fraud exceeding $900,000 perpetrated through her employer's system.

The appellant, as Director of Finance, had exclusive control over the payroll, and the fraudulent transfers were linked to her bank accounts and directly benefited her and her family.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding reasonable doubt, the elements of fraud, and motive, and demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, when viewed functionally, was adequate.

The court held that any minor errors in the charge were harmless given the overwhelming evidence against the appellant, to which the curative proviso applied.

Furthermore, the court found no basis for a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking and sought leave to appeal his 53-month sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to cross-examine a defence witness (Christopher Small) on his knowledge of Charter s. 13 and Canada Evidence Act s. 5 protections, which the appellant claimed improperly impeached the witness's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found the cross-examination permissible because the defence had introduced the witness's motive for testifying, and the Crown's questions challenged the veracity of that explanation.

The sentence appeal sought a reduction based on potential deportation and the impact of COVID-19.

The court dismissed both appeals, finding the sentence was not excessive and the trial judge did not err in considering collateral consequences or COVID-19.

This consolidated appeal addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained through a wiretap authorization granted in 2016 for a 2009 murder investigation.

The Court of Appeal found that the authorization was improperly granted due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds, as the affidavit failed to establish a credible-based probability that interceptions would yield evidence of the long-dormant homicide or that other investigative procedures were unlikely to succeed.

The court emphasized that a generic investigative plan and unsupported inferences of continued association among targets after several years were insufficient.

Consequently, the interceptions constituted a serious breach of Charter s. 8 rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court upheld the exclusion of the evidence under Charter s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the state conduct and the significant impact on privacy interests.

The appeals from conviction were allowed, and acquittals were entered, while the appeals from acquittal were dismissed.

This is an application for bail pending appeal by Jeremy Bailey, who was convicted of serious drug offences and sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

He had previously been granted bail pending appeal but was subsequently charged with new drug offences (fentanyl trafficking) and breaches of his release conditions, leading to his father withdrawing as surety.

Although he was granted new bail pending trial for the fresh charges with new sureties and electronic monitoring, the Court of Appeal dismissed his application for release pending appeal for the original convictions.

The court found that despite the proposed strictures and new sureties, the applicant's history of flagrant and almost immediate breaches of prior bail conditions, coupled with the seriousness of the offences, undermined public confidence in the administration of justice and presented lingering public safety concerns.

The appellant was convicted of producing marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purposes of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Police executed a valid search warrant at a bungalow where a grow-op was operating and seized a large quantity of marijuana.

The appellant was arrested as she approached the bungalow, and a house key was seized from her incident to arrest.

The appellant was delayed over three hours in accessing counsel in breach of s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded the s. 10(b) breach.

The appellant argued the breach tainted not only the seizure of the house key but also the drugs seized under the search warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the seizure of drugs under the valid search warrant was causally, temporally, and contextually distinct from the arrest and subsequent s. 10(b) breach.

Regarding the house key, while subject to potential exclusion, the Grant factors favoured admission as the breach was not strategic or serious, the impact was minimal given other admissible evidence, and society had an interest in trial on the merits.