Jeremy Streeter

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in fentanyl, raising three grounds: a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel, an unlawful search of a co-accused's cellphone under s. 8, and a misapplication of the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant repeatedly waived his right to counsel until 1:30 a.m., and that the subsequent breach was minor.

The court declined to consider the s. 8 claim due to an inadequate evidentiary record, as it was raised for the first time on appeal.

Finally, the court found the circumstantial case for trafficking was strong and the trial judge's reasons were unassailable.

The appellants were convicted of trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine following a lengthy police surveillance operation dubbed 'Project Odyssey'.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in his handling of a confidential informant privilege application, in refusing to stay proceedings for alleged police misconduct, and in rendering unreasonable verdicts based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the in camera, ex parte procedure used for the privilege claim, upholding the trial judge's factual findings regarding police conduct, and concluding the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly supported the convictions.

This is an application for bail pending appeal by Jeremy Bailey, who was convicted of serious drug offences and sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

He had previously been granted bail pending appeal but was subsequently charged with new drug offences (fentanyl trafficking) and breaches of his release conditions, leading to his father withdrawing as surety.

Although he was granted new bail pending trial for the fresh charges with new sureties and electronic monitoring, the Court of Appeal dismissed his application for release pending appeal for the original convictions.

The court found that despite the proposed strictures and new sureties, the applicant's history of flagrant and almost immediate breaches of prior bail conditions, coupled with the seriousness of the offences, undermined public confidence in the administration of justice and presented lingering public safety concerns.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug offences, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to exclude a statement he made after police violated his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The arresting officer had twice asked if the appellant wanted to make a statement after he requested counsel.

However, the appellant later spontaneously asked if his wife would be arrested, and upon receiving a truthful answer, confessed to owning drugs in a safe.

The Court of Appeal found that while there was a Charter breach, the statement was spontaneous and not causally connected to the breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of producing marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purposes of trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Police executed a valid search warrant at a bungalow where a grow-op was operating and seized a large quantity of marijuana.

The appellant was arrested as she approached the bungalow, and a house key was seized from her incident to arrest.

The appellant was delayed over three hours in accessing counsel in breach of s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded the s. 10(b) breach.

The appellant argued the breach tainted not only the seizure of the house key but also the drugs seized under the search warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the seizure of drugs under the valid search warrant was causally, temporally, and contextually distinct from the arrest and subsequent s. 10(b) breach.

Regarding the house key, while subject to potential exclusion, the Grant factors favoured admission as the breach was not strategic or serious, the impact was minimal given other admissible evidence, and society had an interest in trial on the merits.

The appellant was convicted at trial of producing methamphetamine and possessing it for the purpose of trafficking following a fire at an industrial complex containing a clandestine drug lab.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellant's fingerprint on a pop can found in the unit and a cell phone found in the lab that the trial judge concluded belonged to the appellant.

The phone contained incriminating evidence including photographs of equipment used in methamphetamine production.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: improper reliance on certified court documents to link him to the phone, misapprehension of evidence regarding photographs on the phone, and that the conviction on the possession for trafficking count was unreasonable or insufficiently reasoned.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning and that the circumstantial evidence cumulatively supported the convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with possession of MDA and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and unlawful production after police found a drug laboratory in the basement of his leased residence.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the search warrants, which was dismissed as the court found sufficient grounds based on intercepted communications linking him to a drug distribution network.

At trial, the accused denied knowledge of the drugs, claiming he rented the basement to a third party.

The court rejected his testimony as implausible and found that the Crown proved constructive possession and production beyond a reasonable doubt.

A lawyer was convicted of three offences arising from conversations with an undercover police officer posing as a refugee claimant.

The Crown alleged the appellant counseled the undercover officer to provide false information to immigration authorities.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, challenging the validity of the wiretap authorization on the basis of material omissions and misrepresentations in the affidavit.

The trial judge found two errors in the affidavit but concluded they would not have affected the issuance of the authorization.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's analysis was correct and her credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the circumstances warranted a significant jail term given the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's professional status.

The appellant was charged with possession of various drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

Police arrested him before obtaining a search warrant for his residence, and then denied him access to counsel for almost six hours while they obtained and executed the warrant.

The appellant immediately requested to speak to a lawyer upon arrest but was refused.

The trial judge found a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the police followed an unconstitutional routine practice of denying access to counsel whenever they intended to obtain a search warrant, without considering the specific circumstances of the case.

The court held that the evidence should have been excluded as admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from a trial decision.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's conclusion on a Garofoli application regarding a CDSA warrant for a warehouse search.

The appellant argued that the affiant failed to disclose relevant information, included inappropriate opinion, intentionally misled the authorizing judge, and that insufficient grounds existed that marijuana would be found in the warehouse.

The Court of Appeal found the ITO provided ample evidentiary basis for the conclusion that marijuana would be found at the warehouse and saw no basis to find the affiant was untruthful or provided inappropriate opinion.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence imposed did not reflect an error in principle or was otherwise unfit.

The applicant, charged with numerous drug trafficking and organized crime offences, sought a bail review under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code to vacate a detention order.

The applicant argued the justice of the peace erred in law by rejecting the proposed sureties and conflating drug trafficking with trafficking for a criminal organization.

The Superior Court found no error in law, noting the overwhelming evidence of the applicant's high-ranking position in a mafia organization and the massive scale of the drug transactions.

The court upheld the detention on both the secondary and tertiary grounds, concluding that release would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown sought an order vacating the appellant's bail pending appeal and detaining him in custody.

The appellant had been convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and production of marijuana, and was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment and two years' probation.

While on bail pending appeal, the appellant was arrested on charges of sexual assault and forcible confinement.

The Court of Appeal addressed the jurisdiction to revoke appeal bail when an appellant remains out of custody and determined that while the court cannot directly revoke bail in such circumstances, it may issue an arrest warrant under the Criminal Code provisions governing bail violations and new indictable offences committed while on release.

The applicants, charged jointly with a co-accused on one count of trafficking cocaine and one count of possession of proceeds of crime, applied for severance from the co-accused who faced numerous additional charges.

The applicants argued that the volume of evidence against the co-accused on the other counts would cause overwhelming prejudice.

The court dismissed the application, finding a strong factual and legal nexus between the counts, no real risk of moral or reasoning prejudice that could not be cured by jury instructions, and that severance would lead to an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking and carrying a concealed weapon.

He challenged the lawfulness of his arrest for assault and the subsequent searches of his shoulder bag, arguing breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellant also contended that the trial judge erred in finding continuity of the seized items and misapprehended defence counsel's concession regarding continuity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the arrest for assault was supported by reasonable and probable grounds based on the victim's identification, that the searches were lawful as searches incident to arrest for officer safety purposes, and that the trial judge's continuity findings were supported by the evidence despite his misunderstanding of the limited concession.

The appellant appealed from convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking in crystal methamphetamine and cocaine, possession of marihuana, and possession of proceeds of crime.

Drugs and cash were found in the appellant's apartment pursuant to a search warrant obtained in relation to alleged criminal activity by the appellant's former roommate.

The appellant claimed he did not know the drugs were in his apartment and that the cash came from legitimate sources.

The Court of Appeal rejected three grounds of appeal: that the trial judge erred in finding sufficient basis for the search warrant, that she erred in assessing the appellant's credibility, and that her reasons for conviction were insufficient.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of vacating the conviction for possession of marihuana, as the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to hear that count as a summary conviction offence.

The applicants, Marco Maone and Carlo Fazzari, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in their criminal trial.

The court applied the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases, as established in R. v. Jordan, finding the 29-month delay to the anticipated trial completion to be reasonable.

The court rejected the argument that a preferred indictment should trigger an 18-month ceiling.

It also found that Maone failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite proceedings, while Fazzari, despite some efforts, did not establish that the case took 'markedly longer' than it should have, considering the complexity of the multi-accused drug trafficking investigation.

The applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking and assault following his arrest by Toronto Parking Authority security guards in a parking lot.

For the first time on appeal, the appellant raised Charter violations by police, claiming the police illegally continued an unreasonable citizen's arrest and conducted an unlawful search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not raise new Charter issues for the first time on appeal because he had expressly conceded at trial that police had not violated his Charter rights.

The court found the appellant failed to meet the preconditions for raising new issues on appeal, including an incomplete evidentiary record and uncertainty regarding whether the failure to raise the issue was tactical.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the assault charge.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of cannabis resin following a joint trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

He appealed on three grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias based on remarks made by the trial judge in an unrelated sentencing proceeding; the trial judge's erroneous admission of a videotaped police interview as voluntary; and the trial judge's failure to conduct an inquiry into a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter when uncontradicted evidence revealed such a breach.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the bias claim and voluntariness determination were not independently fatal, the trial judge's failure to assist a self-represented accused by raising and inquiring into the Charter breach rendered the trial unfair.

A new trial was ordered.

The offender was convicted of cocaine trafficking and related offences, receiving a 6.5-year sentence.

The Crown appealed, arguing the sentencing judge erred in interpreting aggravating factors under the CDSA and in refusing a half-parole order.

The offender cross-appealed, seeking pre-trial custody credit for time spent in custody on unrelated charges that were later stayed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the sentencing judge properly weighed the aggravating factors, appropriately exercised discretion regarding parole eligibility, and correctly refused to credit time served on unrelated charges.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and failing to comply with a recognizance.

She argued the trial judge erred by relying on hearsay from an informant and admitting a statement without a voir dire.

The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge erred in both instances but applied the curative proviso, finding the remaining circumstantial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the errors were harmless.

The appeal was dismissed.