Jeremy Streeter

The appellant was convicted at trial of producing methamphetamine and possessing it for the purpose of trafficking following a fire at an industrial complex containing a clandestine drug lab.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellant's fingerprint on a pop can found in the unit and a cell phone found in the lab that the trial judge concluded belonged to the appellant.

The phone contained incriminating evidence including photographs of equipment used in methamphetamine production.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: improper reliance on certified court documents to link him to the phone, misapprehension of evidence regarding photographs on the phone, and that the conviction on the possession for trafficking count was unreasonable or insufficiently reasoned.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning and that the circumstantial evidence cumulatively supported the convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.

A lawyer was convicted of three offences arising from conversations with an undercover police officer posing as a refugee claimant.

The Crown alleged the appellant counseled the undercover officer to provide false information to immigration authorities.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, challenging the validity of the wiretap authorization on the basis of material omissions and misrepresentations in the affidavit.

The trial judge found two errors in the affidavit but concluded they would not have affected the issuance of the authorization.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's analysis was correct and her credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the circumstances warranted a significant jail term given the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's professional status.

The appellant was charged with possession of various drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

Police arrested him before obtaining a search warrant for his residence, and then denied him access to counsel for almost six hours while they obtained and executed the warrant.

The appellant immediately requested to speak to a lawyer upon arrest but was refused.

The trial judge found a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the police followed an unconstitutional routine practice of denying access to counsel whenever they intended to obtain a search warrant, without considering the specific circumstances of the case.

The court held that the evidence should have been excluded as admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from a trial decision.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's conclusion on a Garofoli application regarding a CDSA warrant for a warehouse search.

The appellant argued that the affiant failed to disclose relevant information, included inappropriate opinion, intentionally misled the authorizing judge, and that insufficient grounds existed that marijuana would be found in the warehouse.

The Court of Appeal found the ITO provided ample evidentiary basis for the conclusion that marijuana would be found at the warehouse and saw no basis to find the affiant was untruthful or provided inappropriate opinion.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence imposed did not reflect an error in principle or was otherwise unfit.

The applicant, charged with numerous drug trafficking and organized crime offences, sought a bail review under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code to vacate a detention order.

The applicant argued the justice of the peace erred in law by rejecting the proposed sureties and conflating drug trafficking with trafficking for a criminal organization.

The Superior Court found no error in law, noting the overwhelming evidence of the applicant's high-ranking position in a mafia organization and the massive scale of the drug transactions.

The court upheld the detention on both the secondary and tertiary grounds, concluding that release would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown sought an order vacating the appellant's bail pending appeal and detaining him in custody.

The appellant had been convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and production of marijuana, and was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment and two years' probation.

While on bail pending appeal, the appellant was arrested on charges of sexual assault and forcible confinement.

The Court of Appeal addressed the jurisdiction to revoke appeal bail when an appellant remains out of custody and determined that while the court cannot directly revoke bail in such circumstances, it may issue an arrest warrant under the Criminal Code provisions governing bail violations and new indictable offences committed while on release.

The applicants, charged jointly with a co-accused on one count of trafficking cocaine and one count of possession of proceeds of crime, applied for severance from the co-accused who faced numerous additional charges.

The applicants argued that the volume of evidence against the co-accused on the other counts would cause overwhelming prejudice.

The court dismissed the application, finding a strong factual and legal nexus between the counts, no real risk of moral or reasoning prejudice that could not be cured by jury instructions, and that severance would lead to an unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking and carrying a concealed weapon.

He challenged the lawfulness of his arrest for assault and the subsequent searches of his shoulder bag, arguing breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appellant also contended that the trial judge erred in finding continuity of the seized items and misapprehended defence counsel's concession regarding continuity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the arrest for assault was supported by reasonable and probable grounds based on the victim's identification, that the searches were lawful as searches incident to arrest for officer safety purposes, and that the trial judge's continuity findings were supported by the evidence despite his misunderstanding of the limited concession.

The appellant appealed from convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking in crystal methamphetamine and cocaine, possession of marihuana, and possession of proceeds of crime.

Drugs and cash were found in the appellant's apartment pursuant to a search warrant obtained in relation to alleged criminal activity by the appellant's former roommate.

The appellant claimed he did not know the drugs were in his apartment and that the cash came from legitimate sources.

The Court of Appeal rejected three grounds of appeal: that the trial judge erred in finding sufficient basis for the search warrant, that she erred in assessing the appellant's credibility, and that her reasons for conviction were insufficient.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of vacating the conviction for possession of marihuana, as the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to hear that count as a summary conviction offence.

The applicants, Marco Maone and Carlo Fazzari, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in their criminal trial.

The court applied the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases, as established in R. v. Jordan, finding the 29-month delay to the anticipated trial completion to be reasonable.

The court rejected the argument that a preferred indictment should trigger an 18-month ceiling.

It also found that Maone failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite proceedings, while Fazzari, despite some efforts, did not establish that the case took 'markedly longer' than it should have, considering the complexity of the multi-accused drug trafficking investigation.

The applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking and assault following his arrest by Toronto Parking Authority security guards in a parking lot.

For the first time on appeal, the appellant raised Charter violations by police, claiming the police illegally continued an unreasonable citizen's arrest and conducted an unlawful search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not raise new Charter issues for the first time on appeal because he had expressly conceded at trial that police had not violated his Charter rights.

The court found the appellant failed to meet the preconditions for raising new issues on appeal, including an incomplete evidentiary record and uncertainty regarding whether the failure to raise the issue was tactical.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the assault charge.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of cannabis resin following a joint trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

He appealed on three grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias based on remarks made by the trial judge in an unrelated sentencing proceeding; the trial judge's erroneous admission of a videotaped police interview as voluntary; and the trial judge's failure to conduct an inquiry into a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter when uncontradicted evidence revealed such a breach.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the bias claim and voluntariness determination were not independently fatal, the trial judge's failure to assist a self-represented accused by raising and inquiring into the Charter breach rendered the trial unfair.

A new trial was ordered.

The offender was convicted of conspiracy and attempting to import approximately 356 grams of cocaine from Costa Rica.

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the defence sought two years, noting the offender's impending deportation.

The court found the offender was a key participant in the scheme and had a prior record for drug trafficking.

The court determined a fit sentence was 35 months, but reduced it to two years less a day after applying credit for pre-sentence custody, strict house arrest, and the collateral consequence of certain deportation.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to import cocaine into Canada and attempting to import cocaine, arising from a scheme to ship packages from Costa Rica to Toronto through FedEx.

Intercepted communications demonstrated the accused’s involvement in coordinating shipments and arranging for a contact within FedEx to intercept packages before delivery.

The cocaine was discovered when two packages were intercepted in Panama, and documentary evidence from Panamanian authorities obtained under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act was tendered to prove the contents of the packages.

The court held that the foreign investigative and laboratory records were admissible under s. 36 of the MLACMA and could be relied upon for their truth after assessing their reliability and corroboration with other evidence.

The court concluded that the packages contained approximately 355 grams of cocaine and that the accused was a participant in a conspiracy to import the drug into Canada.

The Crown sought estreatment of bail after the accused absconded prior to sentencing following conviction for conspiracy to traffic GHB.

Two third-party sureties sought relief from forfeiture of their recognizances.

The court applied the discretionary factors governing relief from forfeiture, including the sureties’ diligence, financial means, relationship to the accused, and the circumstances under which the recognizances were entered.

Partial relief was granted to one surety whose supervision had been limited and whose financial circumstances had changed, while the other surety—who was the accused’s spouse and primary beneficiary of his release—was ordered to forfeit the full amount sought.

The accused’s recognizance and cash deposit were ordered forfeited to the Crown.

The accused applied to exclude intercepted communications between them from use in a search warrant information, wiretap authorization affidavit, and at trial, arguing the communications were protected by marital privilege under s.4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court held that marital communications privilege is testimonial in nature and does not prevent the interception of communications or their use in investigative affidavits, though they generally cannot be compelled in court testimony without the recipient spouse’s consent.

The accused further argued that limiting the privilege to legally married spouses violated s.15 of the Charter by excluding common-law partners.

The court found the accused had not established that their relationship was analogous to marriage and therefore they could not benefit from the privilege in any event.

The application to excise the communications was dismissed and the intercepted communications were held admissible.

The accused applied under ss. 462.34 and 462.341 of the Criminal Code for the release of $500,000 from seized currency subject to restraint and management orders to fund his legal defence in pending drug trafficking and murder proceedings.

The Crown and an intervening execution creditor opposed the application.

The court held that the applicant failed to establish that he had no other assets or means available and failed to demonstrate that no other person had a lawful ownership or possessory interest in the seized funds.

In particular, the intervenor held a registered restitution and civil judgment enforceable under the Execution Act, and another person potentially claimed an interest in the currency.

The statutory prerequisites for release of seized property were therefore not met.

The Crown applied for the forfeiture of personal property bearing the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club (HAMC) insignia seized from the residences of individual members and the Toronto clubhouse, arguing it was offence-related property under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The individual respondents had been convicted of various drug trafficking offences.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while membership in the HAMC facilitated the drug transactions by providing a trustworthy network, the physical items bearing the insignia were not used to commit the offences, nor was it proven beyond a reasonable doubt that they were intended to be used for such purposes.

The Crown applied under s.16(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for forfeiture of a motorcycle club clubhouse alleged to be offence-related property following convictions of several members for drug trafficking offences.

The court held that the clubhouse facilitated drug trafficking activities, including meetings, negotiations, and at least one drug transaction, and therefore qualified as offence-related property committed in relation to the offences.

The respondent corporation failed to establish that it was an innocent owner under s.19(3), as the property was effectively controlled by members of the organization involved in the offences.

The court also rejected relief under s.19.1(3), finding forfeiture was not disproportionate given the seriousness of the offences, the role of the property, and its fortified nature.

The Crown sought forfeiture of real property under s. 16(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act following convictions of several members of a motorcycle club for drug trafficking and conspiracy offences.

Evidence showed that the property functioned as the clubhouse and operational hub for members involved in trafficking cocaine, oxycodone, and GHB, and was used for meetings, negotiations, and transactions connected to those offences.

The court held that trial evidence from the related criminal proceedings could be relied upon in the forfeiture hearing and concluded that the property was “offence‑related property” because it facilitated networking and discussions integral to the drug trafficking activities.

The respondent corporation failed to establish that it was an innocent owner or that it was sufficiently separate from the convicted offenders, many of whom were de facto shareholders or controlling members of the organization.

The court further held that forfeiture was not disproportionate given the seriousness, scale, and commercial nature of the offences and the fortified nature of the property.