Jeremy Streeter

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing it was unfit and challenging the pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was at the high end of the range but noted no error in principle, given the appellant's lengthy criminal record and the aggravating factor of committing the offence with his son.

The court also deferred to the trial judge's determination of pre-trial custody credit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions for cocaine trafficking, arguing that the motion judge's conduct raised a reasonable apprehension of bias and that various production orders, warrants, and wiretap authorizations were invalid.

They also argued that the search of a Blackberry was unreasonable and that intercepted communications were protected by spousal communication privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, upholding the validity of the warrants and authorizations under the Garofoli standard, and concluding that spousal communication privilege does not extend to common-law spouses.

The offender was convicted of conspiracy and attempting to import approximately 356 grams of cocaine from Costa Rica.

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the defence sought two years, noting the offender's impending deportation.

The court found the offender was a key participant in the scheme and had a prior record for drug trafficking.

The court determined a fit sentence was 35 months, but reduced it to two years less a day after applying credit for pre-sentence custody, strict house arrest, and the collateral consequence of certain deportation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the application judge erred in admitting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Police had entered his apartment after a break-in and searched kitchen drawers to find identifying information, discovering drugs and a gun.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the police conduct was an error in judgment rather than bad faith, and that the evidence should not be excluded under the Grant test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to import cocaine into Canada and attempting to import cocaine, arising from a scheme to ship packages from Costa Rica to Toronto through FedEx.

Intercepted communications demonstrated the accused’s involvement in coordinating shipments and arranging for a contact within FedEx to intercept packages before delivery.

The cocaine was discovered when two packages were intercepted in Panama, and documentary evidence from Panamanian authorities obtained under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act was tendered to prove the contents of the packages.

The court held that the foreign investigative and laboratory records were admissible under s. 36 of the MLACMA and could be relied upon for their truth after assessing their reliability and corroboration with other evidence.

The court concluded that the packages contained approximately 355 grams of cocaine and that the accused was a participant in a conspiracy to import the drug into Canada.

The accused brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence obtained through covert police entries and searches authorized by a general warrant in a drug trafficking investigation.

The court applied the confidential informant framework and held that the tip was sufficiently compelling, the informant had some demonstrated credibility, and police investigation provided adequate corroboration.

Although parts of the ITO were excised and certain omissions and inclusions were criticized, the court found the remaining record still provided a sufficient basis for the issuing justice to authorize the warrant.

No s. 8 Charter breach was established, and the exclusion application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari, which sought to quash his committal for trial on drug trafficking charges.

He argued the preliminary inquiry judge lost jurisdiction by refusing to grant a further adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the preliminary inquiry judge's refusal was a reasonable exercise of discretion and that the appellant had been afforded fairness and natural justice throughout the lengthy proceedings.

Following a traffic stop, police arrested the accused on an outstanding civil bench warrant and located cocaine during a warrantless search.

The central issue on the blended voir dire was whether the Crown proved that the seizure occurred during a lawful search incident to arrest, rather than during an unauthorized inventory search of the vehicle.

The court held that contradictory police testimony and inadequate notes prevented the Crown from establishing on a balance of probabilities that the search was lawfully connected to the arrest.

A section 8 Charter breach was found, the drugs were ruled inadmissible, and the charge was dismissed.

The Crown sought estreatment of bail after the accused absconded prior to sentencing following conviction for conspiracy to traffic GHB.

Two third-party sureties sought relief from forfeiture of their recognizances.

The court applied the discretionary factors governing relief from forfeiture, including the sureties’ diligence, financial means, relationship to the accused, and the circumstances under which the recognizances were entered.

Partial relief was granted to one surety whose supervision had been limited and whose financial circumstances had changed, while the other surety—who was the accused’s spouse and primary beneficiary of his release—was ordered to forfeit the full amount sought.

The accused’s recognizance and cash deposit were ordered forfeited to the Crown.

The accused applied to exclude intercepted communications between them from use in a search warrant information, wiretap authorization affidavit, and at trial, arguing the communications were protected by marital privilege under s.4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court held that marital communications privilege is testimonial in nature and does not prevent the interception of communications or their use in investigative affidavits, though they generally cannot be compelled in court testimony without the recipient spouse’s consent.

The accused further argued that limiting the privilege to legally married spouses violated s.15 of the Charter by excluding common-law partners.

The court found the accused had not established that their relationship was analogous to marriage and therefore they could not benefit from the privilege in any event.

The application to excise the communications was dismissed and the intercepted communications were held admissible.

The accused applied under ss. 462.34 and 462.341 of the Criminal Code for the release of $500,000 from seized currency subject to restraint and management orders to fund his legal defence in pending drug trafficking and murder proceedings.

The Crown and an intervening execution creditor opposed the application.

The court held that the applicant failed to establish that he had no other assets or means available and failed to demonstrate that no other person had a lawful ownership or possessory interest in the seized funds.

In particular, the intervenor held a registered restitution and civil judgment enforceable under the Execution Act, and another person potentially claimed an interest in the currency.

The statutory prerequisites for release of seized property were therefore not met.

The Crown applied for the forfeiture of personal property bearing the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club (HAMC) insignia seized from the residences of individual members and the Toronto clubhouse, arguing it was offence-related property under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The individual respondents had been convicted of various drug trafficking offences.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while membership in the HAMC facilitated the drug transactions by providing a trustworthy network, the physical items bearing the insignia were not used to commit the offences, nor was it proven beyond a reasonable doubt that they were intended to be used for such purposes.

The appellant appealed his sentence.

The Crown agreed that the sentence appeal should be allowed and the sentence reduced to 15 months, which equated to the time the appellant had already served.

The Court of Appeal agreed and allowed the appeal on that basis.

The appellant was convicted of importing over 20 kilograms of marijuana after arriving at Pearson International Airport from Jamaica.

She appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly took judicial notice of common practices in drug importation cases to reject her credibility.

She also appealed her 18-month custodial sentence, seeking a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the trial judge properly relied on his experience and common sense in assessing credibility, and that the custodial sentence was appropriate given the commercial quantity of drugs and the need for deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and breach of probation.

The trial judge had found that as the operator of the vehicle, the appellant had prima facie de facto possession of its contents unless there was evidence to the contrary.

The Court of Appeal held this was an error in law, as it impermissibly transferred the burden of proof to the accused and created a rebuttable presumption not found in common law or statute.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown applied under s.16(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act for forfeiture of a motorcycle club clubhouse alleged to be offence-related property following convictions of several members for drug trafficking offences.

The court held that the clubhouse facilitated drug trafficking activities, including meetings, negotiations, and at least one drug transaction, and therefore qualified as offence-related property committed in relation to the offences.

The respondent corporation failed to establish that it was an innocent owner under s.19(3), as the property was effectively controlled by members of the organization involved in the offences.

The court also rejected relief under s.19.1(3), finding forfeiture was not disproportionate given the seriousness of the offences, the role of the property, and its fortified nature.

The Crown sought forfeiture of real property under s. 16(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act following convictions of several members of a motorcycle club for drug trafficking and conspiracy offences.

Evidence showed that the property functioned as the clubhouse and operational hub for members involved in trafficking cocaine, oxycodone, and GHB, and was used for meetings, negotiations, and transactions connected to those offences.

The court held that trial evidence from the related criminal proceedings could be relied upon in the forfeiture hearing and concluded that the property was “offence‑related property” because it facilitated networking and discussions integral to the drug trafficking activities.

The respondent corporation failed to establish that it was an innocent owner or that it was sufficiently separate from the convicted offenders, many of whom were de facto shareholders or controlling members of the organization.

The court further held that forfeiture was not disproportionate given the seriousness, scale, and commercial nature of the offences and the fortified nature of the property.

The accused were charged with importing approximately 30 kilograms of cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

They brought pre‑trial applications seeking exclusion of statements, cell phone evidence, and evidence obtained during a residential search, alleging multiple Charter breaches including violations of ss. 10(b) and 8.

The court found serious breaches including delays in implementing the right to counsel, police questioning prior to consultation with counsel, failure to ensure the accused understood their rights due to language barriers, and unlawful warrantless searches of a cell phone.

The unlawfully obtained phone evidence formed a central basis for a search warrant; once excised from the Information to Obtain, the warrant could not stand.

Applying the framework from R v Grant, the court excluded the accused’s statements and the cell phone evidence, resulting in exclusion of all derivative evidence from the residential search.

The accused, charged with importing cocaine, brought pre-trial motions challenging the admissibility of their statements to police, the lawfulness of a cell phone search incident to arrest, and the validity of a search warrant for a residence.

The court found multiple breaches of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel, including delays in facilitating access, eliciting evidence prior to access, and failing to ensure comprehension given language barriers.

The court also held that the warrantless search of the accused's cell phone contents incident to arrest violated s. 8 of the Charter, as cell phones attract a high expectation of privacy requiring prior judicial authorization absent exigent circumstances.

The determination of remedies under s. 24(2) was deferred.

The appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of trafficking cocaine and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

He appealed his convictions, arguing his guilty pleas were invalid because he was experiencing hypoglycaemia from Type 1 diabetes at the time.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing it offended the principle of parity compared to his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no evidence he was unwell and noting his active participation in the plea proceedings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant was higher in the chain of command, on parole at the time, and the sentence was based on a joint submission.