COURT FILE NO.: CR-10-90000770-0000
DATE: 20121129
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Applicant
- and -
Douglas Myles, John Neal, Larry Pooler, Rod Barry, Robin Moulton, David Blackwood, Lorne Campbell, Merhdad Bahman, Mohamed Ghafurean and Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation
Respondents
Faiyaz Alibhai and Jeremy Streeter, for the Applicant
Joseph W. Irving, for the Respondent Douglas Myles
Monte T. G. MacGregor, for the Respondents John Neal, David Blackwood and Robin Moulton
Allan Mintz, for the Respondent Rod Barry
R. Craig Bottomley, for the Respondent Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation,
Larry Pooler, Appearing in Person
No one appearing for the Respondents Lorne Campbell, Merhdad Bahman and Mohamed Ghafurean
HEARD: September 11, 2012
Forestell J.
DECISION ON FORFEITURE APPLICATION:
Items with the HAMC Insignia
The Application
[1] This application is brought by the applicant pursuant to ss. 16(1) and 16(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 (“CDSA”), for the forfeiture of various items seized from the residences of certain individual members of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club (“HAMC” or the “Club”) and from the Downtown Toronto HAMC clubhouse at 498 Eastern Avenue. A separate hearing was held to determine the forfeiture application with respect to the clubhouse property. On June 7, 2012, I ordered the forfeiture of the clubhouse property.[^1]
[2] All of the items that are the subject of this remaining portion of the application were seized by the police on April 4, 2007 at the conclusion of an 18-month police investigation when numerous search warrants were executed at private residences and at the HAMC clubhouse in Toronto. The property is itemized in the schedules to the application and need not be comprehensively detailed in these reasons. The property includes black leather vests with the HAMC insignia for each of the individuals, t-shirts, jewelry, club photos, calendars, belt buckles, and toques. All of the items bear the insignia of the HAMC.
[3] It is not disputed that the Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation (the “Corporation”) owns the trademark for the insignia.
[4] The evidence at trial was that only HAMC members are permitted to wear the HAMC insignia.
The Parties
[5] The individual respondents, Douglas Myles, John Neal, Larry Pooler, Rod Barry, Robin Moulton, and David Blackwood, oppose the application for forfeiture of the items seized from their respective residences. The respondent, Lorne Campbell, was served with notice of the application and has not responded to the application. The respondents, Merhdad Bahman and Mohamed Ghafurean, were in custody on the return date for the application. Because they had not responded to the application, they were brought to court. They both indicated that they had no personal interest in the items seized and had no interest in participating in the application.
[6] The Corporation appeared through counsel to claim an interest in all of the items seized – the items in the personal residences of the individuals and the items in the Toronto clubhouse. As will be discussed further, the Corporation argued that any item with the trademarked insignia of the HAMC is the property of the Corporation.[^2]
[7] The individual respondents have each been convicted of one or more designated substance offences. Mr. Bahman, Mr. Neal, Mr. Myles, Mr. Pooler, and Mr. Campbell were tried together in a seven-month jury trial. They were found guilty on May 21, 2011, of the following offences:
Merhdad Bahman: trafficking in cocaine, trafficking in GHB, possession of proceeds of crime, conspiracy to traffic in GHB, and possession of GHB for the purpose of trafficking;[^3]
John Neal: conspiracy to traffic in GHB;
Douglas Myles: conspiracy to traffic in GHB, trafficking in cocaine, and possession of proceeds of crime;
Larry Pooler: trafficking in oxycodone, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession of a restricted firearm; and
Lorne Campbell: conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.
[8] The remaining four individual respondents were found guilty of the following designated substance offences in separate proceedings:
Rod Barry entered guilty pleas to two counts of trafficking in cocaine and two counts of possession of proceeds;
Robin Moulton entered guilty pleas to possession of a loaded restricted firearm and to two counts of trafficking in cocaine;
David Blackwood entered guilty pleas to trafficking in cocaine and failing to comply with a probation order; and
Mohammed Ghafurean entered guilty pleas to trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime.
[9] All of the individual respondents in this application were members of the HAMC. All of the drug trafficking transactions occurred between members of the HAMC. The members of the GHB conspiracy were all members of the HAMC.
[10] Mr. Bahman, Mr. Neal, Mr. Myles, Mr. Pooler, and Mr. Campbell were all charged with criminal organization charges. At trial, the Crown called Sgt. Ken Davis, who was qualified as an expert to testify as to the membership process of the HAMC, the activities of the Club, and the significance of the HAMC symbols. Dave Atwell, the police agent who was involved in the drug transactions testified as to the nature of the HAMC, its rules, membership, activities, and symbols. The jury acquitted Mr. Bahman, Mr. Neal, Mr. Myles, Mr. Pooler, and Mr. Campbell of all criminal organization charges.
[11] Mr. Barry, Mr. Moulton, Mr. Blackwood, and Mr. Ghafurean were not convicted of any criminal organization charges. When sentencing Mr. Barry, Otter J. found that there was no evidence to suggest that the offence was committed in association with or for the benefit of the HAMC.
Evidence
[12] In support of its application, the applicant relies upon a lengthy application record and the evidence called at trial. For the reasons set out in my related decision on the forfeiture of the HAMC clubhouse (Old Navy Property Corp.), I find that the evidence called at trial in support of the findings of guilt is admissible at the forfeiture hearing, and that I must rely on the trial evidence to make the relevant factual findings on this application. These findings must also be consistent with the verdicts.
[13] The evidence relied upon by the applicant is the evidence at trial and the evidence set out in the record on this application concerning the general rules and operations of the HAMC and the role that the Club played in the offences committed by the individual respondents. The evidence may be broadly summarized as follows:
• The evidence of the police agent Dave Atwell: membership in the HAMC provided a network of contacts in the drug trade. His status in the HAMC meant that he was trusted by other members and by drug dealers outside the Club. This was because membership in the Club meant that he was not a police officer or former police officer, and that he was not permitted to go to the police to report on others. It also meant that he was bound by a rule against “rip-offs”.
• The evidence of the expert witness Pedro Diaz, a police officer: kilogram level drug deals require a high level of trust and a connection between the parties to the transactions.
• The evidence of Ken Davis, an expert on the HAMC: Sgt. Davis testified as to the membership rules, the “no rip-off” rule and the rule against making reports to the police. He testified that membership in the HAMC provides a network of contacts for drug trade.
The Statutory Framework
[14] Offence-related property is defined in s. 2(1) of the CDSA as follows:
“offence-related property” means, with the exception of a controlled substance, any property, within or outside Canada,
(a) by means of or in respect of which a designated substance offence is committed,
(b) that is used in any manner in connection with the commission of a designated substance offence, or
(c) that is intended for use for the purpose of committing a designated substance offence
[15] Section 16(1)(b)(ii) of the CDSA provides as follows:
Subject to sections 18 to 19.1, where a person is convicted of a designated substance offence and, on application of the Attorney General, the court is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that any property is offence-related property and that the offence was committed in relation to that property, the court shall…order that the property be forfeited to Her Majesty in right of Canada and disposed of by such member of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada as may be designated for the purposes of this subparagraph in accordance with the law.
[16] Section 16(2) provides for discretionary forfeiture if the court is not satisfied that the offence or offences were committed in relation to the property but the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the property is offence-related property. Section 16(2) reads as follows:
Subject to sections 18 to 19.1, where the evidence does not establish to the satisfaction of the court that the designated substance offence of which a person has been convicted was committed in relation to property in respect of which an order of forfeiture would otherwise be made under subsection (1) but the court is satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that that property is offence-related property, the court may make an order of forfeiture under subsection (1) in relation to that property.
[17] Section 19 provides as follows:
Before making an order under subsection 16(1) or 17(2) in relation to any property, a court shall require notice in accordance with subsection (2) to be given to, and may hear, any person who, in the opinion of the court, appears to have a valid interest in the property.
(3) Where a court is satisfied that any person, other than
(a) a person who was charged with a designated substance offence, or
(b) a person who acquired title to or a right of possession of the property from a person referred to in paragraph (a) under circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference that the title or right was transferred for the purpose of avoiding the forfeiture of the property,
is the lawful owner or is lawfully entitled to possession of any property or any part of any property that would otherwise be forfeited pursuant to an order made under subsection 16(1) or 17(2) and that the person appears innocent of any complicity in an offence referred to in paragraph (a) or of any collusion in relation to such an offence, the court may order that the property or part be returned to that person.
[18] In Old Navy Property Corp., I set out some of the legal principles to be applied in the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the CDSA. For convenience I set out those paragraphs below:
[44] The question of whether property is offence-related property is properly considered in the larger context of the legislative scheme and its objectives. In Scotia Mortgage Corp. v. Leung, 2006 BCSC 846, at paragraphs 18 -22, Chief Justice Brenner of the British Columbia Supreme Court described both the process and intent of the forfeiture scheme set out under the CDSA:
“Section 16 of the CDSA sets out the provisions dealing with the forfeiture of offence-related property. It was submitted by the Attorney General on this application and I agree that the overall intent of the forfeiture scheme is "to ensure that offence-related property is not returned to the offender and the interests of innocent third parties and persons with valid interests in the property are protected”.
It is clear that the forfeiture scheme under the CDSA serves three purposes. First, forfeiture punishes the offender by taking away the property that was used in the commission of the designated substance offence. Second, forfeiture is a deterrent in the sense that it “raises the stakes” by imposing a “very real cost” to those who either use, or permit their property to be used, in the commission of a designated substance offence. Third, forfeiture ensures that the property is no longer available for continued use in criminal activities: (see Canada (Attorney General) v. Huynh, [2005] B.C.J. No. 2168, 2005 BCPC 431.
After an offender has been convicted of a designated substance offence the Attorney General may apply for forfeiture of offence-related property. Under section 16(1) of the CDSA the court must order forfeiture where the Attorney General establishes on a balance of probabilities that the property is offence-related property in relation to which the designated substance offence was committed. Under section 16(2) the court may order forfeiture where the Attorney General establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the property is offence-related property, although not in relation to the specific designated substance offence of which the offender has been convicted.
Section 19 of the CDSA addresses the rights of an innocent owner or other person who may have a valid interest in the offence-related property. Section 19 contemplates the return of restrained property that would otherwise be forfeited. The considerations for such a return take place in the context of the forfeiture hearing. Section 19(1) provides that any person appearing to have a valid interest in offence-related property is to receive notice of the forfeiture proceedings.
Subsection 19(3) of the CDSA provides for the return of property that would otherwise be forfeited to the lawful owner or the person lawfully entitled to possession of the property in circumstances where the owner or the person lawfully entitled to possession is not the offender or a person who acquired possession of the property from the offender for the purpose of avoiding forfeiture of the property, and where the owner or the person lawfully entitled to the possession of the property appears to be innocent of complicity or collusion with respect to the offence. Section 19(3) would apply in circumstances where the innocent person is a co-owner in the property, such as a joint tenant or a tenant-in-common.”
[45] Similarly, some applicable legal principles in the s. 16(1) analysis were summarized by Hill J. in R. v. Cook, 2010 ONSC 5155, [2010] O.J. No. 4413,at paras.39-45,as follows:
The C.D.S.A. procedures for the forfeiture of offence-related property are distinct and independent of conventional sentencing principles and concerns such as those set out in Part XXIII of the Criminal Code: Regina v. Craig, 2009 SCC 23, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 762 at paras. 48-9.
While a forfeiture order may have a punitive impact on an offender, it is also aimed at taking offence-related property out of circulation and rendering it unavailable for future designated substance offences: Craig, at paras. 22, 44. The forfeiture regime is also intended to confront organized crime as it focuses on the property itself and its role in past and future crime: Craig, at paras. 40-1. In R. v. Wu, 2010 BCCA 366 at para. 36, the court stated:
The purposes of the forfeiture provisions in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act include taking the profit out of the production and trafficking of drugs. There is also a punitive aspect to the effect of a forfeiture order. There is also a preventive aspect, as the tools of the crime are removed from the criminal.
Pursuant to s. 16 of the C.D.S.A., the applicant for forfeiture must demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the designated substance offence was "committed in relation" to what is asserted to be offence-related property. The "committed in relation to" language anticipates proof of at least one of the connections described in paras. (a) to (c) of the s. 2 C.D.S.A. definition of “offence-related property”.
[46] The authors of the legal text Money Laundering & Proceeds of Crime describe the breadth of the CDSA definition of offence-related property as follows:
“The reach of offence-related property in both the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act is extremely broad, in terms of both the definition’s linguistic and geographic scope. … It is difficult to imagine anything in any way related to the commission (or intended commission) of a criminal offence that would not be caught in the definition’s dragnet.”
This characterization of offence-related property has been adopted in R. v. Adamson, 2007 BCSC 745 at para. 53, and in R. v. Nikitczuk, 2009 CanLII 29911 (Ont SCJ) at para. 16.
[47] The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Craig, 2009 SCC 23, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 762, considered the legislative history of the relevant sections of the CDSA and the definition of offence-related property in the context of the remedial sections of the legislation. Abella J. writing for the majority acknowledged the expansive definition of offence-related property enacted as part of the 2001 amendments to the legislation. She observed that s. 19.1(3) proportionality test was adopted “to counterbalance the potentially harsh effects of extending the definition of offence-related property without qualification to all real property.” (paragraph 22)
[48] While s. 16(1) requires not only that the property be ‘offence-related property” but also that the offence be committed ‘in relation to the property’, the courts have interpreted “in relation to” to mean merely that the property is connected to the offence. It need not be ‘integral’ to the offence. (see R. v. Cook, supra, R. v. Kopp, 2011 MBPC 74, R. v. Paziuk, 2007 SKCA 63)
Positions of the Parties
[19] The position of the applicant is:
That all items are subject to mandatory forfeiture under s. 16(1). The Court should be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the HAMC insignia make the items offence-related property by identifying the possessors as members of the HAMC and as trustworthy drug traffickers. The drug transactions were all conducted between members of the HAMC based on the trust relationship, and therefore, the offences were committed in relation to any property bearing the insignia of the HAMC; or,
That even if the offences were not committed in relation to the property, all items are subject to forfeiture under s. 16(2). The Court should be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the items are offence-related property because they identify the possessors as members of the HAMC, and therefore, as trustworthy drug dealers. As a result, all of the items are intended to be used for the purpose of committing a designated substance offence.
[20] The applicant has argued this application on the basis that all of the items should be forfeited on the grounds that they symbolize the HAMC. The applicant has made no distinction between items displayed at the clubhouse, items worn by members, or items held in private homes. The position of the applicant is that the actual use of the items is not significant. It is the symbolism of membership that is significant.
[21] The respondents take the position that in order for the property to be subject to forfeiture under s. 16(1), there must be a more direct connection between the property and the designated substance offence. Symbolism, it is argued, is insufficient. With respect to s. 16(2), the respondents argue that the applicant has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual items meet the definition of offence-related property.
[22] Alternatively, the Corporation argues that if the Court would otherwise order forfeiture, the Corporation is a lawful owner, innocent of complicity in the offences, and the property should be returned to the Corporation pursuant to s. 19 of the CDSA.
The Issues
[23] The issues to be determined in this application are as follows:
Has the applicant proven on a balance of probabilities that the property is offence-related property in relation to which the designated substance offences were committed, and therefore, subject to mandatory forfeiture under s. 16(1)?
If the answer to question 1 is no: Has the applicant proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the property is offence-related property, and therefore, subject to discretionary forfeiture under s. 16(2)?
If the answer to questions 1 or 2 is yes: Is the Corporation a lawful owner of the property and innocent of complicity in the offences?
1. Has the applicant proven on a balance of probabilities that the property is offence-related property in respect of which the designated substance offences were committed, and therefore, subject to mandatory forfeiture under s. 16(1)?
[24] There was little dispute at trial as to the rules of the HAMC and the requirements for membership. I find that police officers and former police officers were not allowed to be members. I find that there was a “no rip-off” rule and there was a rule against reporting matters to the police or testifying against a person.
[25] There existed practices of sharing information about police surveillance and investigations between HAMC chapters, and there was security in place to prevent infiltration of the organization by police agents.
[26] The evidence also disclosed, and I find, that there was a rule that members were not permitted to wear HAMC insignia when committing offences.
[27] The evidence at the trial before me easily supports the conclusion on a balance of probabilities that membership in the HAMC was of benefit to drug dealers. The evidence demonstrates that membership in the HAMC provided vendors of illegal drugs with a relatively trustworthy pool of clients. Membership provided purchasers of illegal drugs with trustworthy vendors. I use the word “trustworthy” to mean persons who were less likely to be police, to speak to the police, and to “cheat” on a deal. In sum, membership in the HAMC was of benefit to individuals who wished to sell or buy drugs because of the rules and practices of the Club and the requirements for membership.
[28] There is no dispute that the respondents in this case were all members of the HAMC at the time of the commission of the designated substance offences. Mr. Atwell, the police agent and purchaser in the trafficking offences was, at the time, also a member.
[29] The disputed property in this case, both from the clubhouse and from the individual residences, includes clothing, jewelry, photographs, calendars and other paraphernalia that bear insignia of the HAMC.
[30] The insignia of the HAMC was protected by trademark and was to be worn, possessed or displayed only by HAMC members.
[31] I find that the fact of membership in the HAMC on the part of the offenders and the police agent was a factor in the commission of the designated substance offences. The vendors of the substances trusted Mr. Atwell, at least in part, because of his status as a HAMC member.
[32] While I make no specific finding as to whether, on the record before me, the applicant has proven that the HAMC, including the downtown Toronto chapter, was a criminal organization as defined by the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, I find that one of the purposes of the organization was to provide a safe environment for members to conduct drug transactions. This conclusion is based on the rules and practices of the Club, and the requirements for membership.
[33] While membership in the Club was clearly “used” to commit the offences, membership cannot be equated with the symbols of membership. This is not a case where any item bearing a symbol of membership was used to extort or intimidate. No item bearing a symbol of membership was used as an assurance of trustworthiness. The participants in the transactions knew each other to be members and had no need of such property as a sign of membership.
[34] Considering the definition of “offence-related property” and the provision for mandatory forfeiture in s. 16(1) of the CDSA in the context of the broader legislative scheme, I am not able to conclude that the designated substance offences were “committed in relation to” the property. In my view, s. 16(1) is intended to apply to specific property that is connected to specific designated offences. In this case, membership was used to commit the offences but the property was not used to commit the offences.
[35] Therefore, I find that the applicant has not proven on a balance of probabilities that the property was offence-related property in respect of which any of the designated substance offences were committed. The next question is whether the applicant has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the property is offence-related property.
2. Has the applicant proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the property is offence-related property, and therefore, subject to discretionary forfeiture under s. 16(2)?
[36] Section 16(2) does not require a connection to a designated substance offence for which the offender has been convicted. It does require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the property meets the definition of offence-related property. Therefore the applicant must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the property in question is property,
(a) by means of or in respect of which a designated substance offence is committed,
(b) that is used in any manner in connection with the commission of a designated substance offence, or
(c) that is intended for use for the purpose of committing a designated substance offence
[37] Section 16(2) is not aimed at capturing property that was used in an offence for which the offender has been convicted. Rather, the intent of s. 16(2) is to capture property that was used in the commission of a designated substance offence that did not result in conviction, or property that was intended to be used for the purpose of committing a designated offence.
[38] Pardu J. in R. v. Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation,[^4] found that personal property seized from the homes of individual accused and from HAMC clubhouses in Ontario bearing the trademarked insignia of the HAMC was offence-related property and subject to forfeiture under s. 16(2) of the CDSA.
[39] The application in that case was made after the conviction of various members of the HAMC for trafficking and for criminal organization offences. Pardu J. relied upon the trial judge’s finding that the HAMC was a criminal organization. Pardu J. found that the items of clothing and jewelry were, in a broad sense, intended to be used for the commission of indictable offences because the items advanced the objectives of the criminal organization.
[40] As set out above, it is not open to me to conclude that the offences in this case were committed in association with a criminal organization. Such a finding would be in conflict with the verdicts in each of the underlying cases. Unlike the case of R. v. Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation, none of the individual respondents in this case was convicted of a criminal organization offence. While membership in the Club played a role in the commission of the offences because of the status of the participants to the transactions, there is no connection between the symbols of membership and any offences.
[41] In R. v. Sansalone[^5], Clark J. dismissed the application for forfeiture of HAMC bric-a-brac where the offender had not been convicted of any criminal organization charge and the seized property had not been used in any offence. Clark J. observed that the ‘reputation’ of the HAMC was distinct from the tangible property bearing the insignia of the club.
[42] I agree with Clark J. that the reputation of the HAMC cannot be equated with the items of personal property bearing the insignia of the HAMC.
[43] I accept that there is a possibility that such items could be used to intimidate or extort. I accept that there is a possibility that the items could be used to prove the possessor’s membership in the HAMC and to therefore facilitate a drug transaction. However, the items that are the subject of this application were not used for those purposes and I cannot conclude that the items were intended to be used for those purposes. The items all have legitimate purposes as clothing, jewelry, calendars etc. A mere possibility of use to advance a criminal objective is not sufficient to satisfy the test in s. 16(2) of the CDSA. I cannot conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that items such as the HAMC clothing, jewelry, calendars and photographs that are the subject of this part of the forfeiture application were intended to be used to commit indictable offences.
[44] Therefore, I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the disputed property is offence-related property.
The Interest of the Respondent Corporation
[45] In light of my conclusions with respect to s. 16(1) and s. 16(2), it is unnecessary for me to consider whether the Corporation is a lawful owner of the property and innocent of complicity in the offences. That question only arises if I would otherwise order forfeiture of the property under s. 16(1) of the CDSA. However, had I decided to order forfeiture under s.16(1) I would not have granted relief from forfeiture under s. 19 in favour of the corporation.
[46] The evidence at trial supports the conclusion that members were encouraged to sign licence agreements that indicated that the Corporation was the owner of all property bearing the HAMC insignia, and that indicated that the Corporation granted the individual the right to use and possess the property as long as he remained a member of the Club.
[47] Mr. Atwell, testified that he signed a licence agreement. A copy of that agreement was an exhibit at the trial of some of the respondents. The agreement was signed by Mr. Atwell and witnessed by Mr. Myles. There is a signature line for the Corporation, but there is no signature on behalf of the Corporation.
[48] The Corporation relies on the licence agreements as the basis for its interest in all of the property that is the subject of the forfeiture application. However, the Corporation has not produced any signed licence agreements for the individuals from whom the items were seized. The Corporation has not produced any licence agreement executed by the Corporation.
[49] I am not satisfied that the respondent Corporation is the lawful owner of any of the disputed property.
Decision
[50] The application for the forfeiture of the personal property bearing the name or insignia of the HAMC is dismissed.
Forestell J.
Released: November 29, 2012
COURT FILE NO.: CR-10-90000770-0000
DATE: 20121129
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Applicant
- and -
Douglas Myles, John Neal, Larry Pooler, Rod Barry, Robin Moulton, David Blackwood, Lorne Campbell, Merhdad Bahman, Mohamed Ghafurean and Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation
Respondents
DECISION ON FORFEITURE APPLICATION:
Items with the HAMC Insignia
Forestell J.
Released: November 29, 2012**
[^1]: R. v. Old Navy Property Corp., [2012] O.J. No. 2660 (S.C.). [^2]: Section 19 of the CDSA requires that before an order is made under s. 16(1), notice must be given to, and the court may hear, any person who, in the opinion of the court, appears to have a valid interest in the property. The validity of the interest of the Corporation in the property only arises if the court would otherwise make the order of forfeiture. [^3]: Mr. Bahman entered guilty pleas to trafficking in GHB and cocaine, and to possession of proceeds of crime. He was found guilty by the jury of conspiracy to traffic in GHB and possession of GHB for the purpose of trafficking. [^4]: (2009), 2009 CanLII 53152 (ON SC), 246 C.C.C. (3d) 559 (Ont. S.C.). [^5]: [2011] O.J. No. 5774 (S.C.)at paras. 80-83