Eleanore A. Cronk

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their personal injury claim against the Toronto Transit Commission after a slip and fall at a transit station.

The motion judge found no objective evidence of a hazard on the stairs and concluded the TTC met its statutory duty of care as an occupier.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the summary judgment test or his reliance on the uncontradicted evidence regarding the condition of the stairs and the TTC's maintenance practices.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent bank amounts owing on a mortgage and line of credit, leave to issue a writ of possession, and dismissing their counterclaim.

The appellants admitted indebtedness but argued they had an arrangement with the respondent's employees to make mortgage payments using funds from a third-party loan.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, as the appellants led no evidence to contradict the respondent's evidence of default, including property tax arrears.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment dismissing their application for a refund of $13,000 plus interest.

The respondent argued the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal agreed and quashed the appeal, holding that under s. 19(1.2)(c) of the Courts of Justice Act, an appeal from a final order dismissing a claim for less than $50,000 lies to the Divisional Court.

The moving party sought to set aside an order denying an extension of time to appeal a trial judgment that dismissed a breach of contract claim regarding a ceiling height deficiency.

The trial judge had dismissed the claim because the plaintiffs sued the wrong corporate entity and refused to amend their pleadings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no error in the previous orders and concluding that the justice of the case did not require an extension of time.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

During the hearing, the Court of Appeal discovered the Crown had proceeded summarily at trial, meaning the court lacked jurisdiction.

Because the court had already publicly dismissed the appeal on its merits, a panel judge was authorized under s. 13 of the Courts of Justice Act to sit as a Superior Court justice to hear the matter as a summary conviction appeal.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, but the sexual assault count was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle, and the SOIRA order was varied to 10 years.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

Prior to the determination of the appeal, the parties reached a settlement.

In accordance with the agreed terms of settlement, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay costs of $5,000 to the plaintiff respondent and $5,000 to the other respondents.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment ordering him to pay retroactive and periodic child support.

The monetary amounts fell within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Because the appellant brought the matter to the wrong court and had disregarded the existing support and costs orders, the Court of Appeal declined to transfer the matter and quashed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that ordered his detention in a secure forensic unit, arguing it was inappropriately restrictive and he should have been placed in a general forensic unit.

The Court of Appeal applied the standard of review from R. v. Owen and found the disposition was not unreasonable, as the Board did not misapprehend evidence or make unsupported material findings of fact.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an 18-year-old first offender, appealed his 10-year sentence for manslaughter arising from a home invasion robbery where his partner shot the victim.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made two errors in principle: failing to properly consider the appellant's rehabilitative potential, and failing to address his level of culpability regarding foresight of the risk that the gun would be used.

The Court found the appellant had objective, but not actual, foresight of the risk, representing a lower level of culpability.

The sentence was reduced to 7 years, resulting in an effective sentence of 3 years and 8 months after pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of touching for a sexual purpose, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding delayed disclosure and alleged recovered memories.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully scrutinized the evidence, properly accounted for the historical nature of the offences, and made no palpable and overriding error in finding the complainant credible and reliable.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were responsive to the defence's argument that the complainant attempted to frame the appellant.

The Court also declined to admit the fresh evidence, concluding it could not reasonably undermine the complainant's credibility on material issues.

The appellant appealed his sentence of eight years' imprisonment for firearms offences, including possession of a loaded restricted firearm, and the denial of enhanced credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, granting 1.5:1 enhanced credit for 433 days of pre-trial custody because minor institutional misconduct did not justify an inference that the appellant would be denied statutory release.

However, the court upheld the eight-year sentence, finding it appropriate for a repeat offender whose conduct fell at the 'true crime' end of the spectrum, regardless of the trial judge's reliance on an unconstitutional mandatory minimum.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing it should be reduced to under six months to avoid significant immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis of an error in principle but found that a sentence of six months was well outside the appropriate range given the appellant's serious criminal background and numerous violations of court orders.

As immigration consequences cannot justify a sentence outside the appropriate range, and the appellant had already served the sentence, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision ordering the return of US $250,000 held in trust by the respondent law firm to the respondent client.

The appellant argued the funds were impressed with a trust in its favour and that the application judge erred in denying an adjournment to cross-examine a deponent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of a trust or escrow agreement and concluding the appellant had ample opportunity to cross-examine prior to the hearing but made a tactical decision not to do so.

The appellant, an unsuccessful plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident action, sued the opposing counsel for intrusion upon seclusion, breach of privacy, and negligence.

She alleged the lawyers improperly disclosed her medical and academic records.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that the appellant waived her privacy interests by putting her medical and academic status in issue in the underlying action.

The court also confirmed that opposing counsel owed no duty of care to the appellant.

The appellant was convicted of voyeurism after a man was seen peering into a women's washroom stall.

The Crown's case rested on circumstantial evidence, primarily the appellant's DNA found on a partially consumed pop bottle left in the stall.

The appellant appealed, arguing the verdict was unreasonable because the DNA evidence alone could not prove he was the perpetrator.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the totality of the evidence, including the DNA on the bottle and the lack of any other rational explanation for its presence, reasonably supported the conviction.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his motion to vary an existing child residency schedule to achieve equal parenting time.

The motion judge found that the father failed to establish a material change in circumstances under the Gordon v. Goertz test, despite the child's advancing age, the mother's remarriage, and the child's learning disability diagnosis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the legal test or her assessment of the evidence.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice that incorporated a settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal noted that the appellant had agreed to the terms of the settlement and later affirmed them before the lower court judge.

Finding nothing unconscionable about the agreement on the record, the Court of Appeal concluded there was no basis to interfere and dismissed the appeal with no costs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing the trial judge erred in finding police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him.

The police arrested the appellant based on a tip from a confidential informant, which was corroborated by police surveillance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the arresting officers had both subjective and objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest, applying the Debot criteria.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellants, trustees of a pension fund, sought leave under the Securities Act and certification under the Class Proceedings Act for a $4 billion class action against Kinross Gold Corporation for alleged misrepresentations regarding two gold mines.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable possibility of success for the statutory claims due to flawed expert evidence, and consequently denied certification for the common law claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the motion judge's assessment of the leave test and concluding that a class action was not the preferable procedure for the remaining common law negligent misrepresentation claims due to the need for individualized inquiries into reliance.