David M. Brown

The appellant, Terry LeBlanc, was the high bidder at a Sheriff's auction for a residential property.

His winning bid of $260,000 was less than 60% of the lowest appraised value ($320,000), leading to the sale's cancellation based on an internal Attorney General policy.

LeBlanc sued the Crown for breach of contract.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the contract permitted unilateral cancellation, section 142 of the Courts of Justice Act shielded the respondent, and equitable principles allowed declining enforcement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the auction terms, as announced and posted at the courthouse, allowed for unilateral cancellation up to the time of satisfaction of sale terms, making it unnecessary to address the other grounds.

McDonald's sought to declare North Elgin Centre Inc. (NEC) in contempt of a prior court order requiring NEC to provide "all reasonable cooperation" to obtain Planning Act consent for a renewed lease.

NEC filed a report with the Town's Committee of Adjustment proposing conditions for consent approval, which McDonald's argued was a breach.

NEC also brought a cross-motion for declaratory relief and directions.

The court dismissed McDonald's contempt motion, finding that NEC's report, including its proposed conditions, reflected legitimate concerns as the property owner and did not constitute a failure to provide "all reasonable cooperation." NEC's cross-motion was also dismissed as unnecessary given the contempt motion's dismissal, and because a single judge could not vary a panel order.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a will regarding the disposition of a cottage property and its sale proceeds.

The estate trustee sought directions on how to distribute the proceeds among the testator's grandchildren.

The motion judge ruled for equal distribution among the four surviving grandchildren.

The appellant, a grandchild, appealed, seeking a larger share based on a different interpretation of the will's clauses.

The respondents cross-appealed on the motion judge's reasoning, not the outcome.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, affirming the motion judge's decision that the proceeds should be distributed equally among the four grandchildren alive at the end of the life interests, based on the testator's intention as determined through the "armchair rule."

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal by an insurer, Co-operators General Insurance Company, finding it had no duty to defend its insureds, Family and Children’s Services of Lanark, Leeds and Grenville (FCS) and Laridae Communications Inc., against a class action and a third-party claim.

The claims arose from a data breach where a confidential report was hacked from FCS's website and posted online.

The court held that the data exclusion clauses in both the Commercial General Liability (CGL) and Professional Liability policies were unambiguous and clearly excluded coverage for claims arising from the electronic distribution or display of data.

The court rejected arguments that the exclusion clauses nullified the policies or that there were non-electronic claims, emphasizing that the substance of the claims solely related to online data dissemination.

The accused, J.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's improper use of judicial notice, including drawing on personal experience as counsel and relying on external social science research (a magazine article and parallels to battered woman syndrome from *R. v. Lavallee*), to assess the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge exceeded the proper boundaries of judicial notice and violated procedural fairness by relying on information not put into evidence or subject to submissions.

The errors materially infected the credibility findings, which were central to the trial.

The curative proviso was not applicable due to the procedural unfairness.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

This appeal concerns a defamation action initiated by AA against his former partner CC and her friend BB, following a false report to a children's aid society.

The trial judge initially found BB and CC liable for conspiracy and slander related to the initial false report, awarding $25,000.

However, the trial judge dismissed AA's claim against CC for defamatory statements made during a subsequent interview with the Society, citing qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by not assessing whether CC's statements during the interview were made with malice, which would defeat qualified privilege.

The appellate court found that CC's statements were indeed made with malice, awarded AA nominal damages of $500 for this slander, and increased AA's awarded disbursements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to use lettered names for the parties to protect the children's identities, affirming the court's inherent jurisdiction to do so.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from the Divisional Court, which had found the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal's decision unreasonable.

The case concerned the interpretation of the Pay Equity Act, specifically whether the statutory proxy method, used to establish pay equity in female-dominated workplaces, must also be used to maintain it.

The Tribunal had ruled that the proxy method was not required for maintenance, leading to an internal comparison method.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the Tribunal's interpretation was unreasonable, as it ignored the Act's purpose, scheme, and wording, which necessitate an ongoing comparison to male (or deemed male) comparators to redress systemic gender discrimination.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to specify procedures for maintaining pay equity using the proxy method.

The Participating Nursing Homes (PNH) appealed a Divisional Court decision that upheld a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal order.

The Tribunal had directed the PNH and unions to negotiate a gender-neutral comparison system (GNCS) for maintaining pay equity, specifically to address changes in job duties and ensure ongoing compliance with the Pay Equity Act.

The PNH argued that the Act did not require them to tie their maintenance obligation to the proxy employer's historical valuation of male jobs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the Tribunal's authority to ensure compliance with the Act and the necessity of ongoing comparison, including through the proxy method, to maintain pay equity.

Inzola Group Limited appealed a trial decision dismissing its claims for breach of contract and bias against the City of Brampton regarding a multi-million-dollar construction Request for Proposals (RFP).

Inzola was disqualified for breaching RFP terms, including failing to sign a confidentiality agreement, communicating outside the sole point of contact, and making public disclosures to the media.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that Inzola's breaches were fundamental and threatened the integrity of the RFP process.

The court also rejected Inzola's argument that the City breached a duty of fair and equal treatment by handling a different alleged breach by another bidder (Dominus) differently, finding Dominus's breach inconsequential compared to Inzola's.

The appeal on liability was dismissed, and leave to appeal costs was denied.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal brought by the defendants (appellants) challenging a trial judge's decision to grant specific performance of a real estate agreement and award substantial indemnity costs.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in refusing multiple adjournment requests, including those based on medical grounds, and in granting specific performance for a property they claimed was not unique.

The Court found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding adjournments, citing the appellants' history of non-compliance with court orders and lack of diligence.

It also affirmed that specific performance is not an "extraordinary remedy" and that the trial judge correctly applied the factors for its award, including the property's unique qualities and the inadequacy of damages.

The substantial indemnity costs award was also upheld due to the appellants' litigation misconduct.

This appeal concerned the equalization of net family property under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in finding that full equalization would be unconscionable and in awarding only 10% of the full equalization payment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the conclusion of unconscionability was reasonable given the short marriage, the extent to which the appellant's net family property derived from gifts from the respondent, and the disproportionate financial contributions.

The court also affirmed the trial judge's discretion in setting the unequal division at 10%, rejecting the appellant's argument for a pro-rated division based on the length of cohabitation.

This is an appeal from a trial decision in a high-conflict matrimonial litigation case where the respondent's pleadings were struck due to willful non-compliance with disclosure orders.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's approach to evidence, refusal to recognize a constructive trust, spousal support determination, denial of a vesting order, and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds, affirming the trial judge's discretion in probing evidence even in an uncontested trial, applying the net family property scheme, and exercising discretion regarding support, vesting orders, and costs.

The court also reaffirmed the principle that a party in willful default of court orders may be denied audience on appeal.

The appellant, Cary Beazley, appealed the dismissal of his 2018 action against Canada and Ontario.

This 2018 action raised substantially the same issues and pleadings as a previous 2017 action, which had been dismissed for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and whose dismissal was upheld on appeal.

The motion judge dismissed the 2018 action on the grounds of *res judicata* and abuse of process, finding the pleadings substantially identical and that the claim could not possibly succeed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, agreeing that the claim was abusive and that the motion judge properly exercised discretion under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the claim without requesting submissions.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants, proposed representative plaintiffs in a securities class action, appealed a motion judge's order that granted leave for one misrepresentation claim but denied leave for others under the Ontario Securities Act.

The primary issues on appeal concerned the motion judge's approach to determining "public correction" of alleged misrepresentations, particularly by assuming falsity and applying a narrow textual analysis without considering market context.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in principle by not engaging in a reasoned consideration of evidence regarding how alleged public corrections would be understood in the secondary market.

The Court remitted the issues of leave for capital expense/scheduling and accounting/financial reporting misrepresentations back to the lower court for redetermination, while upholding the denial of leave for certain environmental misrepresentations due to chronology issues.

The appellant purchasers appealed a summary judgment finding them in breach of an agreement of purchase and sale (APS) for refusing to close due to alleged undisclosed easements.

The purchasers argued that Schedule A of the APS imposed an unqualified duty on the vendors to provide clear title, requiring the discharge of all easements, including standard utility easements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding that Schedule A did not conflict with paragraph 10 of the standard form agreement, which excluded minor utility easements.

The court reasoned that the purchasers' interpretation would lead to an absurd commercial result, as it would require the removal of essential services.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant sought to appeal a judgment regarding the personal care of Anna Hernandez.

Anna Hernandez died before the appeal was heard, rendering the primary relief moot.

The Court of Appeal declined to hear the appeal, finding no live controversy, no public importance, and that hearing it would not be an appropriate use of judicial resources, even for incidental costs or potential implications for a passing of accounts proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed as moot.

The appellant, an employee, appealed a motion judge's order striking parts of his statement of claim in a wrongful dismissal action, which included claims against corporate directors for unpaid vacation pay under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA) and the Business Corporations Act (OBCA), and for oppression under the OBCA.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the ESA claim without leave to amend, finding the statutory preconditions were not met.

It also upheld the striking of the OBCA oppression claim with leave to amend, noting insufficient pleading of reasonable expectations.

However, the Court set aside the striking of the OBCA s. 131 claim for unpaid vacation pay without leave to amend, finding material facts were pleaded, and allowed it to proceed with amendment.

It also set aside the striking of certain paragraphs (14-23) related to the reprisal claim and varied the striking of paragraph 40, only removing irrelevant allegations.

The original costs award against the appellant was reduced to reflect his partial success on appeal.

This is an appeal of the dismissal of a medical malpractice claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for appellate review, failing to analyze essential components of the plaintiff's theory of liability and explain his findings on the standard of care.

Additionally, the trial judge erred in his contradictory treatment of a formal admission regarding the abscess location, effectively disregarding it despite having previously denied a motion to withdraw it.

This resulted in an unfair trial for the plaintiff.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Ahmed Abdullahi, appealed his convictions for gun-related and criminal organization offences, and his 12-year sentence, stemming from a police investigation ("Project Traveller").

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's admission of Somali-language translator's opinion evidence or in the jury charge regarding the criminal organization definition and flight as after-the-fact conduct.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the global sentence from 12 years to 10 years.

This reduction was due to the trial judge's error in considering the appellant's racial minority status as an aggravating factor, which the Court of Appeal deemed an improper basis for sentencing.

Justice Paciocco dissented in part on the conviction appeal, arguing that the jury charge on the definition of a criminal organization was inadequate for failing to properly instruct on the elements of structure and continuity.

The London Transit Commission (LTC) appealed a motion judge's decision to strike its third-party claim against Eaton Industries (Canada) Company (Eaton) as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

LTC argued the motion judge erred in determining when it had actual or constructive knowledge of the claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings that LTC had actual or constructive knowledge of its claim against Eaton by May 22, 2013, and failed to exercise due diligence in investigating the contamination.

The court rejected LTC's arguments regarding a general rule for discoverability in environmental claims, continuing torts, and standalone claims, and declined to consider a new argument under the Environmental Protection Act.