David M. Brown

This is an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario concerning a patient's capacity to consent to psychiatric treatment.

The appellant, diagnosed with schizophrenia, was found incapable by the Consent and Capacity Board of consenting or refusing antipsychotic medication, a decision upheld by the Superior Court.

The core issue was whether the appellant could appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decision, particularly in light of his delusional beliefs about environmental factors affecting his health.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the Board correctly applied the two-branch capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Starson v. Swayze, which requires a patient to recognize how their mental condition's manifestations affect them.

The Court found no error in the Board's factual findings or its application of the legal standard, concluding that the appellant's decision was dictated by his delusions, preventing a rational appreciation of treatment benefits.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by finding the complainant had no motive to fabricate and using this to assess her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying the distinction between a "proven absence of motive to fabricate" and an "absence of evidence of motive to fabricate." The court held that while a proven absence of motive is a high bar, the absence of evidence of motive can be considered as one factor among many in assessing credibility, provided it is not given undue weight or used to reverse the burden of proof.

The trial judge's approach was found to be consistent with established legal principles.

This appeal concerned a pre-construction agreement of purchase and sale for a condominium unit.

The vendor purported to terminate the agreement, alleging the purchasers breached a clause prohibiting leasing without consent.

The application judge found the termination wrongful and granted specific performance.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the vendor lost its right to terminate by failing to act within a reasonable time after the alleged breach.

The Court further upheld the award of specific performance, finding that damages were an inadequate remedy given the advantageous terms of the original agreement, the rising real estate market, the purchasers' tied-up deposit, and the vendor's bad faith in attempting to re-sell the unit to related parties at an undervalue.

The issue regarding the subsequent lease to tenants became moot.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a motion brought on consent.

The motion was dismissed, with costs reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

This appeal addressed the application of Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act) to a negligence claim.

Subway sued Trent University for negligence and defamation after Trent's testing of Subway's chicken products was featured on a CBC "Marketplace" broadcast.

The motion judge dismissed Trent's anti-SLAPP motion, finding the negligence claim did not arise from an expression.

The Court of Appeal allowed Trent's appeal, holding that the negligence claim did arise from an expression related to a matter of public interest.

Furthermore, the Court found that Subway's negligence claim lacked substantial merit because no duty of care existed between Trent and Subway, as there was no undertaking of responsibility by Trent in favour of Subway, nor any reliance by Subway on Trent's services or statements.

The motion judge's order was set aside, and Subway's negligence claim was dismissed.

The appellants, Subway, appealed the dismissal of their $210 million defamation action against the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) under an anti-Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (SLAPP) motion (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The action arose from a CBC Marketplace report alleging Subway's chicken products contained only 50% chicken DNA.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in applying a higher standard for the "no valid defence" test and in weighing the public interest.

The Court determined that Subway had established grounds to believe CBC had no valid defence of responsible communication and that the public interest in allowing the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression, given the significant reputational and financial harm alleged and the lack of urgency in disseminating unverified information.

The appeal was allowed, and the defamation action against CBC was permitted to continue.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking after a controlled delivery of a package containing cocaine hidden in food items.

On appeal, they argued the verdicts were unreasonable because the importation was complete before they handled the package, and that the circumstantial evidence did not prove they knew the package contained drugs.

They also argued the trial judge erred in leaving wilful blindness with the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the ultimate domestic recipient was the importer, the circumstantial evidence supported the jury's inference of knowledge, and the inherently suspicious circumstances justified the wilful blindness instruction.

The appellant sought to enforce letters of request from a Florida court to obtain documents from the former Ontario lawyers of his ex-wife and daughter for use in a Florida action for parental alienation.

The application judge dismissed the application on public policy grounds, finding it would interfere with solicitor-client privilege and client confidentiality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the hearing was procedurally fair and the application judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing to enforce the letters of request because they sought presumptively privileged documents.

The applicant applied for bail pending appeal pursuant to s. 679 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant had previously been convicted and his appeal was dismissed, but he subsequently applied to re-open his appeal against conviction to adduce fresh evidence.

Because the formal order dismissing the appeal had not been entered, the court was not functus officio and permitted the application to re-open to proceed.

The motion judge held that the original notice of appeal remained operative, granting jurisdiction under s. 679(1)(a) to consider and grant the applicant's request for bail.

The respondent sold his funeral home business to the appellant and was retained as general manager under a ten-year fixed-term contract.

Following a deterioration in the relationship, the appellant engaged in a course of conduct that included removing the respondent's company vehicle, tracking his time, and changing the locks.

The respondent went on medical leave due to depression and anxiety caused by the appellant's conduct and eventually sued for constructive dismissal.

The trial judge found the respondent was constructively dismissed and awarded damages for the remainder of the contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the employer's appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent had not condoned the conduct despite the delay in bringing the action, nor in the calculation of damages.

The plaintiffs moved for directions regarding motions for leave to file fresh evidence, seeking a sequencing protocol to determine whether the defendants' fresh evidence was protected by litigation privilege before disclosing their own fresh evidence.

The motion judge declined to order the proposed protocol, directing the parties to perfect their appeals and schedule an appeal management conference to determine the procedure.

The motion judge also granted the plaintiffs leave to file an over-length 54-page factum, but ordered them to pay $2,000 in costs for failing to seek permission beforehand.

The plaintiff brought a motion in the Court of Appeal to advance an appeal from a mortgage enforcement action, seeking to set aside a certificate of stay, dismiss the appeal, and obtain a writ of possession.

The defendants had appealed a refusal to set aside a default judgment to the wrong court and improperly obtained a certificate of stay from the registrar.

The motion judge granted the plaintiff's sole shareholder leave to represent the corporation, set aside the improperly issued certificate of stay, and ordered the defendants to perfect their appeal by a fixed date.

Requests for a writ of possession and immediate dismissal of the appeal were denied.

The applicant, convicted of firearms and drug offences and sentenced to 38 months' incarceration, applied for bail pending appeal.

The Crown conceded the first two grounds for bail but argued detention was necessary in the public interest due to public safety concerns and weak grounds of appeal.

The court found the applicant did not pose a substantial risk to public safety, noting his lack of prior record, compliance with pre-trial bail, and the circumstantial nature of the constructive possession case against him.

The court concluded the grounds of appeal were not frivolous and granted bail pending appeal with a strict perfection deadline.

The appellant appealed a spousal support order of $125,000 per month following a 24-year marriage.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the respondent's needs and means, misapplied the Halliwell principle for high-income earners, and erred in awarding indefinite support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the respondent's compensatory entitlement, needs, and means, and confirming that the trial judge properly conducted an individualized fact-specific analysis.

The plaintiffs moved for a stay of a Divisional Court order that reinstated the defendants' jury notices, pending their motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The original motion judge had struck the jury notices due to COVID-19 delays in Ottawa, but the Divisional Court overturned this, finding the decision arbitrary.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test and Sault Dock principles, the Court of Appeal granted the stay, finding a serious question to be tried regarding the Divisional Court's interference with the motion judge's discretion, irreparable harm to the plaintiffs if their scheduled judge-alone trial date was lost, and that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiffs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding them only $5,000 in damages against their former real estate lawyer for a title defect error.

The trial judge found the lawyer breached his duty of care but concluded the appellants' significant claims for reduction in property value, carrying costs, and business losses were not caused by the title defect, but rather by the appellants overpricing the property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions on causation, damages, or the exclusion of expert evidence.

The applicant, who was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference, brought motions for bail pending appeal and for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The bail application was adjourned to allow the applicant's counsel to review newly disclosed information regarding the applicant's refugee status.

The motion for the appointment of counsel was granted, as the applicant's limited English skills and the presence of an arguable ground of appeal regarding uneven scrutiny of evidence made it desirable in the interests of justice to appoint counsel.

The successful purchasers in a specific performance action moved to expedite the vendors' appeals, require security for costs, and lift the stay of the trial judge's cost order.

A non-party law firm, acting as an execution creditor, moved to intervene and delay the purchasers' motion pending a priority dispute in the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to expedite the appeals, noting the purchasers withdrew their other requests.

The intervention motion was dismissed, as the priority dispute among creditors was properly a matter for the Superior Court of Justice.

The buyers appealed a partial summary judgment declaring they breached two agreements of purchase and sale for abutting residential properties.

The buyers argued the agreements were void for contravening the subdivision control provisions of the Planning Act and that the seller tendered defective closing documents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the parties intended a simultaneous conveyance that complied with the Planning Act, and the seller's tender was valid.

Although the Court criticized the use of partial summary judgment in this context, it declined to set aside the judgment as doing so would only cause further delay and expense.

The appellant, a unionized employee of the Ontario Public Service, commenced a civil action against her employer and union alleging workplace discrimination and harassment.

The motion judge dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the essential character of the dispute arose from the collective agreement and was therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator or the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

On appeal, the appellant argued that section 46.1 of the Human Rights Code granted the court concurrent jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that section 46.1 does not override the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitrators where the dispute arises from a collective agreement and no independent civil wrong is pleaded.