David M. Brown

The appellant father, a self-represented family law lawyer, brought a motion to extend the time for perfecting his appeal concerning child support arrears, inter-party debt, and parenting time.

The respondent mother opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the appellant's delay inordinate and inadequately explained, his litigation conduct indicative of delay tactics, and the merits of his appeal very weak.

The court also ordered the appellant to pay costs to the respondent.

Donald Parker, a class member, appealed an order denying him an extension to opt out of a class proceeding.

He brought a motion seeking an extension of time to perfect his appeal and permission to include an affidavit from his counsel in the appeal book and compendium (ABC) regarding an unrecorded lower court hearing.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time to perfect the appeal and allowed the inclusion of the affidavit, finding it permissible under Rule 61.10(1)(i) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, while noting that the relevance of the affidavit would be determined by the appeal panel.

The applicant, Melissa Hart, a self-represented litigant who had previously been declared a vexatious litigant, sought an order extending the time to file a notice of appeal from the dismissal of her spousal support application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, affirming that under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act, leave from a Superior Court judge was required to appeal the spousal support claim, and that no appeal lies from a refusal to grant such leave.

The court also clarified that a vexatious litigant order under s. 140(1)(c) of the CJA includes proceedings in the Court of Appeal.

The moving parties sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a lower court order.

The motion was brought six days after the deadline.

The court applied the four-factor test for granting an extension of time: intention to appeal within the period, reasonable explanation for delay, arguable merits, and lack of prejudice to the responding parties.

The court found that the moving parties had a strong contemplation of appeal, a short and reasonable delay, and arguable issues regarding beneficial interests in the property.

No prejudice was found as the original order for sale was not automatically stayed.

The extension was granted on strict terms, including deadlines for filing and perfecting the appeal, and expedited hearing.

Despite granting the extension, the court awarded costs to the responding parties due to deficiencies in the moving parties' motion materials.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault against two young teenagers, appealed his conviction and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's credibility assessment of the complainants, specifically the use of "lack of exaggeration" as a factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's reasoning, interpreting the impugned passages as noting the absence of factors that would diminish credibility rather than using lack of exaggeration as a positive makeweight.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the imposed prison term of 8.5 years was within the appropriate range given the breach of trust and serious consequences for the victims.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

In accordance with an agreement between the parties, the appellants were ordered to pay costs to the respondents, Mandeep Dhatt and Kulwinder Dhatt, fixed at $8,200, and to the third party respondents, Jay Brijpaul and Re/Max West Realty Inc., Brokerage, fixed at $6,700.

Both amounts were inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The purchase price under the agreement of purchase and sale dated January 22, 2016, was to be reduced by the amount of these costs.

The appellant, David Joseph Lesko, appealed three aspects of a divorce order: an equalization payment to the respondent, Kelly Sue Lesko, based on her 50% interest in a pre-marriage property due to unjust enrichment; the determination of his income for support purposes; and the disallowance of his claim for credit against retroactive support for post-separation expenses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds, upholding the trial judge's findings regarding unjust enrichment, income calculation, and the discretion to deny the appellant's late-claimed expenses.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellant, AA, was previously awarded reasonable disbursements.

AA filed submissions seeking $1,382.75 in disbursements.

Respondent CC had no issue with the amount, and respondent BB did not file any submissions.

The court awarded AA the full amount of disbursements sought, payable jointly and severally by BB and CC.

The appellants, Celine and Richard Pizale, sought to appeal orders approving the sale of their partially-renovated property by a receiver and an administration order.

They argued they had an automatic right of appeal under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) or, alternatively, should be granted leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The Court of Appeal dismissed their panel review motion, affirming the chambers judge's decision that no automatic right of appeal existed as the sale approval order did not result in a loss beyond that already worked by the unappealed appointment order.

The court also found no basis to grant leave to appeal, concluding that the appeal did not raise an issue of general importance or prima facie merit, and would hinder the receivership process.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal where the appellants, though not fully successful on the merits, significantly reduced the judgment amount against them.

The court considered the parties' respective cost submissions and awarded the appellants partial indemnity costs of $10,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, while denying the respondent's request for costs.

The court did not interfere with the cost award made by the motion judge.

R.H. appealed sentences totaling six years for sexual interference, making child pornography, and accessing child pornography.

The Court of Appeal upheld the global sentence, finding no error in principle by the sentencing judge, who properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors and the principles of denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse offences.

The court, however, modified a lifetime internet prohibition order to align with previous jurisprudence and granted credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant, Darren Pearce, sought leave to appeal a five-year global sentence for aggravated assault and breach of recognizance.

The Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge erred by failing to adequately address the principle of parity between Mr. Pearce's sentence and that of his co-accused, Terrance Goodwin, who received a substantially shorter sentence for the same crime.

The court substituted a sentence of "time served" equivalent to approximately three and a half years, to achieve appropriate parity, considering Mr. Pearce's pre-sentence custody and credits.

The appellant appealed a trial decision concerning spousal support, equalization payment, imputation of income, and the dismissal of a fresh evidence motion.

The respondent cross-appealed regarding an error in the equalization calculation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal on all five grounds, affirming the trial judge's decisions on interpreter competency, lump sum child support, income imputation, spousal support, and the refusal to admit fresh evidence.

The court allowed the respondent's cross-appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by not deducting the value of a date of marriage asset from the respondent's net family property in the equalization calculations, leading to an increased equalization payment owed by the appellant.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal by Subway against the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in an anti-SLAPP motion.

Subway sought partial indemnity costs of $61,291.30.

CBC requested reconsideration of the costs award based on Supreme Court of Canada anti-SLAPP decisions (Pointes and Bent) or a reduction to $17,000.

The Court of Appeal upheld its decision to award partial indemnity costs, distinguishing the case from Bent due to the availability of substantial judicial guidance on s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act prior to CBC's motion, and the significant costs incurred by Subway.

The court awarded Subway $40,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal concerning the interpretation of a commitment letter for real estate financing and the calculation of damages.

The lender (MarshallZehr Group Inc.) terminated the commitment letter before any funds were advanced to the borrower (Ideal (BC) Developments Inc. et al.), citing the borrower's failure to satisfy initial funding conditions.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment to the lender, upholding the termination and awarding damages including a lender fee.

The appellate court affirmed the motion judge's interpretation that the cancellation provision in the commitment letter allowed for termination in the pre-closing period when no funds had been advanced.

However, the court found that the lender fee was not recoverable as the commitment letter stipulated it would be deducted from the initial advance, which never occurred.

The damages award was reduced accordingly.

This motion was brought by the appellant for a review of a single judge's decision dismissing his application for court-appointed counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was appealing his conviction and sentence for robbery and related offences, including a dangerous offender declaration.

The single judge had dismissed the application, finding little merit to the appeals and that counsel was not necessary given the straightforward nature of the grounds and the appellant's ability to present his arguments.

The panel of the Court of Appeal found no reason to differ from the single judge's conclusions and dismissed the motion for review.

The applicant sought a panel review from the Court of Appeal for Ontario of a single judge's decision refusing an extension of time to appeal a summary conviction dismissal.

The applicant had been convicted of breach of undertaking and assault.

His initial summary conviction appeal was dismissed due to a lack of transcripts.

Subsequent applications for extensions of time and panel reviews were dismissed by single judges of the Court of Appeal (MacPherson J.A. and Coroza J.A.) on grounds of unexplained delay, lack of bona fide intention to appeal, and absence of apparent merit.

The panel upheld the previous decisions, finding no error of law and no justification to depart from the prior rulings.

The application for review was dismissed.

The appellant, Andrew Bielli, appealed his conviction for possession of proceeds of crime for the benefit of a criminal organization.

The case centered on a police ruse designed to search the appellant and his vehicle without disclosing the true nature of the investigation, leading to the seizure of evidence.

The application judge found breaches of the appellant's Charter rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2), finding no s. 8 or s. 9 breach and police good faith.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in concluding there was a de facto arrest, thus finding a s. 8 breach.

The Court also found errors in the s. 24(2) analysis, particularly regarding the police's good faith and reliance on prior case law, as the Charter violations were planned and deliberate.

The Court concluded that the impugned evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed Her Majesty the Queen's appeal, remitting the case for a new trial due to insufficient reasons from the lower court.

In this costs endorsement, the Crown sought $25,000 in appeal costs, while the respondents requested no costs.

The court awarded no costs for the appeal, citing the regrettable outcome of a new trial and the respondent's limited resources compared to the state.

The costs of the first trial were remitted to the judge hearing the new trial.

The appellant, convicted of speeding, appealed the dismissal of his provincial offences appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial justice of the peace made a palpable and overriding error by failing to consider a significant discrepancy between the officer's oral testimony regarding time and distance and the radar reading, which could have raised reasonable doubt about the radar's functioning.

The conviction was set aside, and a new trial ordered, with the Crown indicating it would withdraw the charge.

Costs were not awarded, consistent with the general rule for Provincial Offences Act proceedings.