Sarah E. Pepall

The appellants were convicted of production of and possession for the purposes of trafficking in marijuana, and possession of proceeds of crime.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the police violated their Charter section 8 rights by obtaining energy consumption data from their electricity provider, Horizon Utilities, without consent or judicial authorization.

The appellants contended that this data was used to obtain a search warrant for their residence.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the energy consumption data, and that the police examination and use of that data without judicial authorization constituted a breach of section 8.

However, the court found that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the police had acted reasonably given the state of the law at the time, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits outweighed the Charter breach.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a personal guarantor of corporate indebtedness, appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent lender US$3 million plus interest at 21% on his personal guarantee.

The guarantor had negotiated an amended guarantee that excluded facility and forbearance fees totaling US$2.75 million from his liability.

The lender acquired the company's assets through a receivership sale, with the purchase price calculated as total debt less US$3 million.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by failing to consider that the amended guarantee served to reduce the company's obligations that were guaranteed.

The court held that the guarantor's liability should be calculated as the remaining debt after the credit bid (US$3 million) less the excluded fees (US$2.75 million), resulting in liability of only US$250,000.

The Crown appealed from an acquittal on second degree murder and conviction for manslaughter.

The respondent stabbed and killed his girlfriend, admitting to the killing but claiming lack of intent for murder or alternatively acting under provocation.

The jury found him not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.

The Crown advanced two grounds of appeal: whether the trial judge erred in leaving the provocation defence with the jury, and whether expert psychiatric evidence was admissible.

The appellate court dismissed the first ground, finding the Crown could not advance a contradictory position on appeal after accepting provocation was available at trial.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the second ground, finding significant portions of the psychiatrist's evidence regarding the accused's disposition and mental state were inadmissible as they invaded the jury's province and went beyond the proper scope of expert psychiatric opinion.

The court ordered a new trial on the charge of second degree murder.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting his half-brother in the back with a shotgun.

The appellant admitted to the shooting but claimed he only intended to scare his brother and shoot at the computer or stereo, not to kill him.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's jury instructions on the mens rea for murder contained serious legal errors, particularly regarding the treatment of evidence of mental illness and the distinction between a legal presumption and a permissible inference.

The trial judge incorrectly suggested that evidence of mental illness could only be relevant to sentencing and failed to properly instruct the jury that such evidence could negate the mental element required for murder.

The court also noted deficiencies in how the trial judge responded to the jury's request for clarification on the state of mind required for murder.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant sued two law firms alleging they defrauded him by misappropriating settlement funds from a motor vehicle accident claim.

The motion judge dismissed the action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the allegation of misappropriation was not entirely implausible and that the statement of claim did not bear the hallmarks of frivolous or vexatious litigation.

The court held that Rule 2.1.01 should be reserved for the clearest of cases and is not an appropriate mechanism for early dismissal when a pleading asserts a legitimate cause of action.

Appeal from conviction for arson and possession of incendiary material.

The appellant, an unrepresented accused in custody, was convicted after a two-day trial.

The appeal raised issues concerning the Crown's disclosure obligations to an unrepresented accused and the trial judge's duty to assist such an accused.

The Crown failed to ensure the appellant received a substantial disclosure package of over 500 pages containing witness statement transcripts and fire investigation photographs, which was couriered to the custodial institution but not properly communicated to the appellant.

The trial judge failed to adequately inquire into disclosure issues when they became apparent during trial.

The court found both a breach of the right to disclosure and inadequate judicial assistance, resulting in impairment of the right to make full answer and defence.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

Appeals from conviction and sentence in a complex fraud case involving a scheme to divert millions of dollars from the Canadian Revenue Agency.

The appellants were convicted of fraud over $5,000 following a four-month jury trial.

The appellants challenged their convictions on multiple grounds including delay, issue estoppel, evidentiary rulings, and jury instructions.

The Crown appealed the quantum of the fine in lieu of forfeiture imposed on one appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals and the sentence appeals, but granted leave to appeal on the sentencing issues.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that it was not required to provide a justification for requesting examinations under oath of statutory accident benefits claimants.

The application judge had found that section 33(4)3 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule required insurers to provide a specific justification or reason for requesting such examinations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 33(4)3 does not require an insurer to provide a justification for its request that an applicant attend an examination under oath.

A general statement of the purpose of the examination that gives the applicant notice of the general type of questions that will be asked is sufficient.

A condominium corporation appealed from a damages award of $18,000 and sought leave to appeal a costs award of $17,000 made under section 134(5) of the Condominium Act, 1998.

The respondent unit owners had leased their condominium to tenants who vandalized common elements.

The corporation claimed $33,381.28 in damages and $52,637.56 in costs.

The application judge found certain repair expenditures disproportionate and reduced the damages award.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in assessing security camera installation costs and in conflating two distinct types of costs under the Act.

The damages award was increased to $25,458 and the costs award was increased to $34,000.

This appeal concerns a statutory interpretation dispute regarding the priority of a condominium corporation's lien under the Condominium Act, 1998.

The appellant condominium corporation obtained a compliance order and costs award against a unit owner in February 2011.

The owner defaulted on payment of the costs in March 2011.

The corporation added the costs to common expenses in August 2011 and registered a lien certificate in December 2011.

The respondent mortgagee held a first mortgage on the unit.

The central issue was whether the corporation's lien lost priority over the mortgage because it failed to register the lien certificate within three months of the default, as required by section 85(2) of the Act.

The court held that the default triggering the three-month perfection period occurred when the owner failed to pay the costs order in March 2011, not when the owner failed to pay the claimed common expenses in September 2011.

Accordingly, the corporation's failure to register within three months caused the lien to lose priority.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The appellants, The Regional Municipality of Sudbury and The City of Greater Sudbury, appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated November 17, 2015.

The appeal was unsuccessful.

The court awarded costs to the respondents in the amount of $95,000, inclusive of disbursements and all applicable taxes.

This is a costs endorsement following a partial appeal in a family law matter.

The appellant was successful in reducing the quantum of spousal support on appeal but was wholly unsuccessful on the equalization payment issue and failed on several other grounds relating to spousal support.

The court affirmed the trial costs and awarded the appellant partial costs of the appeal in a fixed sum, reflecting his limited success.

The appellant appealed a 15-month jail sentence imposed for two counts of making false statements contrary to the Canada Small Business Financing Act and three counts of fraud contrary to the Criminal Code.

The appellant had exploited the Canada Small Business Financing Program by using false documents to secure loans for his own business and seven other business entities, resulting in over $1 million in loans advanced and $409,000 in losses to Industry Canada.

The appellant extracted $192,000 in fees and obtained $100,000 through his own company.

The sentencing judge imposed imprisonment after finding that a conditional sentence would not sufficiently advance general deterrence and denunciation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was not manifestly unfit.

The appellant was convicted of one count of indecent assault and one count of gross indecency relating to a complainant (TS) for events that occurred in 1978 when the complainant was 16 years old and the appellant was her skating coach.

He received a 12-month conditional sentence.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings and the admission of reply evidence from the complainant's boyfriend.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no palpable and overriding error in the credibility assessments and determining that the reply evidence was properly admitted as it addressed a live issue that arose from the defence case.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from the dismissal of his appeal to the Superior Court from his conviction in the Ontario Court of Justice for uttering threats to cause death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the appellant failed to satisfy the test on both branches: there was no question of law with arguable merit and significance to the administration of justice, and there was no clear error in the decision below.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding solicitor-client privilege, finding that such privilege did not apply to the communications in question and that the summary conviction appeal judge was not required to address the issue in his reasons.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, incest, and breach of probation.

The victim was his teenage daughter, from whom he had been estranged for many years before reconnecting in 2010.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility assessments and claimed the trial judge applied inconsistent standards of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge's conclusions were entitled to deference and were supported by ample evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, as was the abandoned sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed her convictions for impaired driving and dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The appellant had driven across three lanes of oncoming traffic at high speed on a major highway, collided with another vehicle, and crashed into the median.

The appellant argued that the accident may have resulted from falling asleep at the wheel and challenged the trial judge's finding of impairment by alcohol.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellant's arguments.

While the Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of the evaporation rate of alcohol, the court applied the proviso, finding that the overwhelming evidence supported the conviction regardless of this error.

The appellant appealed from the dismissal of his motion to set aside a settlement and consent order dismissing his action.

The appellant acknowledged signing the settlement but argued he did so following a lengthy examination while suffering from a headache and other ailments, claiming incapacity.

The motion judge found the appellant had not met his burden of proof and there was no legally justifiable reason to set aside the settlement.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, finding the evidence fell short of establishing incapacity.

The appellant also challenged the costs award, but the court found the official transcript supported the formal order and declined to interfere.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision interpreting a shareholders' agreement regarding the purchase rights of shares held jointly by a deceased shareholder and his spouse.

The appellant argued that shares held jointly with right of survivorship should not be subject to purchase options upon the shareholder's death, and that the respondent, as a non-founder, had no right to acquire founder's shares.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding that Article 2.7 of the agreement required jointly-held shares to be treated as owned by the deceased shareholder for all purposes of the agreement, including purchase options.

The court also found that when the respondent became the sole surviving shareholder, he was entitled to exercise his option to purchase all remaining shares.

An appeal concerning the validity and location of an access easement reserved by CN when it sold property to Remicorp in 2002.

CN later transferred its easement rights to Metrolinx in 2010.

The application judge found the easement had been abandoned by implied release and by operation of law, and ordered it relocated from Part 5 to Part 1 of the property.

The Court of Appeal allowed Metrolinx's appeal, finding the application judge erred in concluding abandonment occurred.

The court held that non-use alone is insufficient to establish abandonment without evidence of intention to abandon, and that the three registrations on title (2002, 2003, and 2010) evidenced the absence of such intention.

The court also found the application judge erred in relocating the easement, as this deprived Metrolinx of its contractual rights under the easement agreement without proper application of the legal test under the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act and Land Titles Act.