Robert A. Blair

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an appeal book endorsement directing that an order go as per the amended draft order filed by the parties.

The appellant appealed an order declaring a child to be a child of the marriage and requiring him to pay retroactive and ongoing child support, as well as spousal support.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on the child's status, his income, and the respondent's ability to contribute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or serious misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence regarding the appellant's income, noting it lacked cogency and that the trial order already provided a mechanism for adjusting support based on annual income tax returns.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible (NCR) for aggravated assault after stabbing a complainant.

She appealed the NCR verdict, arguing she received ineffective assistance of counsel because she was not informed that an NCR finding could result in indefinite detention, and alternatively sought to withdraw her consent to the NCR finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice to support the ineffective assistance claim and concluding that the appellant understood the implications of the NCR verdict when she consented to it.

The appellant appealed a formal order containing only support orders made by the trial judge, including an order for retroactive support of $53,800.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as the order fell within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellants asserted an oppression claim under s. 248 of the Business Corporations Act, alleging misappropriation of funds from a widely held public company and seeking to recover those funds for the company.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding it was solely that of the company and had to be pursued as a derivative action with leave of the court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that where a claim seeks to recover solely for wrongs done to a public corporation and does not allege harm to the complainant's individualized personal interests, it must be pursued as a derivative action.

The applicant obtained a default judgment for fraud against the respondents regarding a tax loss allocation scheme.

He subsequently obtained an ex parte order under s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act appointing a receiver over the respondents' assets.

Through further ex parte applications, the receivership was expanded into a broad investigative receivership freezing the assets of 43 additional non-party individuals and entities to protect the interests of thousands of other investors.

The Court of Appeal set aside the orders, holding that while s. 101 permits investigative receiverships in appropriate circumstances, the orders here were unjustifiably overreaching and went beyond protecting the applicant's judgment recovery.

The Crown appealed a sentence order directing it to pay a $200 victim surcharge out of $170 seized from the offender upon his arrest for drug trafficking, with the balance forfeited.

The Court of Appeal held that a trial judge cannot order a victim surcharge paid out of funds forfeited as proceeds of crime, as the obligation rests on the offender.

Furthermore, the Court found the trial judge erred by reversing the onus regarding the forfeiture of the remaining $150, as there was no finding beyond a reasonable doubt that it constituted proceeds of crime.

The appeal was allowed, the offender was ordered to pay the $200 surcharge, $20 in buy money was forfeited, and the remaining $150 was returned to the offender.

Apotex's generic version of a patented drug was kept out of the market for two years by Eli Lilly using the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.

After the patent was invalidated, Apotex sued for unjust enrichment, seeking disgorgement of Eli Lilly's monopolistic profits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision to strike the claim, finding that Apotex suffered no corresponding deprivation of the monopolistic profits because it would never have earned them.

The appellant, a medical doctor dismissed from a residency program, sued the university and several faculty members for various torts including conspiracy and intimidation.

The motion judge struck all claims against the individual respondents and the intimidation claim against the university, denying leave to amend.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the claims, finding the pleadings failed to distinguish individual acts from corporate acts or plead the essential elements of the torts.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, granting the appellant leave to amend her statement of claim since no prior amendments had been made and the motion judge provided no reasons for denying leave.

The appellant, a bankrupt who suffered severe injuries in a motor vehicle accident, appealed a motion judge's order regarding the calculation of his surplus income under s. 68 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The motion judge had included financial assistance payments, statutory accident benefits settlement proceeds, and portions of a personal injury settlement in the appellant's total income, resulting in a surplus income payment obligation and a $15,000 penalty for failing to disclose the settlements.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the financial assistance loan, legal costs, and damages for future care and housekeeping should not have been included in the total income calculation.

The surplus income payment was set aside, but the $15,000 penalty for non-disclosure was affirmed.

The appellants were convicted of numerous fraud-related offences arising from a widespread credit and debit card skimming scheme operated through a storefront business.

Three of the appellants were also convicted of participating in and committing offences for the benefit of a criminal organization.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of wiretap evidence, the finding that they constituted a criminal organization, and various individual convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the wiretap authorization was properly granted and the group met the statutory definition of a criminal organization.

The sentence appeals of the two principal offenders were dismissed, while the sentences of the two lesser offenders were varied in part.

The appellant, Teranet Inc., appealed a Divisional Court decision certifying a class action brought by the respondent land surveyor for copyright infringement.

The respondent alleged that the appellant's provision of electronic copies of land surveys to the public for a fee infringed the surveyors' copyright.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court did not err in allowing the respondent to revise its class definition and common issues on appeal, as the changes were not fundamental and did not prejudice the appellant.

The Court further upheld the certification, concluding that the revised class definition was not merits-based, the common issues would significantly advance the litigation, and the respondent was a suitable representative plaintiff despite not relying on the appellant's services.

The appellant appealed her first-degree murder convictions for the deaths of her two young daughters.

At trial, she raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) due to a mental disorder, arguing she believed killing her children was an altruistic act to save them.

The jury rejected the defence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the concept of 'moral wrongfulness' and in his treatment of the expert psychiatric evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the jury charge, concluding the instructions properly focused on the appellant's capacity to know her acts were morally wrong by societal standards.

The appeal was dismissed.

The parties cohabited for eight years.

At trial, the applicant was awarded time-limited spousal support and a $100,000 equitable trust interest in the respondent's home.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal varied the spousal support to an indeterminate duration, noting the applicant's age and disability.

The Court upheld the $100,000 trust interest, rejecting the applicant's new argument for a joint family venture, but granted pre-judgment interest and a charge on the property as security.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding support quantum, costs, and financial reconciliation was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that ordered her to pay an equalization payment and denied her request for lump sum child support.

The respondent had refused to disclose his net worth, failed to pay child support, and disappeared prior to trial.

The Court of Appeal set aside the equalization payment and, admitting fresh actuarial evidence, awarded lump sum child support.

To satisfy the respondent's support and other obligations, the Court ordered his equity in the jointly owned matrimonial home to be vested in the appellant.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's refusal to appoint her as estate trustee during litigation to pursue a claim against the respondent for breach of fiduciary duty owed to their late mother.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, agreeing that the appellant would be in a conflict of interest.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, finding the motion judge erred in ordering the appellant to pay full indemnity costs, and reduced the award to partial indemnity costs.

The appellant sought to appeal an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an interlocutory order.

Costs of $2,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant sought an adjournment, which was refused.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, noting that although the original Superior Court action claimed a higher amount, it was settled together with a small claims court action for a global amount within the jurisdiction of the small claims court.

Therefore, any appeal lies to the Divisional Court.

Costs of $2,000 were awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiff, a municipal councillor, brought an action for defamation against other councillors based on statements made during a council meeting.

The defendants moved to strike the allegations, arguing their statements were protected by absolute privilege.

The motion judge held that absolute privilege does not apply to municipal councillors, who instead enjoy qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that Canadian law applies qualified privilege to municipal council speech and declining to extend absolute privilege without a full evidentiary record demonstrating its necessity.

The respondent was arrested during the G20 summit and filed a timely complaint against the arresting officers.

After receiving the investigative report, he discovered that higher-ranking officers may have ordered the arrests, prompting him to file a second complaint outside the six-month statutory period.

The Director of the OIPRD refused to deal with the second complaint, citing the time limit without further explanation.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, finding the Director failed to apply discoverability principles and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Director's appeal, affirming that discoverability applies to the screening of complaints and that the Director's cursory reasons were inadequate and unreasonable.