Robert A. Blair

The appellant, a general contractor, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its breach of contract action against a sprinkler system subcontractor as statute-barred.

The appellant argued the limitation period began when the respondent refused to pay an invoice for repair costs under a 'save harmless' clause, rather than when the water damage occurred 3.5 years prior to the lawsuit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the cause of action arose, and was discovered, when the water damage occurred and the appellant put the respondent on notice of its responsibility.

The appellant condominium corporation sought to recover common expense arrears from a defaulting unit owner.

Having failed to register a certificate of lien within the statutory three-month period, the appellant lost its priority over the respondent mortgagee.

The appellant applied under s. 134 of the Condominium Act, arguing the unpaid common expenses constituted damages that could be added to the common expenses, thereby reviving its priority lien.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that classifying unpaid common expenses as damages under s. 134 is contrary to the legislative purpose, scheme, and plain language of the Act, which balances the rights of condominium corporations and mortgagees.

The deceased promised to bequeath his farm and cottage to his common-law wife's grandsons in exchange for their unpaid labour.

He later married the appellant, who claimed dependant's relief against the estate.

The trial judge ordered the properties conveyed to the grandsons and awarded the widow support based on an inflated estate value, refusing to consolidate the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, holding that the promise was to bequeath, not convey, meaning the properties remained in the estate and were subject to the widow's dependant's relief claim under s. 71 of the Succession Law Reform Act to the extent their value exceeded the grandsons' consideration.

The matter was remitted for a new trial on the dependant's relief claim.

The appellant challenged Canada's assent to changes to the royal succession rules, arguing that the continued exclusion of Roman Catholics from the throne violated s. 15 of the Charter and seeking declaratory relief.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the application, holding that the succession rules form part of the constitution of Canada and cannot be amended or overridden by the Charter.

The court further held that the appellant lacked both private standing and public interest standing, and rejected the argument that standing had been admitted through a failure to respond to a notice to admit.

The appeal, including the appeal on costs, was dismissed, with appeal costs fixed at $10,000 all inclusive.

The appellant mother appealed an order dismissing her appeal from a child protection disposition making the child a Crown ward without access.

She alleged numerous palpable and overriding errors relating to the child’s behavioural problems, her parenting abilities, mental health, judgment, and the child’s dietary needs, and argued material evidence had been ignored.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge gave extensive and considered reasons, that any misstatements did not amount to palpable and overriding error, and that the evidence of the infant mental health counsellor had been considered.

Applying a deferential standard of review in child welfare matters, the court found no basis to interfere.

The appellants appealed an order striking their negligence claim against former criminal defence counsel as an abuse of process.

The court held the civil action was plainly a collateral attack on criminal convictions that had remained undisturbed on appeal.

To succeed, the appellants would have had to prove that, but for counsel's negligence, the accused would have been acquitted, thereby re-litigating the criminal charges and undermining the integrity of the adjudicative process.

The court held that allegations of ineffective assistance generally should be pursued by direct attack within the criminal proceeding, not through a separate civil action.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence following convictions for multiple sexual assaults against a child in respect of whom he occupied a position of trust and authority.

He argued the sentencing judge selected the wrong sentencing range because the assaults did not involve penetration and that a three-year penitentiary term should have been imposed.

The court held that, whether the starting point was three years or five years, the five-year sentence disclosed no error in principle, fell within the applicable range, and was not manifestly unfit given repeated assaults, grooming behaviour, exploitation of vulnerability, and trust-based abuse.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for an unprovoked and brutal aggravated assault, arguing it was manifestly unfit and failed to give proper effect to denunciation and deterrence.

The sentencing judge had effectively imposed a low penitentiary sentence after giving credit for pre-sentence custody, emphasizing the principle of rehabilitation to give the respondent one last chance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fresh evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion regarding the respondent's rehabilitative prospects and seeing no basis for appellate intervention.

The appellant, an HIV-positive inmate, was placed in administrative segregation due to safety concerns regarding his sexual relations with other inmates.

He applied for habeas corpus, which was dismissed by the application judge despite findings of minor procedural flaws in the segregation review process.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the application judge lacked discretion to deny the writ once a breach of procedural fairness was found.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the procedural flaws did not render the detention unlawful and that the application judge properly exercised his residual discretion to deny the writ.

The appellants were substantially successful on their appeal, which resulted in a new trial on certain issues.

They sought costs of $52,994.52 on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent argued for a reduced amount of $25,000 due to divided success.

The Court of Appeal agreed the appellants were substantially successful but applied a minor reduction for divided success, fixing costs at $45,000 all-inclusive.

The costs of the first trial were remitted to the judge hearing the new trial.

The appellants, nieces of the deceased and remainder beneficiaries of his estate, appealed a decision declaring the Constantine Gicas Family Trust validly created.

They argued the trust lacked the three certainties and was not properly constituted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the trust was validly declared and constituted, and that specific shares were properly transferred to it.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs award, finding that because the litigation was reasonably necessary to administer the estate due to the testator's conduct, costs should be paid out of the estate rather than by the appellants personally.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and assault involving a teenage complainant.

The trial judge found that the appellant had cultivated a relationship of trust with the vulnerable youth, provided drugs and gifts, and engaged in grooming behaviour culminating in sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence supported the finding that the appellant occupied a position of trust and that a deliberate course of grooming conduct could amount to an invitation to sexual touching for the purposes of the sexual exploitation offence.

The court also upheld the trial judge’s credibility assessments and found no reversible error arising from the limited adverse inference relating to cross‑examination.

The convictions were affirmed.

The young person appealed a custodial sentence of 300 days followed by 14 months' probation for the sexual assault of a friend.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by treating his trial testimony as an aggravating factor and that the sentence was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and noting the sentencing judge properly considered the appellant's lack of empathy and remorse, as evidenced by text messages sent after the assault, rather than his trial testimony.

The appellant pleaded guilty to break, enter and theft of a dwelling house and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment, less 1:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by declining to grant enhanced credit at a rate of 1.5:1.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to discharge the onus of demonstrating that enhanced credit was warranted.

The appellant appealed his convictions on nine counts of sexual offences involving two minors.

He argued that the trial judge's interventions during witness examinations created an appearance of unfairness and that the trial judge improperly minimized the impact of a false statement made by one of the complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions, while numerous, did not create an appearance of unfairness or suggest he had pre-judged the appellant's credibility.

The court also held that the trial judge's credibility findings regarding the complainant were entitled to deference.

The appellants were convicted of multiple mortgage financing frauds involving the manipulation of recent immigrants to obtain mortgage financing and take title to properties.

They appealed their convictions and sentences of four years' imprisonment, fines in lieu of forfeiture, and a joint restitution order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding co-conspirators, treatment of evidence, or response to Crown counsel's closing remarks.

The sentence appeals were also dismissed, as the custodial sentences were within the appropriate range for large-scale fraud, and the fines and restitution orders were properly imposed.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after the victim was beaten to death with a baseball bat in the appellant's home.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding joint involvement, the Vetrovec warning for an unsavoury witness, the W.(D.) instruction, and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge could have given a joint party liability instruction, the failure to do so did not result in a miscarriage of justice and was cured by the proviso.

The court also found the Vetrovec, W.(D.), and post-offence conduct instructions were sufficient.

The sentence appeal regarding the 13-year parole ineligibility period was also dismissed.

The appellants sold their business to the respondent under a Share Purchase Agreement that included an initial payment and potential Earn-Out Payments based on future earnings (EBIAT).

The trial judge found that revenues from a specific project were excluded from the EBIAT calculation and that the earnings threshold was not met.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by interpreting the contract's calculation provision in isolation rather than reading the agreement as a whole.

The Court also found the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in assessing the expert financial evidence regarding revenue deferral, and ordered a new trial solely on whether the earnings threshold was met.

The appellants, representing former Barbados participating policyholders of Manulife, brought a class action for negligence.

They claimed Manulife owed them a duty of care to protect their interests when it transferred their policies to another insurer in 1996, three years before Manulife demutualized and distributed $9 billion to its participating policyholders.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that while harm was foreseeable, policy reasons negated a duty of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the claim was for pure economic loss and did not fall within established categories.

The Court found no prima facie duty of care because the relationship lacked sufficient proximity, as the policyholders had no legally recognized right to share in a future demutualization at the time of the transfer, and the governing legislation permitted Manulife to terminate the relationship.

The appellant appealed his convictions relating to a home invasion and an assault.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended identification evidence on the assault count, failed to consider an alternate suspect for the home invasion, and inadequately scrutinized unsavoury witnesses.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, entering an acquittal on the assault count because the trial judge mistakenly believed the identifying witnesses had prior knowledge of the appellant.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed, as the alternate suspect was physically incapable of the crime and the trial judge properly applied the Vetrovec principles.