Robert A. Blair

The appellant judgment creditor sought to enforce its judgment by having the sheriff sell the respondents' mortgaged property.

The sheriff required a mortgage discharge statement, which the mortgagee bank refused to provide without the respondents' consent, citing PIPEDA.

The respondents failed to attend examinations in aid of execution.

The appellant brought a motion to compel the mortgagee to produce the statement, which was dismissed based on binding precedent.

On appeal, a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that the mortgage discharge statement was sensitive personal information under PIPEDA, and the respondents could not be deemed to have impliedly consented to its disclosure to a judgment creditor.

The majority affirmed that the proper procedure to obtain the statement without consent is to seek an order for the examination of the mortgagee under Rule 60.18(6)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which would satisfy the court order exemption in PIPEDA.

The appellant hosted a golf tournament at the respondents' golf course.

A guest was injured in a golf cart accident and sued the respondents for negligent course design.

The respondents brought a third-party claim against the appellant for contractual indemnity based on a clause in the event contract.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondents.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the indemnity clause did not clearly and unambiguously shift the risk of the respondents' own negligence to the appellant.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision and sought leave to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, noting it did not meet the test and was not needed to argue the appeal.

On the main appeal, the appellants argued that summary judgment was premature due to missing evidence.

The Court rejected this, finding the appellants failed to take steps to compel production and did not put their best foot forward.

The motion judge correctly applied the tests for summary judgment.

The appeal and leave to appeal costs were dismissed, with costs of the appeal fixed at $85,000.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order regarding spousal support and the dismissal of her civil claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

She argued the trial judge erred in imputing income to both parties.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings on support.

The Court also upheld the dismissal of the civil claims, noting the contract issue had been previously determined and there was insufficient evidence for the emotional distress claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant purchased a second mortgage as an investment, but the mortgagor fraudulently misrepresented the balance of the first mortgage.

After the property was sold under power of sale, leaving no funds for the appellant, she sued the mortgage broker for negligence and breach of contract, and the title insurer for coverage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the action.

The court found the title insurance policy did not cover the loss, and the claim against the broker was statute-barred because it was discovered more than two years before the action was commenced.

The court clarified that the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 applied, rather than the ten-year period under the Real Property Limitations Act, because the claim was based in negligence and contract rather than an interest in land.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their 14-year-old medical malpractice action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the hearing judge properly applied the two-part test requiring an acceptable explanation for the delay and no non-compensable prejudice.

The court agreed that the appellants failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for a delay of almost 11 years since the delivery of the statement of defence.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision finding that a requirement to maintain eight doctors as tenants and a corresponding rent abatement provision in a 1990 commercial lease were not eliminated by a subsequent renewal agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation of the commercial context and language of the agreements.

Applying Sattva, the Court held that deference was owed to the application judge's interpretation.

The parties entered into a joint venture to purchase and convert a property into a self-storage facility, which included a put/call agreement.

The respondent exercised the put, forcing the appellant to purchase the property at a price determined by an appraiser.

The appellant refused to close, alleging the appraiser made a manifest error by not using the income approach.

The trial judge granted specific performance to the respondent and awarded substantial indemnity costs based on an unserved offer to settle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no manifest error in the appraisal, upholding the award of specific performance for the vendor, and confirming the costs award.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against the police for negligent investigation.

The appellant alleged the police negligently failed to send a needle for communicable disease testing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis for a negligence claim because uncontroverted evidence showed that testing the needle was impossible or unreliable, meaning no damages flowed from the failure to test.

The respondents, former employees and officers of a union local, brought an application before the Ontario Labour Relations Board alleging unfair labour practices.

They requested the vice-chair recuse himself because he had previously acted for one of the respondents in an employment dispute.

The vice-chair declined and dismissed the application for serving no labour relations purpose.

The Divisional Court quashed the decisions, finding a conflict of interest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court erred by applying the test for a lawyer's conflict of interest rather than the test for reasonable apprehension of bias by an adjudicator.

The Court found the presumption of impartiality was not rebutted and reinstated the vice-chair's decisions.

The appellants advanced funds to Cash Store, a payday lending company operating under CCAA protection.

They appealed a motion judge's dismissal of their claim that they were the sole legal and beneficial owners of loan payments and accounts receivable from Cash Store's customers.

The motion judge found that the actual practices of the parties, including the payment of interest and commingling of funds, reflected a debtor-creditor relationship rather than the principal-broker relationship set out in their agreements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's factual determinations.

The appellant husband appealed the trial judge's decisions regarding spousal support, child support, section 7 expenses, and the dismissal of his third-party claims for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of mental distress against a former neighbour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on all grounds except for a conceded error in calculating section 7 expenses, finding that the trial judge's determinations on income calculation, support, and the third-party claims were supported by the record and free from reversible error.

The appellant appealed his conviction for forgery-related offences concerning a forged consent to set aside a vexatious litigant order.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to stay the proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that, after attributing 19 months of the delay to the appellant and finding no actual prejudice, a stay was not warranted.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant forged and presented the consent document.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial decision granting the respondents title to a disputed strip of land between their adjoining properties by adverse possession.

On appeal, the appellants argued for the first time that the finding of adverse possession did not justify granting title to the full width of the 2.03 metres vested by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the issue of width was not raised at trial, the survey was presented on consent, and there was ample support in the record for the trial judge's finding.

The appellant, a commercial truck driver, was convicted of importing cocaine after 53 kilograms of cocaine were found hidden in his trailer.

At trial, the Crown introduced an expert police report on the use of commercial vehicles for transporting contraband.

The report contained both general opinions and case-specific opinions regarding the appellant's credibility and knowledge of the drugs.

The Court of Appeal held that the case-specific opinions were inadmissible as they usurped the role of the trier of fact.

Finding that the trial judge improperly relied on this inadmissible evidence to conclude the appellant knew about the cocaine, the majority allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that the respondent tenant's installation of an ATM violated the permitted use clause of their commercial lease.

The lease restricted the premises to use as a fast-food restaurant.

The application judge found the ATM was a business tool to keep costs low and did not change the purpose of the premises.

The Court of Appeal applied the deferential standard of review for contractual interpretation established in Sattva, finding no error of law or mixed fact and law, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its claim on the basis that it was barred by a broadly worded release from a 1996 action settlement.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the claim related to the lands referred to in the release.

Furthermore, the court found that the appellant was an affiliate or associate of the releasing party due to the common control of both entities by the same individual.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order finding him in contempt of court, imposing a $10,000 fine payable to the estate, and dismissing his request for a passing of accounts in Brampton.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding, noting the appellant's repeated attempts to re-litigate venue constituted an abuse of process and subverted the administration of justice.

The Court also held that the lack of personal service did not invalidate the contempt finding as the appellant had actual knowledge and a full opportunity to be heard.

However, the Court set aside the $10,000 fine, ruling that civil contempt fines should be payable to the Provincial Treasurer rather than a party, and found no fine was necessary for deterrence given the three-day imprisonment already served.

The prohibition on further litigation was varied to allow steps with leave of the court.

The appellant was convicted of multiple fraud-related offences arising from a credit and debit card scheme.

At trial, the Crown relied heavily on the testimony of four former co-accused who had previously pled guilty based on agreed statements of fact implicating the appellant.

When these witnesses recanted their statements at trial, the trial judge admitted their prior statements for the truth of their contents under the K.G.B. framework.

The appellant appealed, arguing the statements should not have been admitted and that the trial judge's Vetrovec warning was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal held that while the statements met the test for threshold reliability, the Vetrovec warning failed to adequately explain to the jury the witnesses' strong motives to lie in their prior statements to obtain lenient sentences.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, administering a noxious substance, and failing to provide the necessaries of life in relation to her two-year-old son.

At trial, the Crown relied on expert evidence from the Motherisk Program regarding hair testing to prove the child had ingested cocaine over a 14-month period.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence challenging the methodology and validity of the hair testing.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it credible and potentially decisive.

The convictions related to cocaine ingestion were quashed and a new trial was ordered, but the order was stayed because the appellant had already served her sentence.

The appeal from the fracture-related convictions was abandoned.