Robert A. Blair

The Attorney General appealed a decision discharging the bankrupt, arguing that the bankrupt's personal income tax debt exceeded the threshold under s. 172.1 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

At the time of the discharge hearing, the bankrupt had unpaid income tax assessments totalling approximately $4.478 million, of which $4.424 million was subject to outstanding appeals to the Tax Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal held that assessed amounts of personal income tax under appeal are contingent claims that the trustee can refuse to admit as proven claims.

Therefore, these amounts are not included in calculating the bankrupt's personal income tax debt under s. 172.1(1).

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle accident caused in part by an unidentified driver.

He failed to report the accident to the police or his insurer within the time limits prescribed by the Uninsured Automobile Coverage regulation.

The trial judge granted the plaintiff relief from forfeiture under s. 129 of the Insurance Act and apportioned liability 60% to the plaintiff and 40% to the unidentified driver.

The insurer appealed the relief from forfeiture and the liability apportionment, while the plaintiff cross-appealed the liability apportionment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, holding that failure to give timely notice constitutes imperfect compliance for which relief from forfeiture is available, and that the trial judge's liability findings were supported by the evidence.

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring them vexatious litigants.

They failed to appear at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the application judge's reasons and the appellants' written arguments, finding no merit to the appeal and agreeing that the appellants' conduct met the definition of vexatious litigants.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim for the return of a 50% interest in a property transferred to the respondent upon her marriage.

The appellants argued the transfer was a conditional dowry (mahr) under Iranian tradition, requiring return upon marriage breakdown, and was obtained through undue influence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the transfer was an irrevocable, unconditional gift, noting the Deed of Gift contained no conditions and the Statute of Frauds barred reliance on an alleged oral promise to reconvey the property.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents, former employees, sued the appellant employer for unpaid wages and were granted summary judgment.

The appellant argued it was authorized under s. 13 of the Employment Standards Act to deduct amounts from the unpaid wages because the respondents failed to return a company computer containing intellectual property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the employment contracts did not contain written authorization permitting such deductions.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's discretionary refusal to stay the enforcement of the judgment pending the appellant's counterclaim for conversion.

The appellant, an Ontario resident, was injured in a motorcycle accident in British Columbia while a passenger on a motorcycle driven by an Alberta resident.

The appellant sued the driver, his insurer, and her own Ontario insurer in Ontario.

The driver successfully moved to stay the action against him for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, the appellant argued her Ontario insurance contract, which required her to sue her insurer in Ontario, was a presumptive connecting factor giving Ontario jurisdiction over the entire dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that an insurance contract is not a presumptive connecting factor over an extra-provincial tortfeasor, and declined to apply the forum of necessity doctrine as the appellant could pursue her claim in British Columbia.

Following a successful appeal setting aside a series of ex parte 'investigative receivership' orders, the successful appellants sought costs against both the original applicant and the court-appointed receiver.

The Court of Appeal held that both were liable for costs.

The applicant was liable on a partial indemnity scale because he initiated and supported the proceedings.

The receiver was held personally liable for costs on a substantial indemnity scale because it acted as a 'real litigator' and pursued an impermissibly overreaching roving receivership, losing its objectivity as an officer of the court.

The Court also clarified that substantial indemnity costs are calculated as 1.5 times partial indemnity costs under Rule 1.03, rather than as a percentage of full indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding child custody, child support, property equalization, and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions granting sole custody to the respondent, calculating child support based on 2012 income, and excluding gifts and inheritances deposited into a joint account from the respondent's net family property.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, finding the trial judge erred in awarding full recovery costs based on an offer to settle that expired before trial.

The trial costs award was varied to $76,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant sought to set aside four property transfers made by the respondent to his wife and her company under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The trial judge found the 1987 and 1988 transfers were not fraudulent, but set aside the 1992 and 1993 transfers of the matrimonial home and a Florida property.

Both parties appealed the trial judge's findings of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, his refusal to pierce the corporate veil, or his rejection of the laches defence.

Motions to admit fresh evidence were also dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a noting in default and default judgment.

The motion judge found that while the appellant had a triable defence, he failed to move expeditiously, waiting 28 months after the noting in default to proceed with the motion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding ample evidence to support the conclusion on delay and confirming that the motion judge properly considered the prejudice to the parties and the appellant's litigation conduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's interpretation of a consent order incorporating terms of settlement regarding zoning restrictions on a proposed plan of subdivision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the language of the consent order clear and unambiguous in excluding the contested lots from the restrictions.

The Court further held that even if there were ambiguity, the parole evidence rule would not assist the appellants, and there was no basis to find unilateral or mutual mistake.

The appellant sought full indemnity costs for his successful appeal and two underlying motions regarding his bankruptcy discharge and the treatment of a personal injury settlement.

The Court of Appeal declined to award full indemnity costs, finding that the Trustee's conduct was not reprehensible and that Rule 49.10 did not apply to grant a defendant substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the appellant partial indemnity costs of $5,000 for the motion before Spence J. and $10,000 for the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing he was entitled to enhanced credit (1.5 to 1) for pre-sentence custody after his bail was revoked.

He had consented to his detention without a show cause hearing.

The Court of Appeal held that an accused whose prior form of release is cancelled under s. 524(8) of the Criminal Code is 'detained in custody' under that section, regardless of whether a separate detention order is made following a show cause hearing.

Consequently, the appellant fell within the exclusion in s. 719(3.1) and was not entitled to enhanced credit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of manslaughter in the drowning death of his wife and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, applied for bail pending his conviction and sentence appeals.

The Crown conceded the appellant was not a flight risk or a danger to the public, but argued the appeals were frivolous and detention was necessary in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal found that the conviction appeal raised an arguable issue regarding the trial judge's response to a jury question, which introduced a new route to liability based on failing to provide the necessaries of life.

Concluding the appeal was not frivolous and the principle of reviewability outweighed enforceability, the Court granted release pending appeal.

The appellant applied to re-open his sentence appeal and introduce fresh evidence regarding the immigration consequences of his 26-month sentence for fraud over $5,000.

The fresh evidence demonstrated that a sentence of two years or more would deprive him of the right to appeal a deportation order.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, admitted the fresh evidence, and reduced the sentence to two years less a day, noting the appellant's long-term residence in Canada, family ties, and lack of connections to his homeland.

The appellant, who claimed to have a spiritual healing gift from God, was convicted of sexual assault and breaching recognizance conditions after touching a client's breast without consent during healing sessions.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, exhibited a reasonable apprehension of bias, and erred in finding he breached his recognizance and committed sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge managed the trial fairly, the presumption of impartiality was not rebutted, and the convictions were supported by credible evidence.

The United States sought the extradition of the appellant for child luring based on internet communications traced to an IP address.

The extradition judge committed the appellant for extradition after inferring that the appellant was the user of the IP address at the relevant time because he was the subscriber.

The Court of Appeal held that this inference was unreasonable without further evidence linking the subscriber to the actual use of the device at the time of the offence, and quashed the committal order.

The Court also dismissed a constitutional challenge to the ex parte gathering and sending provisions of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, finding they contained adequate safeguards to satisfy procedural fairness under the Charter.

The appellant appealed an order staying his action pending the payment of outstanding costs orders.

The respondents argued the order was interlocutory and the appeal route was to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the order did not determine any substantive matter in the action.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a decision granting the equitable remedy of rectification to correct mistaken share redemptions that triggered unintended tax consequences.

The application judge found that the respondents had a continuing intention to carry out loan arrangements on a tax-neutral basis and that the share redemptions were a mistake.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under the binding authority of Juliar, the critical requirement for rectification is proof of a continuing specific intention to undertake a transaction on a particular tax basis, which the respondents had established.

The appellant advanced funds to finance the cost of repairs by third parties to an aircraft owned by the respondent.

It brought a motion for a declaration that it had a non-possessory lien under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding the appellant was not a 'repairer' under the Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that advancing funds to finance repairs does not constitute making a repair or bestowing skill, labour, or money on the aircraft.

The appeal was dismissed.