Patrick Smith

The 72-year-old offender was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The defence sought a suspended or conditional sentence, citing the offender's age, health issues, the risk of contracting COVID-19 in prison, and the likelihood of deportation to England.

The court found that the gravity of commercial cocaine trafficking required a sentence emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

The court held that a non-custodial sentence would be disproportionate and sentenced the offender to 2 years plus 1 day in a federal penitentiary.

The accused, Scotland Crompton, was charged with aggravated assault.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the assailant.

The court considered direct and circumstantial evidence, including eyewitness testimony, surveillance footage, post-offence conduct such as changing hair colour and making false statements to police, and the unreliability of the accused's father's testimony.

Applying the principles of reasonable doubt and the holistic assessment of circumstantial evidence, the court found the accused's guilt proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Paul Whiteley Langis was convicted of three counts of fraud over $5,000, totaling approximately $80,000, committed against his employer (two Wendy's restaurants) through manipulation of accounting software and misuse of a corporate credit card.

The offences involved a breach of trust, planning, and sophistication, and were committed while the employer was dealing with a serious illness.

The court considered aggravating factors such as breach of trust, significant impact on the victim, and lack of remorse, alongside mitigating factors including the offender being a first-time offender with a stable family and positive character references.

The court imposed a sentence of 14 months' incarceration, a restitution order of $40,000, and a lifetime prohibition from employment involving financial authority over others.

The applicant municipality brought an application for a declaration and permanent injunction against the respondents for violating a zoning by-law by keeping multiple recreational trailers on their property for permanent residential seasonal use.

The respondents argued they had a legal non-conforming use under a previous by-law.

The court found that neither the previous nor the current zoning by-laws permitted the use of multiple recreational trailers as a main use on the property.

Finding a clear breach of the by-laws and no exceptional circumstances, the court granted the declaration and permanent injunction requiring the removal of the trailers.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging his s. 11(b) right to a trial within a reasonable time was violated.

The charges arose from a complex multi-year joint forces investigation into drug trafficking.

The court applied the Jordan framework and calculated the total delay, subtracting periods of defence waiver and defence-caused delay.

The court found the net delay of 25.5 months fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts.

Alternatively, the court held that the case's significant evidentiary and procedural complexity justified the delay as an exceptional circumstance.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The court addressed the issue of who should pay costs previously awarded after dismissing a motion brought by Bending Lake Iron Group Limited (BLIG).

The BLIG motion was deemed an abuse of process, a collateral attack on prior orders, and res judicata, with BLIG lacking standing due to its bankruptcy.

The court ordered that the costs be paid jointly and severally by BLIG's lawyer, Robert MacRae, and its directors and officers (Henry Grant Wetelainen, J. Chris Bailey, Dawn Elaine Mackay-Daynes, and Henry Clayton Wetelainen), citing the broad discretion under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for personal costs against lawyers.

The City of Thunder Bay applied for declaratory orders and specific performance to compel Canadian National Railway Company (CN) to reopen and perpetually maintain the James Street Swing Bridge for vehicular traffic.

The City argued that CN's perpetual maintenance obligation included upgrading the bridge to modern safety standards.

CN contended its obligation was limited to the original 1906 design and that reopening required significant structural reconfiguration beyond maintenance.

The Fort William First Nation supported the City's position.

The court dismissed the application, finding the City's proposals for reopening the bridge vague and lacking specificity, and that the evidence did not clearly define the required work or establish that such work fell within CN's contractual maintenance obligation.

The accused was found guilty of communicating with a person under 14 for the purpose of facilitating child pornography.

Prior to sentencing, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The court applied the transitional framework from Jordan and the Morin guidelines, finding a total delay of 47 months after deducting defence delay.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay exceeding the 30-month ceiling.

The court concluded the accused's rights were violated, quashed the conviction, and entered a stay of proceedings.

The plaintiff, a distributor, sued the defendant, a manufacturer of adult sex toys, for breach of three purported exclusive distribution agreements.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims, finding that the parties were merely negotiating and had never reached a binding consensus ad idem on the essential terms.

The defendant counterclaimed for defamation and other torts based on a complaint the plaintiff's principal sent to Health Canada alleging safety defects in the defendant's products.

The court granted the counterclaim for defamation and injurious falsehood, finding the statements were false, defamatory, and made with the intent to harm the defendant's reputation and business.

The defendant was awarded $50,000 in general damages.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs following their successful motion for an interlocutory injunction.

The defendant, Mr. Cabezas, argued that costs should be reserved for the trial judge or significantly reduced.

The court, exercising its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered costs in the cause.

The decision emphasized that it is generally preferable to reserve costs for interlocutory injunctions to the trial judge, given the absence of a final determination of rights and the plaintiff's undertaking as to damages.

Conflicting positions on factual complexity and proportionality also made it difficult to fix costs at this stage.

The parties settled custody, access, and child support arrears.

The remaining issues were the quantum of ongoing child support and costs.

The applicant father sought a suspension of ongoing child support and enforcement of future arrears, arguing undue hardship under s. 10 of the Child Support Guidelines due to a stroke, depression, alcoholism, and a claw-back of disability payments.

The respondent mother resisted this application.

The court found that the father had demonstrated "exceptional and unusual" circumstances constituting undue hardship.

Consequently, the payment of the table amount of child support and the enforcement of any future arrears were suspended until the father's financial circumstances improved, with only the agreed-upon arrears payment continuing.

No costs were awarded as both parties achieved partial success.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and four counts of breaching a recognizance.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging arbitrary arrest, unreasonable search, and seeking a stay of proceedings based on the cumulative effect of 25 prior police contacts.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the prior contacts unrelated and the arrest and search lawful based on reasonable and probable grounds.

The accused was found guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking and one count of breaching a recognizance (driving while suspended).

He was acquitted of the remaining charges as his testimony raised a reasonable doubt.

The Plaintiffs, Accreditation Canada International and Accreditation Canada, brought a motion to extend and vary an interlocutory injunction against former employees, José Luis Cabezas Guerra and Bieu (Marty) Van Huynh, and their company, Efficiency on Health Services Canada Inc. The Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract, fiduciary duty, and confidence due to the Defendants' use of confidential information and solicitation of clients under misleading trade names.

The court applied the R.J.R. Macdonald test for injunctions, finding a strong prima facie case, irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favored the Plaintiffs.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was granted.

The applicant sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, proposing a new surety and GPS ankle monitoring as new evidence.

The court found the proposed surety lacked credibility and that GPS monitoring was insufficient to mitigate the substantial likelihood of the applicant reoffending.

The application was dismissed as the new evidence did not meet the Palmer test to justify a review of the initial detention order.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant guarantor for over $1 million owed by a corporate debtor.

The guarantor argued the demand for payment was invalid because the bank did not provide reasonable time to pay, and that the bank's conduct caused the debtor's default, entitling him to a discharge.

The court applied the Hryniak framework and granted summary judgment, finding the guarantee's language clear, the right to payment crystallized upon default, and no bad faith by the bank.

The parties consented to an interim order incorporating an access and visitation schedule and the report of Julie Guindon.

The respondent was ordered to pay $817 per month in child support for two children based on an annual income of $55,000.

Ms. Guindon was to remain available to assist the parties for 12 months, and the matter was assigned to the judge under the Coordinated Case Management protocol.

The plaintiff proceeded with an undefended claim against the defendant.

The court found that the defendant breached its contract with the plaintiff, was unjustly enriched, and improperly used the plaintiff's trade name, Kerkuk Café.

The plaintiff was directed to provide a draft judgment summarizing the losses and damages.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a substantial indemnity basis fixed at $25,000.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on two offers to settle.

The defendants argued costs should be payable in the cause or fixed on a partial indemnity basis.

The court found the plaintiff was not entitled to substantial indemnity costs because the first offer had expired and the judgment did not meet or exceed the second offer's terms.

Applying the principle that costs must be fair and reasonable, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs fixed at $65,000, inclusive of disbursements, payable forthwith.

The applicant brought an application for leave to have two of his former solicitors' accounts referred for assessment outside the statutory time periods.

The applicant argued that his mental health issues during the relevant period constituted special circumstances under the Solicitors Act.

The court found the medical evidence provided was insufficient, as it referred to mental health issues predating the solicitors' retainer.

The application was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The applicant sought declaratory orders against his neighbours regarding the maintenance of an artificially raised property grade and an encroaching fence.

The court refused to grant the declarations, finding that they would serve no practical purpose as they merely repeated existing law and legislation.

The request to relocate the fence was also dismissed as partially moot, given the respondents had already removed most of it and undertook to remove the remaining posts.