Peter D. Lauwers

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum to its oral reasons released on April 24, 2015, which allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

On consent of counsel, the Court added a declaration that the appellant is the sole surviving spouse of the deceased and is entitled to receive all surviving spouse pension benefits from the respondent benefit administrators corporation.

The appellant, a Kyrgyz company wholly owned by the Kyrgyz Republic, appealed an order declaring that the Republic had an equitable interest in shares held by the appellant and ordering their seizure to satisfy an arbitral award.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Republic was not properly served with the initiating documents.

Service on the Republic's embassy in Washington D.C. did not comply with the mandatory and exhaustive service provisions of the State Immunity Act, and the court could not validate service using provincial rules of civil procedure.

The appellant son appealed a judgment setting aside the transfer of his mother's home to him based on non est factum and undue influence, and dismissing his counterclaim for equitable remedies.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, noting the mother's limited English, recent widowhood, and lack of independent legal advice.

The counterclaim was properly dismissed due to the appellant's lack of clean hands and prematurity.

The appeal and a related motion were dismissed with costs.

The appellants, foreign corporations and an individual, appealed a motion judge's order dismissing their motion to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction or to stay it on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The respondent municipality sued for breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy regarding a waste management agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the respondent established a 'good arguable case' for jurisdiction based on the pleadings and evidence of agency.

The court also deferred to the motion judge's conclusion that Ontario was the appropriate forum given the torts and contract were connected to the province.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action as an abuse of process.

The motion judge found that the appellants could have raised their allegation of being specifically targeted in prior judicial review proceedings regarding the FIT program.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the abuse of process doctrine applies to issues that could have been determined in earlier administrative processes, and found no error in the motion judge's refusal to exercise her discretion to allow the action to proceed.

The appellant sought to add the respondent as a defendant to an action for unpaid benefits.

The motion judge declined to add the respondent as a party.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that any liability the respondent might have for the unpaid benefits stems from a collective agreement and would be arbitrable, meaning the respondent is not a proper party to the action.

Supplementary reasons addressing implementation and costs following an appeal decision regarding a condominium dispute.

The court ordered a trial of an issue to determine the difference in value between a two-storey and three-storey townhouse unit.

The court denied prejudgment interest on the valuation amount, finding the loss crystallized on the date of the appeal decision.

The court also allocated trial and appeal costs among the parties, applying modified Sanderson orders to account for successful and unsuccessful claims against various defendants.

The appellant developer earned municipal development credits and sold the land with an agreement that the purchaser would pay the appellant the credits once established.

The land was subsequently sold twice without this covenant, eventually to the respondent, who developed the property and received the credits.

The appellant sued the respondent for unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent was not enriched because it had paid a premium for the property in expectation of receiving the credits.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that the respondent insurance company did not have a duty to defend them in a defamation action arising from an internet video.

The application judge had concluded that the substance of the claim did not implicate the appellants as employees acting in the course of their employment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge failed to consider cross-claims and third-party claims, which established a mere possibility that the appellants were acting in the course of their employment.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial judge applied the incorrect standard of proof, made erroneous credibility findings, and improperly drew adverse inferences from his failure to testify.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's decisions regarding the interest rate and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the balance of probabilities standard, made no palpable and overriding error in credibility findings, and properly exercised his discretion regarding adverse inferences, interest, and costs.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appellants' appeal from an order striking certain paragraphs of their statement of defence.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the order under appeal was interlocutory because it did not dispose of any substantive defence.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

The appellant sought to enforce a settlement agreement between a developer and a municipality regarding public access to a woodlot, relying on section 86 of the Ontario Municipal Board Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no legal obligation for the developer to permit access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant should have first sought relief from the Ontario Municipal Board, which has the expertise to interpret the settlement agreement and its own orders, rather than applying directly to the Superior Court.

The appellant condominium corporations sought a declaration that they owned a clubhouse within their development and that a mortgage granted by the respondent developer was void or subordinate to their interests.

The developer had retained legal title to the clubhouse, but the disclosure statements provided for its future conveyance to the appellants once the developer no longer owned any lands in the project.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the disclosure statements did not constitute an executory contract of purchase and sale.

Consequently, the appellants did not have an equitable interest in the clubhouse capable of registration under the Land Titles Act, and the developer was entitled to mortgage the property.

The moving party sought an extension of time to serve and file a notice of motion for leave to appeal his convictions and fines for driving without insurance and driving with a suspended licence.

He explained the multi-year delay was due to his alcoholism and mental disabilities at the time of the initial appeal, and that the outstanding fines were preventing him from obtaining a record suspension.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no legislative mechanism to commute the fines despite expressing great sympathy for the moving party's rehabilitation and financial plight.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the successful respondent sought costs of $800, primarily for disbursements.

The Court of Appeal found the claim reasonable and ordered the appellant to pay $800 in costs to the respondent.

The plaintiffs brought a motion asking the Court of Appeal to reconsider its refusal to grant leave to appeal, arguing that a subsequent decision by the court changed the interpretation of Rule 53.03.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under Rule 61.16(6.1) because a change in jurisprudence does not constitute a 'fact arising or discovered after' an order is made under Rule 59.06(2)(a).

The court further noted that even if it had jurisdiction, it would not exercise its discretion to reconsider the decision, and declined to extend the time for seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Crown appealed the sentence of a conditional discharge and two years' probation imposed on the respondent for assault causing bodily harm.

The respondent had severely beaten the victim while intoxicated, causing facial fractures and brain damage.

The Court of Appeal found the conditional discharge was manifestly unfit and failed to reflect the gravity of the offence and the principles of deterrence and denunciation.

The court allowed the appeal, entered a conviction, and imposed a sentence of six months' incarceration followed by two years' probation, along with mandatory DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and breach of recognizance after police, acting on a confidential informant's tip, stopped a taxi he was in and eventually found crack cocaine in his backpack.

On appeal, the appellant argued his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 9 were breached during the traffic stop, pat-down search, and the search of his backpack at the police station.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the traffic stop was a lawful investigative detention, the pat-down was a valid safety search, and the backpack search was a lawful search incident to arrest because police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest for drug offences prior to the search.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference involving his 13-year-old stepdaughter.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, applied different standards of scrutiny to the evidence, and reached irreconcilable conclusions by acquitting him of sexual assault but convicting him of sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach to the evidence, noting her findings were rooted in the record and her reasonable doubt on the sexual assault count did not contradict her satisfaction that the sexual interference count was proven.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking enhanced credit for pre-trial custody.

The Crown conceded the appeal, as the original sentence was imposed before the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Summers.

The Court of Appeal granted the appellant credit for 24 months of pre-trial custody at a rate of 1.5 to 1, reducing the sentence by 12 months.