Anna M. Vannelli

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal decision finding that the employer and union violated the Pay Equity Act by agreeing to reduce the wages of a female-dominated job class.

The employer argued the reduction was a temporary measure to avoid contracting out work and was justified under exceptions in the Act.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding that the Act prohibits reducing wages of employees who have achieved pay equity, and that the Tribunal reasonably concluded it lacked jurisdiction to order the union to contribute to the wage adjustments.

The applicants filed separate applications against the same respondent and requested that the applications be heard together.

The respondent consented to the request.

Applying the factors set out in Lattey v. Canadian Pacific Railway, the Tribunal found that the applications raised common issues of fact and law.

The Tribunal ordered that the applications be heard together to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The complainant, a Facility Attendant, alleged that the Employer and Union violated section 7 of the Pay Equity Act by agreeing to a wage grid that reduced her wages below the pay equity job rate she had previously achieved.

The Employer argued the reduction was necessary to prevent contracting out and was justified by differences in bargaining strength.

The Tribunal held that reducing an incumbent's wages below an achieved pay equity job rate violates the Act's maintenance requirements.

The Tribunal also found that the bargaining strength exception in subsection 8(2) applies to differences between male and female job classes, not between the union and employer.

Finally, the Tribunal concluded it lacked jurisdiction to order the Union to contribute to the wage adjustments.

The applicant employer brought a motion to stay an arbitrator's interim award pending judicial review.

The employer had disciplined an employee, who grieved the discipline.

The employer subsequently withdrew the discipline and argued the arbitrator lost jurisdiction as the matter was resolved.

The arbitrator found there were remaining remedial issues and retained jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the stay motion, finding no serious question to be determined because the judicial review application was premature and would result in fragmentation of the administrative process.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging creed-based discrimination in employment.

The application was deferred pending a union grievance, which was subsequently settled.

The applicant sought to reactivate the application.

Following a preliminary hearing, the Tribunal dismissed the application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, finding that the grievance settlement appropriately dealt with the substance of the application and the applicant was bound by its resolution.

The applicant filed two human rights applications alleging discrimination on the basis of creed and reprisal.

The respondents requested that certain documents be struck from the first application, while the applicant requested that the applications be consolidated and deferred pending the conclusion of related grievance arbitrations.

The Tribunal deferred the second application pending the grievance arbitrations but declined to consolidate the applications at this time.

The respondents' request to strike documents was deferred to the member presiding at the upcoming preliminary hearing.

The applicant requested to reactivate her human rights application alleging creed discrimination, which had been deferred pending a union grievance.

The respondents opposed the request, arguing it was untimely and barred by a grievance settlement.

The Tribunal granted the reactivation request, finding it was filed within the 60-day time limit under the Rules of Procedure.

However, the Tribunal directed that a preliminary hearing be scheduled to determine whether the application should be dismissed under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code or as an abuse of process due to the settlement.

The appellant was terminated for cause after making violent threats to fellow employees.

He appealed, arguing his conduct was influenced by a mental disability and his termination violated the Ontario Human Rights Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the employer was unaware of the disability at the time of termination and fired him solely for workplace violence.

The appeal was dismissed, and the termination for just cause was upheld.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of family status after she was deemed to have resigned due to absences related to childcare issues.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing the matter was already dealt with by an Employment Standards Officer who denied the applicant termination and severance pay.

The Tribunal dismissed the respondent's request, finding the ESO decision did not address human rights principles or the duty to accommodate, and concluded the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant, a single father and atheist, filed a human rights application alleging that the respondent Children's Aid Society discriminated against him on the basis of creed, sex, family status, and marital status during a child protection investigation and custody dispute.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's complaints related to the quality of his interactions with the respondent and that he failed to point to any evidence linking the alleged poor treatment to a prohibited Code ground.

The application was dismissed as having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister of Labour's delegate to revoke a prior order that authorized a multi-site joint health and safety committee for the respondent school board.

The applicants argued the delegate failed to consider statutory criteria, exercise discretion properly, and provide procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the delegate's decision was a discretionary administrative decision akin to public policy, owed significant deference, and was reasonable given the committee's dysfunction.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of Labour's decision to revoke an order authorizing a multi-workplace joint health and safety committee.

The respondent school board brought a preliminary motion to strike portions of the applicants' affidavits, arguing they contained irrelevant information, hearsay, and improper opinion evidence.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the full panel hearing the judicial review application would be in a better position to assess the admissibility and relevance of the affidavit evidence.

The applicant filed an application to terminate the union's bargaining rights shortly after a previous termination application was dismissed.

The union argued that the multiple applications constituted an abuse of process that interfered with collective bargaining.

The Board exercised its discretion under section 105(2)(i) of the Labour Relations Act to refuse to entertain the application, finding that the union had not been given a reasonable opportunity to pursue collective bargaining free from continuous challenges.

The application was dismissed, and the applicant was barred from filing any new termination application for a period of six months.

The applicant trade union filed an unfair labour practice complaint alleging that the employer's reorganization of its workforce shortly after certification breached the Labour Relations Act.

The employer raised several preliminary procedural issues, seeking an adjournment pending a section 108(2) employee status determination, dismissal for lack of a prima facie case, dismissal for want of particulars, and an order that the union proceed first with its evidence.

The Board dismissed the motions for adjournment, lack of a prima facie case, and want of particulars.

A majority of the Board ordered the employer to proceed first with its evidence, finding that the core allegations attracted the reverse onus provisions of section 91(5) and that the employer had peculiar knowledge of the circumstances.