Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant appealed a 10-year sentence imposed for sexual interference, breach of probation, and breach of prohibition.

At trial, the Crown and defence had presented a joint submission for a 7-year sentence, which the trial judge rejected.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by not following the joint submission and by imposing a demonstrably unfit sentence that ignored the facts of the offence.

The sentence was reduced to the jointly submitted 7 years.

The deceased left a will that expressly disinherited his daughter, stating she had had no communication with him for several years.

The daughter challenged the will, adducing extrinsic evidence that her father's actual motive was racially discriminatory because she had a child with a white man.

The application judge admitted the evidence and set aside the will on public policy grounds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that third-party extrinsic evidence of a testator's motive is inadmissible when the will is clear and unambiguous.

Furthermore, the court held that the public policy doctrine cannot be used to void an unconditional, private testamentary bequest based on a testator's alleged discriminatory motive, affirming the principle of testamentary freedom.

The appellant commenced an action in 2001 against the municipality.

After years of inactivity and failure to set the action down for trial, the motion judge dismissed the action for delay in 2015.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in finding inordinate and inexcusable delay, and failed to accommodate him as a self-represented litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the delay was indeed inordinate and inexcusable, raising a presumption of prejudice that the appellant failed to rebut.

The court noted that while self-represented litigants face challenges, they must still familiarize themselves with relevant procedures.

The appellants challenged the validity of the testator's 2010 wills on the basis of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence.

The respondents successfully moved to dismiss the challenges on the basis that they were barred by the equitable doctrines of estoppel by representation and estoppel by convention.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the equitable doctrines of estoppel do not apply to bar a challenge to the validity of a will.

The Court also held that an interested person does not have an automatic right under rule 75.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to require that a will be proved in solemn form, as the court retains discretion over whether and how a testamentary instrument is proved.

The appellant, author of a book, alleged that the respondents illegally reproduced and sold unauthorized copies of his work, claiming primary and secondary copyright infringement.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment, with the motion judge finding no evidence that they had published, handled, distributed, or offered for sale any infringing copies.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge failed to apprehend key evidence and was biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's factual conclusions were supported by the evidence and that the hearing was fair and impartial.

The appellant was struck by a car and retained a lawyer who pursued accident benefits but failed to commence a tort action within the limitation period.

The appellant sued the lawyer for negligence, and new counsel subsequently issued a statement of claim against the driver.

The motion judge dismissed the tort action as statute-barred, finding the appellant failed to exercise reasonable diligence to discover whether her injuries met the Insurance Act threshold.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, concluding that the appellant's failure to inquire about the permanence of her injuries was unreasonable and that a defence medical report obtained during litigation did not toll the limitation period.

The appellant commercial tenant suffered property damage from a flood and sued the respondent landlord for the uninsured balance of its loss.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding that the lease required the tenant to maintain all-risks insurance and barred claims against the landlord for property damage.

On appeal, the tenant argued summary judgment was inappropriate, the expired lease terms did not apply, and the landlord retained liability for failing to repair the premises.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that summary judgment is appropriate for waiver of subrogation cases, the overholding tenant remained bound by the lease terms, and the lease shifted the risk of damage from an insured peril to the tenant regardless of the landlord's conduct.

The appellant, a second mortgagee on a matrimonial home, appealed a judgment denying its claim for additional funds and interest based on unregistered amending agreements.

The appellant argued its claim trumped that of an execution creditor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant had previously admitted its security only applied to the registered principal amount and had taken an inconsistent position in a separate action.

The court also rejected the appellant's equitable mortgage argument and upheld the costs awards.

Following a successful appeal where the appellant was granted leave to amend his statement of claim, the Court of Appeal determined the issue of costs.

The parties agreed the successful party on appeal should receive $5,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the appellant $5,000 for the appeal, but upheld the motion judge's $15,000 costs award in favour of the respondent.

The amounts were set off, resulting in a net payment of $10,000 from the appellant to the respondent.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claims against the respondent in his personal capacity and as estate trustee for their parents' estates.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in finding no secret trust existed, in concluding the respondent did not hold a property in trust, and by intervening during testimony in a way that created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and credibility, and concluding the single intervention did not meet the threshold for bias.

The appellants appealed a judgment prohibiting them from depositing additional fill on their property and requiring them to remove deposited fill to comply with an approved drainage and grading drawing.

They argued procedural unfairness, limitation periods, and an exemption under the Farming and Food Production Protection Act, 1998.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness or limitation period violation, and agreeing with the application judge that the appellants' operations did not resemble a normal farming operation.

The court also dismissed the appellants' application to file fresh evidence and awarded costs to the respondents.

The appellant landlords appealed a decision declaring that their consent was not required for the respondent tenants to assign and sublease commercial leases as part of a joint venture.

The tenants proposed assigning the leases to a limited partnership whose general partner was the existing tenant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that a limited partnership can only hold property through its general partner.

Since the leases were being assigned to the general partner, which was the existing tenant, the assignment fell within the leases' affiliate exception and did not require the landlords' consent.

The appellants appealed an order regarding disclosure and examination of garnishees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the order under appeal was interlocutory rather than final, as it did not dispose of the appellants' rights on a final basis.

Costs of $8,500 were awarded to the garnishees on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant pleaded guilty to dangerous driving, criminal harassment, and breach of a court order.

He was unaware that his guilty plea to dangerous driving would result in an automatic, indefinite suspension of his driver's licence under the Highway Traffic Act due to his prior convictions.

The Court of Appeal held that the collateral consequence of an indefinite licence suspension was legally relevant and significant to the appellant, a truck driver.

Because he was uninformed of this consequence, his plea was invalid.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty plea and conviction for dangerous driving were set aside, and a new trial was ordered on that charge.

The appellant, a gas station operator, appealed the dismissal of its counterclaim against its former landlord and two former employees.

The employees had secretly negotiated a head lease for the gas station premises after the appellant's lease expired and it refused the landlord's terms.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and inducing breach of contract as statute-barred, finding the appellant knew of the employees' actions more than two years before filing the counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's factual findings on discoverability and the lack of intent by the landlord to induce a breach of contract, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 16 years of parole ineligibility.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the intent for murder by including 'recklessness' as an alternative, and erred in his Vetrovec warnings.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to properly consider his Aboriginal background.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, applying the curative proviso because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there was no realistic possibility the jury convicted based on recklessness.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered the Gladue factors in setting the parole ineligibility period.

The appellant, representative plaintiff in a proposed class action by unit holders of a real estate investment trust, appealed a motion judge's decision striking a knowing assistance claim against the respondents.

The claim alleged the respondents assisted a trustee in a breach of trust by concealing a conflict of interest in a property transaction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motions judge erred by failing to generously construe the pleadings and by concluding that the respondents' alleged suppression of information and active participation could not amount to knowing assistance.

The claim was found to be legally plausible.

The parties separated after a seven-year unmarried relationship.

The trial judge found the respondent had established an unjust enrichment claim regarding the home owned by the appellant, concluding there was a joint family venture, and awarded him $86,500.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing her retroactive child support claim and in finding a joint family venture.

The child support ground was abandoned during the hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the constructive trust claim, finding the trial judge's conclusions on unjust enrichment, joint family venture, and the proportionate damages award were supported by the evidence.

The appellant company appealed a trial decision finding that two kitchen cabinet installers were dependent contractors entitled to 26 months' reasonable notice upon termination.

The appellants argued the workers were independent contractors because they had performed some work for a competitor in the two years prior to termination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that exclusivity must be assessed over the full history of the relationship, during which the workers had served the company almost exclusively for over 25 years.

The Court also upheld the 26-month notice period, finding that the workers' age, length of service, and economic dependence constituted exceptional circumstances justifying an award beyond the usual 24-month cap.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing personal guarantees she signed for corporate loans.

She argued the motion judge erred procedurally by proceeding despite allegations that she lacked mental capacity, and substantively by rejecting her defenses of non est factum, undue influence, and material change to the loan arrangement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no cogent medical evidence of incapacity and upholding the motion judge's findings that the appellant understood the continuing all accounts guarantees she signed.