Stephen M Panzer

The defendant moved for an order setting aside his noting in default.

The court considered the factors for setting aside default, including the defendant's explanation for delay, the substantial value of the claim, and the lack of prejudice to the plaintiffs.

The motion was granted, and the noting in default was set aside on terms, allowing the defendant to file a statement of defence and setting timelines for document exchange.

The defendant moved to set aside a noting in default and default judgment, as well as an order for a writ of possession and a certificate of lien related to unpaid common expenses.

The court found that the defendant failed to prove she did not receive notice of the claim, delayed significantly in bringing the motion, and presented no arguable defence on the merits.

The motion was dismissed, but the plaintiff agreed to a 90-day stay on eviction.

The plaintiffs sought leave to register a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on a property, claiming an equitable interest based on resulting trust or an oral trust agreement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no triable issue regarding the plaintiffs' claim to an interest in the property and that the equities did not favour granting the CPL.

The court found insufficient credible evidence to support either a gratuitous transfer for a resulting trust or the alleged oral trust agreement, noting inconsistencies in the plaintiffs' evidence and an adverse inference drawn from refusal to disclose electronic files.

The plaintiff brought a motion to substitute a known roofing contractor for a 'John Doe Contractor' defendant on the basis of misnomer, to have three related fire damage actions tried together, and to assign the matter to case management.

The court dismissed the misnomer motion, finding the proposed defendant could not have reasonably known the 'litigating finger' was pointed at him since he was known to the plaintiff and the pleading described an unknown entity.

The court granted the request to try the actions together due to overlapping facts and witnesses, but declined to order case management.

The applicant filed a human rights application against her employer, King Township, alleging discrimination and harassment based on disability, sex, and reprisal.

She subsequently requested to add three individuals as respondents: Alan Jackson, Rick Hampton, and Dina Hampton.

The Tribunal applied the three-part test from Smyth to determine whether to add the proposed respondents.

The Tribunal granted the request to add Alan Jackson, finding that the allegations of sexist comments could support a finding of sexual harassment for which the employer is not vicariously liable.

The Tribunal denied the request to add Rick Hampton, as the single allegation against him did not amount to harassment and the employer would be vicariously liable.

The Tribunal also denied the request to add Dina Hampton, as the alleged harassing conduct was not connected to a prohibited ground of discrimination.

The appellant commercial tenant suffered property damage from a flood and sued the respondent landlord for the uninsured balance of its loss.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding that the lease required the tenant to maintain all-risks insurance and barred claims against the landlord for property damage.

On appeal, the tenant argued summary judgment was inappropriate, the expired lease terms did not apply, and the landlord retained liability for failing to repair the premises.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that summary judgment is appropriate for waiver of subrogation cases, the overholding tenant remained bound by the lease terms, and the lease shifted the risk of damage from an insured peril to the tenant regardless of the landlord's conduct.

The plaintiff brought a motion to transfer the action to another jurisdiction and for leave to amend the statement of claim after discovery evidence revealed additional entities allegedly involved in selling the plaintiff’s musical compositions.

The defendants argued the amendments were statute‑barred, would cause prejudice, lacked particulars, and were invalid because the underlying oral agreement contravened the Copyright Act.

The court held that amendments should generally be permitted under Rule 26.01 unless non‑compensable prejudice would result.

The court found the alleged cause of action arose after termination of the agreement in 2012, rejected arguments that the oral agreement was invalid under s. 13(4) of the Copyright Act, and concluded the proposed amendments raised triable issues.

Leave to amend was granted with limited exceptions, and the action was ordered transferred to Newmarket or Toronto.