Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellants obtained a default judgment against Grocery Dayton for $980,200 after discontinuing their action against Wakefern Food Corporation.

Upon discovering Grocery Dayton was not a legal entity, the appellants moved to amend the judgment to add Wakefern as a judgment debtor, arguing Grocery Dayton was merely an alias for Wakefern.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding insufficient evidence that the two were the same entity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing there was insufficient evidence and that it would be unfair to add Wakefern without allowing it to defend the action on its merits.

However, the Court exercised its jurisdiction to set aside the discontinuance against Wakefern.

The appellants, a group of trucking companies, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for two shipments of copper tubing hijacked in Mexico.

The trial judge found the appellants could not rely on exclusion of liability clauses or statutory limitations, and were alternatively liable in tort.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the exclusion clauses did not apply because they were not brought to the respondent's attention.

However, the Court held the trial judge erred in finding the statutory limitation of liability did not apply, as the value of the goods was not declared on the face of the bill of lading.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in finding independent tort liability.

The appeal was allowed in part, reducing the judgment to the statutory limit of $110,830.

The accused was acquitted of sexual offences involving two underage girls after the trial judge found he had taken all reasonable steps to ascertain their ages under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in his application of the mistake of age defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly identified and applied the legal principles, and that it was open to him to conclude that a reasonable person would not have made further inquiries given the compelling indicia of age presented by the complainants.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on drug trafficking charges, which followed the trial judge's exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to a finding of arbitrary detention under s. 9.

The trial judge had concluded that police lacked objectively reasonable grounds to arrest the respondent based on confidential informant tips and surveillance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by considering the informant information and police observations in isolation.

When viewed in totality, the informant information was sufficiently compelling and corroborated by police surveillance of multiple brief meetings in vehicles outside the respondent's residence to establish reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal two orders in a high-conflict matrimonial proceeding: an order striking his pleadings for failure to pay costs, and a subsequent final order from an uncontested trial.

The moving party argued that as a self-represented litigant, he did not understand the implications of the order striking his pleadings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party had a lawyer present when the consequences were discussed, failed to move promptly after learning of the final order, and failed to demonstrate that the final order resulted in any real injustice or substantive errors.

The plaintiff sued the municipality for a slip and fall.

The municipality claimed contribution and indemnity from its winter maintenance contractor and the contractor's insurer.

The insurer appointed a single law firm to represent both the contractor and the municipality.

When the insurer later attempted to remove itself from representing the municipality, the municipality brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement for full defence and indemnity.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appointment of joint counsel necessarily implied an agreement to both defend and indemnify the municipality, as any other interpretation would have placed counsel in an untenable conflict of interest.

The appellant, a dentist, was injured in a motor vehicle accident and claimed damages for future income loss, arguing her injuries prevented full-time clinical practice.

The jury awarded significantly less for future income loss than claimed.

The appellant appealed, arguing the award was inconsistent and that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding the propriety of pre-trial communications between her counsel and an expert witness.

The respondents cross-appealed on costs, assignment of collateral benefits, and prejudgment interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding evidence supported the jury's verdict, counsel had agreed to the jury charge regarding the expert witness, and the trial judge made no errors in her discretionary orders on costs, benefits, and interest.

Following a successful appeal in an estate litigation matter, the appellants sought costs for both the motion below and the appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their full requested costs for the motion below, totaling approximately $319,000, noting these were less than the costs originally awarded to the respondents.

For the appeal, the court awarded partial indemnity costs of $100,000 and $75,000 to the respective appellants.

The court rejected the argument that the issues were sufficiently novel to depart from the normal costs rules, and held that the public policy considerations for a blended costs award payable from the estate were not engaged.

The appellant appealed two orders concerning a default judgment for amounts owed on a professional student line of credit and a credit card.

The appellant had failed to file a defence, was noted in default, and default judgment was granted.

Her subsequent motions to set aside the default judgment were dismissed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judges that the motion to set aside was not brought in time, lacked a plausible excuse for the default, and presented no arguable defence on the merits.

The appellant's argument that repayment was only required upon her call to the bar was rejected as contrary to the written agreement.

In a court-appointed receivership, the spouse of the debtor's principal sought leave to appeal an order extending a Mareva injunction and repatriating a misappropriated HST refund.

A third party claiming an interest in the funds also appealed the order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the spouse's motion for leave to appeal, finding no arguable merit to her procedural complaints about the ex parte Mareva order.

The Court granted the Receiver and a secured creditor's motions for security for costs against the third party, finding his appeal appeared frivolous and he lacked assets in Ontario.

The appellant brought an oppression remedy claim against his siblings regarding the sale of shares in a family business and the failure to provide information.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on summary judgment as statute-barred under the two-year limitation period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while summary judgment is generally not available for applications under Rule 14, the procedural defect caused no prejudice.

However, the Court found that the respondents' subsequent application for a valuator constituted a new, discrete act of oppression.

Therefore, the oppression claim was not statute-barred.

The appeal was allowed and the matter directed to trial.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following its decision on the main appeal.

In accordance with the parties' agreement, the court ordered that the costs of the appeal be paid out of the estate of the deceased.

The successful appellant was awarded $46,000, and the respondents were awarded $25,000.

The appellant solicitors appealed an assessment ordering them to repay $73,000 and costs to their former client.

They argued the trial judge erred by relying on an inadmissible expert report, failing to dismiss for delay, and violating mediation confidentiality.

The respondent cross-appealed, seeking further reduction of the accounts and a higher interest rate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evaluation of the solicitors' competence, his procedural rulings, or his discretionary award of interest.

The appellant, Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation, appealed a decision regarding the calculation of amounts payable to the respondent non-utility generators under long-term power purchase agreements.

The dispute centered on whether a new government regulation reallocating the Global Adjustment Mechanism (GA) altered the calculation of Total Market Costs (TMC) under the agreements.

The application judge found that the new GA calculation was inconsistent with the definition of TMC, which required costs to be allocated pro rata to consumption.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge did not decide the case on an unargued issue, made no palpable and overriding factual errors, and properly interpreted the agreements without improperly implying a term.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and commenced an action against one driver.

He later amended his claim to add a second driver as a defendant, and the first driver crossclaimed against the second driver.

The second driver successfully moved for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim as statute-barred, but the motion judge refused to dismiss the crossclaim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff's appeal, finding the motion judge erred by conflating a lack of due diligence with the actual date of discoverability under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court dismissed the second driver's cross-appeal regarding the crossclaim, upholding the motion judge's finding on when the claim for contribution and indemnity was reasonably discoverable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter and assault with a weapon, as well as his sentence of five years' imprisonment and a ten-year long-term supervision order.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification and the Vetrovec warning for an accomplice's testimony.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the instructions.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued he should have received enhanced credit (1.5:1) for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in denying enhanced credit solely because the appellant did not apply for bail, enhanced credit was not warranted because the appellant's extensive criminal record and likelihood of reoffending meant he was unlikely to be granted early release.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of sexual assault, arguing he was denied a fair trial due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

He alleged his counsel failed to cross-examine the complainant on certain text messages and conducted a perfunctory examination-in-chief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that counsel's decision not to use the text messages was a deliberate tactical decision within the range of reasonable professional assistance.

Furthermore, the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice, as the text messages largely corroborated the complainant's account.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for firearms offences, mischief, and intimidating a justice system participant.

The charges arose after the appellant fired a high-powered rifle into the home of a witness scheduled to testify against his friend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility findings or conclusion that the appellant had exclusive access to the firearm.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the imposition of consecutive sentences for distinct wrongs was appropriate and the total sentence of eight years was not unreasonable given the gravity of the offences.

An administrative error imposing victim fine surcharges was quashed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision regarding a software licensing dispute.

The motion judge found that the respondent breached the licence agreement and infringed copyright by using the software on operating systems other than AIX, but did not breach the agreement by using it on multiple servers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the contract, finding no server restriction but confirming the AIX operating system restriction.

However, the Court allowed the respondent's cross-appeal in part, finding that the motion judge erred in dismissing the estoppel defence regarding the AIX restriction, and directed that the estoppel issue proceed to trial alongside the limitation defence and damages.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order for extradition.

The applicant argued the Minister erred in refusing disclosure of correspondence related to the termination of his Ontario prosecution and in assessing the Cotroni factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no air of reality to the disclosure claim and concluding the Minister's Cotroni assessment was reasonable.