Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the Law Society of Upper Canada after his statement of claim was struck out as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and being an abuse of process.

The appellant alleged a long history of unfair treatment, including administrative suspensions, disciplinary proceedings, and bankruptcy opposition.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the individual acts did not give rise to viable causes of action as pleaded and that many claims were settled by prior releases.

However, the Court found the motion judge erred in refusing leave to amend the pleading to properly allege the tort of misfeasance in public office based on a cumulative pattern of bad faith conduct.

The appeal was allowed in part to grant leave to file a fresh as amended statement of claim.

The appellant challenged jury convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime under $5,000.

The court rejected the submission that intercepted drug purchase calls were inadmissible hearsay, distinguishing the governing Supreme Court authority because there were multiple calls, confirmatory evidence, and practical necessity.

The court also held that the jury charge, read as a whole, adequately instructed on reasonable doubt and did not require a specific W.(D.) instruction concerning the defence witness.

The remaining complaints about credibility and demeanour instructions disclosed no material error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits until returning to work.

The insurer sent a letter discontinuing benefits and warning of a two-year limitation period to dispute the refusal.

The appellant later stopped working due to her injuries and sought reinstatement of benefits, which the insurer denied as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the action, confirming that the limitation period began running upon the valid refusal of benefits, and was not delayed by the temporary return to work provision in the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant sought an extension of time to seek a panel review of a 2008 order by a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which had denied his application for an extension of time to appeal his 2002 second-degree murder conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the seven-year delay in seeking the review and failed to demonstrate any basis to interfere with the single judge's discretionary decision.

The appellant was convicted of procuring a 14-year-old to become a prostitute and aiding her in engaging in prostitution for gain.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the closing address by his co-accused's counsel relied on matters not in evidence and prejudiced his right to a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that circumstantial evidence supported the co-accused's counsel's inferences and that the trial judge provided an adequate corrective instruction.

Leave to appeal the sentence was also denied.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 7 years' imprisonment for drug and property-related offences, including possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in finding he was at a high level of the drug business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the agreed facts amply supported the inference that he was a high-level trafficker and not merely a non-professional courier.

The sentence fell within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and assault in respect of the death of his infant son, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of civilian witnesses and a medical expert.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material error in the trial judge's appreciation of the evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed to grant enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody at a ratio of 1.5:1, reducing the residual sentence to 5.25 years' imprisonment.

The appellants brought an action to enforce promissory notes and a claim for fraudulent conveyance.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the appellants on the promissory notes but dismissed their fraudulent conveyance claim.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in dismissing the fraudulent conveyance claim when the defendants had not moved for summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that summary judgment may be granted against a moving party.

The cross-appeal was allowed in part on consent to reduce the damages awarded on the promissory notes from $710,000 to $650,000.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its summary judgment motion, which sought to declare mortgages granted by the respondent parents to their children as fraudulent conveyances.

The motion judge found good consideration for the mortgages and no intent to defraud, dismissing the action against the children.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding the motion judge's factual findings were entitled to deference and rejecting the appellant's attempt to raise new claims on appeal.

The appellants appealed the summary dismissal of their medical malpractice action.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, finding the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of discoverability under s. 5(2).

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge failed to consider receipts for medical records that suggested a later discovery date.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that pleadings are not evidence and the receipts alone, without an explanation linking the records to the discovery of the claim, were insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption.

The appellants appealed their convictions for numerous drug, proceeds of crime, and firearms offences following a jury trial.

The appellant Duncan also appealed his sentence.

The appellants argued that the trial judge's jury instructions were inadequate, particularly in relating the evidence to the legal issues and presenting the defence's position.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals regarding the drug and proceeds of crime convictions, finding the jury instructions adequate.

However, the Court allowed Duncan's appeal on the two firearms convictions, finding the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the elements of trafficking by offer and conspiracy to possess an unauthorized firearm, and erred in applying a reverse onus for the conspiracy charge.

The firearms convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

Duncan's global sentence was reduced from 15 years to 14 years to reflect the overturned convictions.

The parties separated after a 27-year marriage.

At trial, the judge ordered the wife to pay an equalization payment, ordered the husband to pay indefinite spousal support based on imputed incomes, and awarded full indemnity costs to the husband.

The wife appealed the spousal support, equalization, and costs orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge failed to explain the basis for imputing $484,356 in annual income to the wife, precluding meaningful appellate review.

The court also set aside the costs award, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the husband's settlement offer and his degree of success at trial.

The spousal support and costs issues were remitted to the trial judge, while the equalization payment was upheld.

The moving party, a director of the debtor companies, sought leave to appeal orders approving the sale of a lawsuit commenced by the debtors against their secured creditor.

The receiver had accepted a credit bid from the secured creditor to purchase the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the receiver's authority to sell the action was already determined in prior unappealed orders (res judicata) and that the proposed appeal lacked prima facie merit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break, enter, and theft under $5,000, and sought leave to appeal his sentence of six months' imprisonment and 24 months' probation.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by excluding spontaneous exculpatory statements, reversing the onus of proof regarding alibi evidence, and failing to caution himself on eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or assessment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly considered the mitigating factors and the sentence was not unfit.

The appellants appealed an order recognizing the respondents' common user rights over narrow parcels of land fronting Lake Simcoe, known as the 'Slivers'.

The application judge found that the respondents, as owners of lots in the subdivision, had openly and continuously used the Slivers since 1950, satisfying the requirements under the Registry Act and Land Titles Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's assessment of the uncontradicted affidavit evidence and declining to restrict the user rights to bathing purposes.

The appellant receiver sought to appeal an interlocutory order refusing to cancel a letter of credit posted as security in a civil action.

The receiver argued the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction under s. 193 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act because the motion was styled in both the civil action and the receivership proceedings.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that the substance of the order was a refusal to vary an order in a civil action, not an order in bankruptcy proceedings.

The proper route of appeal was to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order awarding sole custody of two children to the respondent father.

The mother argued the trial judge erred by proceeding in her absence, demonstrated bias, and ignored evidence of her good parenting and the father's domestic violence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the custody and bias issues, finding no error in the trial judge's conduct or factual findings.

The appeal was allowed only to correct a miscalculation of child support arrears agreed upon by the parties.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing death after striking a 13-year-old pedestrian while driving 152 km/h in a 50 km/h zone.

He argued the trial judge failed to consider evidence regarding his speed and erred in assessing legal causation, specifically whether the victim running onto the road was an intervening act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the speed evidence lacked probative force and the appellant's dangerous driving was a significant contributing cause of the death.

The applicant, whose licence to practise law was revoked following discipline proceedings, brought a motion to the Court of Appeal to state a special case regarding the jurisdiction of the Law Society Hearing Panel.

She also sought directions for leave to appeal a 2009 Divisional Court order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that Rule 22 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the parties to agree to state a special case, which the Law Society did not.

The request for directions was also dismissed as there was no pending motion for leave to appeal and the underlying jurisdictional issue had already been rendered moot by subsequent proceedings.

The Bank appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for knowing assistance in a breach of trust after it allowed a payroll processing company continued access to electronic banking facilities despite knowing of a deficit in a trust account.

The plaintiffs cross-appealed the dismissal of their claim for knowing receipt of trust funds regarding a transfer that reduced an overdraft.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the knowledge requirement for knowing assistance and made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the Bank had no obligation to inquire into the overdrafts.