Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The receiver of the appellant appealed a motion judge's interpretation of an accounts receivable insurance policy with the respondent insurer.

The motion judge found that buyers' claims for set-off against amounts owing to the appellant constituted a 'dispute' under clause 7 of the policy, which deferred the insurer's liability to pay claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no ambiguity in the clause and confirming that a dispute is not restricted to claims arising out of the unpaid shipment of goods.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to quash the plaintiff's notice of appeal to the Court of Appeal on jurisdictional grounds.

The trial judge had dismissed the plaintiff's defamation claim but indicated that if the claim had been allowed, damages would have been assessed at $25,000.

The Court of Appeal held that under s. 19(1.2)(d) of the Courts of Justice Act, the Divisional Court has jurisdiction because the trial judge indicated the award would have been not more than $50,000.

The motion to quash was allowed and the appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellant brought a motion to set aside an order of Blair J.A., which denied his request for the province to pay for appeal transcripts and refused a stay of child support pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the single judge's analysis or conclusions and dismissed the motion.

The tenant appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to set aside a default judgment obtained by the landlord respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's decision because the appellants failed to provide affidavit evidence explaining their delay in responding to the Statement of Claim or establishing a plausible defence.

The court noted the respondent's undertaking to credit the appellants for any re-rental amounts received and directed that the final judgment be adjusted accordingly.

The appellant appealed an order regarding funds held in court related to an estate.

The respondents moved to dismiss or stay the appeal, alleging the real litigant was a declared vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the underlying application had not been advanced for over 10 years, the beneficiaries were elderly, and the appellant's agent could not justify retaining the funds in court.

The appeal was found to be devoid of merit.

The self-represented appellant father appealed a summary judgment order granting sole custody of the two teenaged children to the respondent mother, with access at the children's discretion.

The father argued the motion judge erred in hearing the summary judgment motion after the matter was set for trial, in applying the evidentiary burden, and in assessing the children's best interests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the summary judgment framework and properly considered the children's best interests, including their expressed wishes not to have court-ordered access with the father.

The plaintiff commenced an action for negligence after a fire on the defendant's railway lands damaged its business.

The action was struck from the trial list due to outstanding undertakings and later administratively dismissed for delay after a motion judge refused to restore it.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in principle by focusing on allocating blame for the delay rather than whether the plaintiff's explanation was reasonable, and by presuming prejudice from the passage of time.

The Court reweighed the evidence, found the plaintiff's explanation acceptable and no non-compensable prejudice to the defendant, and ordered the action restored to the trial list.

The appellant, a permanent resident, pleaded guilty to robbery and was subsequently deported.

He appealed his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to ineffective assistance of counsel, as his lawyer allegedly failed to advise him of the immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was already subject to a stayed deportation order and knew that further criminal convictions could lead to deportation.

Even if counsel's performance was deficient, there was no miscarriage of justice because the appellant understood deportation was a potential consequence of his plea.

The debtor executed an irrevocable direction instructing its law firm to disburse an anticipated tax refund to three creditors, including the law firm itself.

A judgment creditor subsequently served a notice of garnishment on the law firm in respect of the tax refund.

The law firm disbursed the funds according to the irrevocable direction rather than paying the judgment creditor.

The motion judge found the law firm should have followed the garnishment procedure.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the tax refund was not a garnishable debt owed by the law firm to the debtor, and therefore the notice of garnishment had no effect.

The Crown appealed the youth's acquittals for human trafficking and living on the avails of prostitution, while the youth cross-appealed his convictions for assault and breach of an undertaking.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge erred by applying a subjective standard to the definition of exploitation and by concluding a single act could not constitute prostitution.

The youth's cross-appeal was dismissed as the trial judge's credibility findings and verdicts were reasonable.

A new trial was ordered on the trafficking and prostitution charges.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment that awarded his bankrupt wife an equalization payment, lump sum spousal support, and costs.

The wife's former lawyers also appealed an order requiring the assessment of their accounts and a personal costs award against them.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the equalization payment because the wife lacked capacity to assert the claim after her bankruptcy, and setting aside the assessment of the lawyers' accounts.

However, the Court upheld the lump sum spousal support award and the costs awards, including the personal costs award against the wife's former lawyer for acting in bad faith and running up costs without reasonable cause.

The Town brought an application under s. 440 of the Municipal Act to enjoin the appellant from contravening its zoning and site alteration by-laws, alleging the appellant operated an illegal waste disposal business.

The appellant claimed the properties were used for a legal non-conforming peat moss and triple mix business.

The application judge granted the injunction based on affidavit evidence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred by resolving conflicting material facts and credibility issues solely on a written record and by failing to make factual findings to support the site alteration injunction.

The appeal was allowed and a trial of the issues was directed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to the complainant's lack of credibility and that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge meaningfully addressed the frailties in the complainant's evidence, including her criminal record and drug use, and properly found confirmation in other evidence such as her immediate reporting and physical injuries.

The verdict was held to be reasonable.

The appellant, a high school teacher, was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault against a 14-year-old student.

He appealed his convictions, arguing primarily that the trial judge erred by permitting the Crown to call a vice-principal as a reply witness to rebut the appellant's testimony regarding a conversation between them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the reply evidence did not breach the rule against case-splitting because the Crown could not have reasonably anticipated the appellant's testimony.

The court also dismissed arguments regarding inadmissible hearsay and inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The appellants were convicted of administering a stupefying thing to enable sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm against two complainants.

They appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on evidence of the complainants' out-of-character conduct, misapprehended toxicological evidence, and improperly used post-offence conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or application of legal principles.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge's reasons were insufficient because she acquitted on two other incidents based on unreliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly explained why the evidence for the third incident was reliable despite concerns about the first two.

The Crown appealed the refusal of a trial judge to make a DNA data bank order pursuant to s. 487.05(1) of the Criminal Code against a young person.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and issued the order sought by the Crown.

The appellant appealed a conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting and using similar fact evidence by relying too heavily on generic similarities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly relied on specific similarities and correctly applied the law regarding the admissibility and use of discreditable conduct evidence.

The trial judge's discretionary determination was entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed his conviction for theft.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's receipt being found in the complainant's stolen purse and the complainant's wallet being found near the appellant's residence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the only rational inference was the appellant's guilt.

The respondent pleaded guilty to breaking and entering a dwelling-house and committing sexual assault under s. 348(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing judge initially imposed a SOIRA order but later rescinded it, concluding that s. 348(1)(b) was not a designated offence.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while s. 348(1)(b) is not listed as a designated offence, the respondent was sentenced under s. 348(1)(d), which is a designated offence.

Therefore, the SOIRA order was mandatory.