Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant appealed a discretionary order deferring the determination of her entitlement to post-retirement spousal support until the respondent's retirement.

The trial judge recognized that the operation of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act could create an inequity, but concluded the issue was best addressed when the parties' means and needs had crystallized.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle given the parties' ages and the time-limited support order already in place.

The appeal was dismissed, though the Court noted the appellant should be protected against unilateral dissipation of the pension prior to retirement.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his wrongful dismissal claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant did not accept an amended employment contract and that his dismissal was justified for just cause due to his conduct.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the respondent improperly deducted $6,250 from the appellant's final payment in violation of s. 13 of the Employment Standards Act.

The trial judgment was varied to order payment of $6,250 to the appellant, with costs of the appeal awarded to the respondent due to mixed success.

The appellants appealed a judgment assessing damages for an admitted breach, arguing the motion judge applied the wrong test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge applied the correct test and reasonably concluded it was foreseeable the respondent would continue to lend money to the deceased.

The court also upheld the motion judge's analysis regarding section 13 of the Evidence Act.

The appellant commenced a construction lien action against the respondent, who counterclaimed for breach of contract and negligence.

The lien claim was dismissed, but the counterclaim proceeded to trial within the same action, resulting in a judgment for the respondent.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction, arguing the appeal lay to the Divisional Court under s. 71(1) of the Construction Lien Act.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, holding that a judgment on a counterclaim in a construction lien action remains a judgment under the Act unless explicitly transferred to the ordinary procedure.

The appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed a trial order regarding custody, parenting time, spousal support, and equalization.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's factual findings on custody and the valuation of a shareholder loan for equalization purposes.

However, the court set aside the trial judge's award of $1 per year in spousal support, noting it was unnecessary and unrequested at trial.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of deleting the spousal support order.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder and accessory after the fact to murder.

At trial, the Crown called the common-law spouses of two of the appellants as witnesses and introduced out-of-court statements made by one of the spouses shortly after the shooting.

The appellants appealed, arguing the spousal incompetency rule should be extended to common-law spouses under s. 15(1) of the Charter, and that the out-of-court statements were inadmissible hearsay.

The Court of Appeal held that while failing to extend the spousal incompetency rule to common-law spouses violates s. 15(1) of the Charter, the limitation is justified under s. 1.

The court also upheld the admission of the out-of-court statements under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

At his annual review hearing, all parties presented a joint submission to continue his previous disposition, which included unaccompanied privileges.

The Board rejected the joint submission and imposed a more restrictive disposition without giving the parties notice of its intention to do so.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Board breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to give the appellant notice that it was inclined to reject the joint submission and an opportunity to lead further evidence or make additional submissions.

The plaintiff, a Canadian citizen residing in Ontario, sued the defendant, an Iranian national, for damages arising from his alleged abduction and torture in Iran.

The defendant brought a motion to stay the proceedings on the basis of forum non conveniens, arguing England was the more appropriate forum.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge made factual errors regarding the defendant's ability to enter Canada and the procedural advantages of litigating in England.

The Court concluded that England was clearly the more appropriate forum, as the defendant had no connection to Ontario, both parties had connections to England, and most witnesses resided outside Canada.

The appeal was allowed and the Ontario action was stayed.

The appellant and respondent entered into a business arrangement to acquire a property, incorporating a company to hold it.

The respondent provided financing, secured by promissory notes and share pledging agreements.

When a third partner defaulted, the appellant acquired his shares but failed to pay the outstanding debt associated with them.

The trial judge found the respondent was entitled to forfeit the unpaid shares, resulting in a 55% ownership stake for the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge reasonably interpreted the interconnected agreements and correctly found that the statement of claim served as sufficient written notice of forfeiture.

The Ministry of Transportation (MTO) appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for the failure of a road surface treatment applied by the respondent contractors.

The trial judge concluded the contract was a method specification contract, placing the risk of failure on the MTO, and heavily criticized MTO's counsel for allegedly improperly influencing its expert witness, awarding full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the contract but found he erred in his severe criticism of MTO's trial counsel, noting that counsel's interactions with the expert were appropriate under the principles in Moore v. Getahun.

Consequently, the Court reduced the trial costs award from full to substantial indemnity.

The appellant employer appealed a partial summary judgment awarding the respondent employee 16 months' notice for wrongful dismissal.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by applying a 'rule of thumb' of one month per year of service and by finding the respondent made reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages despite applying for only four positions in ten months.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge properly applied the Bardal factors to determine the notice period and correctly concluded the respondent's mitigation efforts were reasonable given his specialized role as a radiation safety officer.

The appellant appealed a costs order made by the application judge, arguing a lack of jurisdiction and inadequate notice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the claim for further relief, a previous costs order, and a settlement offer provided adequate notice.

The court also upheld the costs order as justified because the application judge found the appellant had perjured herself, protracting the litigation.

The appellant appealed an order striking his claim against a Texas lawyer and an Ontario lawyer for conduct related to Texas litigation and subsequent Ontario enforcement proceedings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the claims of conspiracy, intentional infliction of harm, and interference with contractual relations were misconceived and disclosed no cause of action.

The court also found no merit in the appellant's argument that the motion judge should have recused himself for reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sued the respondent bank for breach of contract and negligence after his cousins fraudulently withdrew over $1 million from his account.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the appellant was bound by a Financial Services Agreement (FSA) that released the bank from liability if errors were not reported within 30 days.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons and misconstrued the FSA.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the verification agreement constituted a complete defence and the appellant failed to exercise reasonable care.

The respondent's cross-appeal on costs was allowed, directing the appellant to pay the trial costs.

The appellant employer appealed a trial decision finding it had constructively dismissed the respondent and awarding damages based on a 16-month notice period.

The employer argued the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of the mining industry's cyclical nature, finding the respondent was not obliged to accept a recall position to mitigate, setting a 16-month notice period, and determining the termination date under the Employment Standards Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and that the respondent was constructively dismissed upon recall to a substantially different position.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his counterclaim for delay.

He had failed to deliver an affidavit of documents or prepare a discovery plan as required by a consent timetable order issued at a status hearing.

The appellant argued the motion judge should have applied Rule 24, which places the onus on the moving party to show inordinate and inexcusable delay.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in requiring the appellant to explain his delay under rule 48.14 and noting the court's power to dismiss a proceeding for failure to comply with an interlocutory order under rule 60.12.

The defendants appealed an order granting the plaintiff leave to amend her statement of claim in an occupier's liability action.

The defendants argued the amendment introduced a new cause of action outside the limitation period, making the order final.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding the amendment merely alleged an alternative factual scenario for the fall and did not add a new cause of action.

As the order was interlocutory, the appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction, with costs awarded to the plaintiff.

The appellant noted her former solicitor in default and proceeded to an assessment of damages.

The trial judge found the solicitor had not served the appellant well but concluded she failed to establish any damages, providing no explanation for denying the return of her $5,000 retainer.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal granted judgment for the $5,000 retainer but dismissed a motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding no other damages were established.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision upholding her termination for just cause.

The employer had terminated the appellant after she submitted a claim for benefits under the employer's health insurance plan in the name of a 'phantom beneficiary'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility findings or the conclusion that termination was a proportional response to the misconduct.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment dismissing its claim against the respondent.

The appellant alleged that the respondent was liable for a fraud perpetrated by his son because they had previously been in business together and the son used a bank account associated with that business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the respondent had any knowledge of or participated in the alleged fraud, and agreeing with the motion judge that the case put against the respondent was entirely speculative.