Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder after his three children tried to kill their mother.

At trial, the Crown theorized that the appellant used his religious beliefs to influence the children, and made inflammatory remarks during closing submissions comparing the appellant to notorious cult leaders and calling him a 'Jesus nut'.

The trial judge did not correct these remarks or instruct the jury on how to use the evidence of the appellant's religious beliefs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the Crown's improper comments and the trial judge's failure to intervene rendered the trial unfair and caused a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and possession of child pornography relating to a young girl.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in restricting cross-examination under s. 276 of the Criminal Code, misapprehended evidence, and improperly used child pornography evidence.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence and appealed his six-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or factual findings.

The fresh evidence application was dismissed as it lacked sufficient probative value.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the six-year global sentence was fit given the serious aggravating factors.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment in favour of the respondent bank for a credit card debt and the dismissal of his counterclaim.

The appellant argued that documents he sent to the bank constituted an accord and satisfaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant could not unilaterally dictate the terms of repayment and finding no procedural unfairness in the denial of cross-examination where no notice of examination was served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failing to stop at the scene of an accident involving bodily harm and death.

He argued that he rebutted the presumption of intent to escape civil or criminal liability under s. 252(2) of the Criminal Code because he pulled over after the accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly concluded the appellant knew his vehicle had been struck, stopped only to assess the damage, and left to avoid liability because he was driving without the requisite licence.

The respondent pleaded guilty to trafficking in a substance held out to be cocaine and faced a mandatory minimum sentence of one year.

The sentencing judge imposed the mandatory minimum but illegally granted 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown appealed the illegal sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, correcting the pre-sentence custody credit to the maximum permitted 1.5:1 ratio.

However, considering the Crown's failure to raise the error at sentencing, the delay in the appeal, and the fact that the respondent had already served the imposed sentence, the Court permanently stayed the execution of the remaining balance.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for damages arising from a shareholder dispute.

A motion judge granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff for the defendants' breach of an interim agreement, ordering damages and costs.

When the defendants failed to pay, a second motion judge struck their statement of defence.

The defendants appealed both orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the summary judgment, finding the defendants had consented to the procedure and the evidence supported the breach.

However, the Court allowed the appeal of the order striking the defence, holding that such a severe sanction was disproportionate and should not be a remedy of first resort, particularly where the defendants were misled by their former counsel.

The appellant, a resident of the United States, appealed the dismissal of her motion to dismiss or stay an action on a debt for lack of jurisdiction.

The respondent, an Ontario resident, sued the appellant for repayment of a loan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the contract was made in Ontario when the respondent received telephone confirmation of the acceptance of her offer to lend funds.

This established a presumptive connecting factor for jurisdiction simpliciter under the Van Breda framework, which the appellant failed to rebut.

The appellants appealed from a judgment made at an undefended trial, arguing they were not properly served with notice of two preceding orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had actual knowledge of the proceedings and had failed to move to set aside the underlying orders.

The court noted that an order made without notice is not a nullity but remains an order of the court until set aside.

The plaintiff's action was administratively dismissed for delay twice.

The defendant consented to setting aside the first dismissal but refused for the second.

The master dismissed the plaintiff's motion to set aside the second dismissal, finding the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence rebutting the presumption of prejudice.

The Divisional Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal, holding that the master erred in requiring affirmative evidence to rebut presumed prejudice.

The defendant's own conduct, including consenting to the first dismissal and engaging in settlement discussions, rebutted any presumption of prejudice, and the finality principle was not engaged because the plaintiff moved promptly.

The appellant husband appealed judgments in a debt action and a matrimonial proceeding.

In the debt action, the trial judge found the husband jointly liable with his former wife for three loans advanced by her father.

In the matrimonial proceeding, the trial judge ordered spousal support, child support including section 7 expenses, and determined equalization amounts without discounting the wife's debts to her father.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual conclusions or assessment of credibility.

The appellant was convicted of firearm and drug offences after police found him in the backyard of a townhouse while responding to a 911 call.

The police placed him under investigative detention for trespassing and, after observing suspicious movements indicating he might be armed, conducted a safety search that revealed a loaded handgun and drugs.

On appeal, the appellant argued the safety search was unlawful and the evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the safety search was justified by a reasonable belief that officer safety was at stake, and upholding the trial judge's decision to admit the evidence despite minor s. 10 Charter breaches.

The respondent submitted a claim for long-term disability benefits under a group insurance policy, which was denied.

After exhausting the internal appeal process, she commenced an action.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred under both the contractual and statutory limitation periods.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the contractual limitation period ambiguous and that the statutory period began only when the final appeal was denied.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing the contractual language was unclear and deferring to the motion judge's factual finding on when the claim was discovered.

The Court also clarified that a group disability policy is not a 'business agreement' under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing an international arbitration award, arguing it was denied procedural fairness when the application proceeded in its absence.

The appellant had previously terminated its solicitors' retainer and indicated an intent to follow different channels.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the motion to adduce fresh evidence, finding no adequate record to support the procedural fairness claim.

The court noted that the appropriate procedure to raise the issue is a motion to set aside the order under Rule 38.11 in the Superior Court.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his medical malpractice action.

The motion judge dismissed the action because the appellant failed to provide an expert report establishing causation or a breach of the standard of care, despite court-ordered timetables.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no denial of procedural fairness and confirming that the appellant failed to meet his obligation to put his best foot forward by providing evidence on the essential elements of his claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing at a nightclub.

At trial, he claimed he acted in self-defence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by reversing a ruling that excluded prejudicial portions of his police statements, and by improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct and exculpatory statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly reweighed the probative value of the police statements after the defence put the officer's conduct in issue, and that the jury instructions on post-offence conduct and reasonable doubt were sufficient.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed the Chief Justice's summary dismissal of his complaint against a Case Management Master.

The appellant alleged the Master lacked integrity and impartiality, and that the Chief Justice exceeded her jurisdiction and denied him procedural fairness by asking the Master for comments without disclosing them or referring the matter to a committee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Chief Justice had clear authority under s. 86.2(2) of the Courts of Justice Act to dispose of groundless complaints summarily and was not precluded from seeking the Master's comments.

The appellant insurer appealed a jury trial judgment, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing two motions for a mistrial due to plaintiff's counsel's conduct during cross-examination and closing address.

The appellant also challenged the award of 2% per month interest on overdue payments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge gave clear and appropriate instructions to the jury to cure any prejudice.

The Court also upheld the 2% interest rate, noting that the 2010 Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule preserved the substantive right to the former interest rate for accidents occurring before its effective date.

The appellant, a deaf individual with limited communication skills, was involuntarily committed under the Mental Health Act and detained in a maximum security psychiatric facility for 19 years.

He challenged the constitutionality of the involuntary committal provisions under s. 7 of the Charter and alleged a violation of his s. 15(1) equality rights due to inadequate sign language interpretation.

The Court of Appeal held that the Mental Health Act violates s. 7 when applied to long-term detainees because the Consent and Capacity Board lacks the authority to ensure that liberty is restricted no more than necessary.

The Court also found a violation of s. 15(1) due to the systemic failure to provide adequate interpretation services.

The Court severed the words 'or subsequent' from s. 20(4)(b)(iii) of the Act, suspending the declaration of invalidity for 12 months, and granted a declaration of the appellant's equality rights.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claim to reverse a 1988 conveyance on the grounds of fraud.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant's execution of a 1996 quit claim deed reflected her intention to show true ownership, rendering the claim against the 1988 conveyance bound to fail.

Furthermore, any claim for damages was barred by the two-year limitation period, as the appellant discovered the alleged fraud in 2004, and obtaining corroborating expert evidence later did not delay discoverability.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for second-degree murder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board refusing an absolute discharge and continuing a conditional discharge.

The Board concluded the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety due to a high likelihood of non-compliance with anti-psychotic medication if discharged absolutely.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by the evidence, particularly the expert opinion of a consulting forensic psychiatrist regarding the appellant's fluctuating insight into his condition.

The appeal was dismissed.