Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and submitted an application for accident benefits without a disability certificate.

The respondent insurer denied the claim.

More than two years later, the appellant sought mediation and subsequently commenced an action, which was dismissed on summary judgment as statute-barred.

On appeal, the appellant argued the limitation period did not begin until a valid claim, including a disability certificate, was denied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application was valid without the certificate and that allowing a claimant to delay the limitation period indefinitely by withholding a certificate would undermine the statutory regime's purpose of timely resolution.

The appellant appealed an order requiring her to file a fresh Statement of Claim in the Superior Court rather than transferring her existing Small Claims Court claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly required a fresh claim because the original included improper references to settlement discussions and presented procedural issues.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias and upheld the motion judge's decision to make no order as to costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her motor vehicle accident claim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment because the appellant failed to plead facts relevant to discoverability in her statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a limitations defence must be pleaded in a statement of defence, and discoverability should be addressed in a reply, not anticipated in the statement of claim.

The court found a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding when the claim was discovered and granted the appellant leave to deliver a reply.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible (NCR) for a 2007 sexual assault and appealed his annual review by the Ontario Review Board, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

In parallel proceedings, the Superior Court overturned the NCR verdict and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the current appeal as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal as the bias issue was highly fact-specific.

The respondent sued the appellant for defamation arising from a brief sexual relationship.

The appellant counterclaimed for sexual battery and intentional infliction of mental distress.

The motion judge struck the claim in battery, and the appellant appealed.

The appellant, representing herself, repeatedly sought adjournments based on alleged emotional difficulties and medical appointments but failed to provide supporting evidence or appear at the hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the request for an adjournment and the appeal, noting the appeal had little chance of success.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after crossing the centre line and striking an oncoming vehicle while feeling suicidal.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the requisite mens rea and rejecting his defence of a momentary lapse of attention.

He also appealed his 90-day intermittent sentence, arguing the trial judge improperly considered his deliberate crossing of the centre line as an aggravating factor without it being proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's mens rea analysis.

While the Court agreed the trial judge erred in relying on the unproven aggravating factor for sentencing, it ultimately found the original sentence was fit and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order granting a conditional stay of proceedings in Ontario.

The motion judge found that while Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter, other actions in Nevada and British Columbia were relevant to the forum non conveniens analysis, and ordered a temporary stay that would become permanent if the respondent commenced an action in those jurisdictions within 60 days.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's application of the Van Breda factors and the resulting disposition to be reasonable and fair.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's finding of contempt and the determination of a fit sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decisions, noting the reasons were clear and correct.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice claim against a family physician for alleged negligence in prenatal care that resulted in the infant appellant being born with cerebral palsy.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred in rejecting their theories that the mother suffered from pre-eclampsia or elevated blood pressure, and that the physician was negligent in failing to induce labour or refer her to an obstetrician.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings that the physician met the standard of care and that the appellants failed to prove causation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing his payment obligations under a Share Purchase Agreement.

He argued the business was illegal and that the agreements contemplated an ongoing supply of movies, raising credibility issues requiring a trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant provided only bald statements without supporting evidence, and upheld the motion judge's decision.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent in the amount of $4,200.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident when the pickup truck he was a passenger in went through a red light and was struck by a transport truck going through a green light.

The jury found the driver of the pickup 95% liable and the driver of the transport truck 5% liable.

The appellants (the transport truck driver and owners) appealed, arguing the jury verdict was unreasonable, the trial judge misdirected the jury on causation, and there was improper cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding evidence supported the jury's conclusion that a reasonably prudent driver should have been aware of the hazard, the jury charge was not in error when read as a whole, and the improper cross-examination was not serious enough to undermine trial fairness.

The respondent, a bricklayer, was totally disabled following two falls.

The appellant insurer paid disability benefits for a short period before terminating them based on surveillance evidence, despite medical opinions supporting total disability.

The trial judge found the insurer breached its duty of good faith and awarded contractual damages, $200,000 in punitive damages, and $100,000 in mental distress damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the punitive damages award, finding the insurer's conduct was high-handed and adversarial.

However, the Court reduced the mental distress damages to $25,000, finding the trial judge's award was inordinately high and disproportionate.

The appellant sought leave to appeal and appealed a summary conviction appeal decision upholding a finding that he was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for breach of probation.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the record supported the order directing an NCR assessment under ss. 672.11(b) and 672.12(3)(b) of the Criminal Code, leave should not be granted on that issue.

Leave was granted on the issue of the sufficiency of the trial judge's reasons for the NCR finding.

Applying the framework for adequacy of reasons in criminal cases, the court concluded the reasons did not disclose whether the trial judge found incapacity under the relevant branch of s. 16 or how the mental disorder rendered the appellant incapable of knowing the breach was wrong.

The NCR finding was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant challenged orders dismissing his civil action arising from alleged new home construction defects and declaring him a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge misconstrued both the pleading and the statutory scheme under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act by treating the action as a prohibited relitigation of matters already determined by the Tribunal.

Relying on the distinction between Tarion decisions, Tribunal determinations, and surviving civil warranty claims, the court concluded that the pleaded claims related to defects found warranted and were not fully barred by issue estoppel, res judicata, or abuse of process.

The vexatious litigant order was also set aside because it was premised on the erroneous view that the Superior Court action itself was vexatious.

Leave to amend was granted only to the extent previously contemplated for the appellant's own claims, and no costs of the appeal were ordered.

In a pending conviction appeal involving child pornography offences, the Crown sought directions limiting full compliance with the Court of Appeal’s ineffective assistance protocol, and the self-represented appellant sought an order under s. 683(3) to examine or cross-examine former trial counsel.

The court held that the protocol is flexible and may be varied on a case-by-case basis, and it was unnecessary and inappropriate to make a preliminary merits determination of the ineffective assistance ground.

Given the existing record, the court permitted the Crown to decline the full fresh evidence process contemplated by the protocol, subject to any further order of the panel hearing the appeal.

The appellant’s request to examine or cross-examine former trial counsel was dismissed because the proposed questioning would not materially advance the claim.

Five criminal appeals arising from a major gang investigation challenged informer-privilege procedures, wiretap authorizations, general warrants, covert searches, no-knock take-down warrants, a warrantless vehicle search, jury instructions, and expert opinion evidence.

The court held that an ex parte, in camera first-stage informer privilege hearing was proper, that Criminal Code ss. 186(1.1) and 487.01 were constitutionally valid, and that the wiretap authorizations and general warrants were lawfully issued and executed.

Although one warrantless vehicle search was conducted in an unreasonable manner and one aspect of the conspiracy jury charge was erroneous, the evidence was properly admitted under s. 24(2) and the charge error caused no substantial wrong.

All convictions were upheld and all appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of six years for breaching a Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO) by failing to report and travelling to restricted areas without committing any substantive offences.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence disproportionate, noting it gave undue emphasis to deterrence and inadequate emphasis to rehabilitation and reintegration, contrary to the principles in R. v. Ipeelee.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to four years concurrent on both counts.

The respondents' property was damaged by an oil spill after a tenant bypassed the furnace thermostat, causing it to overheat and overflow.

The appellant insurer denied coverage, relying on pollution and mechanical breakdown exclusions, and later argued the respondents failed to file a proof of loss.

The trial judge found for the respondents, concluding the insurer waived the proof of loss requirement and that neither exclusion applied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, upholding the findings that the adjuster's letter constituted a waiver, the mechanical breakdown was caused by external interference rather than an internal defect, and the pollution exclusion required another operative exclusion to apply.

The accused was originally charged in 1987 with offences arising from a series of home invasion sexual assaults but was discharged at a preliminary inquiry in 1989.

In 2010, after advances in DNA technology linked him to the crime scenes, a new indictment was preferred.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings, finding that the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated by including the 21-year 'gap' period in the delay calculation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the accused was not a 'person charged with an offence' during the gap period when he was unaware of any ongoing investigation, and therefore s. 11(b) was not engaged during that time.