Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of arson.

The accused, while highly intoxicated, left a pan of oil on a stove, causing a fire that destroyed his ex-girlfriend's house.

The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding that arson was a specific intent offence in these circumstances and that the accused's intoxication raised a reasonable doubt about his intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The majority held that arson under s. 434 is an offence requiring subjective intent or recklessness, making it akin to a specific intent offence where evidence of intoxication is relevant.

Although the trial judge erred in treating the classification of the offence as a question of fact, the error did not affect the outcome.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory order for the pre-trial sale of the matrimonial home under the Partition Act.

The respondent challenged the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction, arguing that section 7 of the Partition Act directs such appeals to the Divisional Court.

The panel agreed it lacked jurisdiction as the Court of Appeal but, given the imminent trial date, was designated as a panel of the Divisional Court to hear the matter.

On the merits, the court allowed the appeal and set aside the sale order, noting the motions judge failed to explicitly address whether the sale would prejudice the appellant's rights under the Family Law Act and that a pre-trial sale was practically unnecessary.

The respondent was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for first degree murder.

At his first Ontario Review Board hearing, the board accepted a joint submission for detention in a medium security unit with escorted hospital grounds privileges, but added a condition permitting escorted or accompanied access to the community at the hospital's discretion.

The Crown appealed, arguing the community access condition was unreasonable and that the board breached procedural fairness by adding it without allowing prior submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the condition was supported by expert psychiatric evidence and that the board did not owe the Crown a common law duty of procedural fairness in these circumstances.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's order finding him in contempt of court for using his mother as a caregiver for his children instead of the designated daycare provider, and a subsequent order imposing sanctions.

The respondent mother moved to quash the appeal as out of time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, extending the time for service.

The Court allowed the appeal and set aside the contempt and sanction orders, finding that the motion judge erred by making findings of contempt that extended beyond the specific non-monetary breach alleged in the notice of motion.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring that the respondent's debt would be released by his discharge from bankruptcy.

The respondent had acted as a 'straw borrower' and co-signed a mortgage application, unaware that the primary borrower had made fraudulent misrepresentations.

The appellant argued the debt should survive bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act due to false pretences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 178(1)(e) requires a causal connection between the bankrupt's false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation and the obtaining of the property.

The trial judge correctly found the mortgage funds were advanced based on the primary borrower's misrepresentations, not the respondent's.

The applicant commenced an action against York University, which was struck by a Superior Court judge.

The applicant then brought an ex parte motion before another Superior Court judge to set aside the dismissal, which was denied.

The applicant appealed this denial, but the appeal was dismissed for delay by the Registrar.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal refused to set aside the Registrar's order.

On a motion to review the single judge's decision, a panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no merit to the underlying appeal because the second Superior Court judge had no jurisdiction to set aside the first judge's order.

The applicant brought a motion to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which had dismissed his motion to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of his appeal for delay.

The underlying action was a claim for damages against the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario regarding its investigation of a complaint against his former physician, which had been struck for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to interfere with the single judge's decision, agreeing that the appeal had no merit.

The motion for review was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for unpaid construction work.

The principal issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in refusing to re-open the trial to admit articles of revival for a dissolved corporate defendant, which the individual appellant sought to introduce after judgment was rendered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the evidence could have been discovered sooner with reasonable diligence and that the refusal to re-open the trial was a proper exercise of discretion.

The parties executed minutes of settlement requiring the respondents to pay $250,000 in instalments, with a consent judgment held in escrow.

The respondents missed the final $95,000 payment, prompting the appellant to file a writ of execution.

The respondents successfully moved for relief from forfeiture under s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act, and the motion judge rescinded the consent judgment, granting judgment for $95,000 instead.

The appellant appealed, arguing it should have been allowed to revert to its option to continue the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no live issue that the option could be revived after being exercised.

The respondents moved to quash the appeal on the basis that the appellant sought to appeal an interlocutory order.

The order below dismissed the appellant's summary judgment motion without making any binding determinations of law under Rule 20.04(4).

The Court of Appeal held that the order was not final and quashed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The Children's Lawyer and other appellants appealed a decision dismissing their application to appoint an independent trustee for an inter vivos spousal trust.

The appellants alleged that the respondents, who were directors of the corporation wholly owned by the trust, committed a breach of trust by declaring dividends in excess of net income.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondents' actions as directors were governed by the Business Corporations Act, not the trust agreement, and did not constitute a breach of trust.

The court also dismissed an application to admit fresh evidence and upheld the application judge's order that costs be paid out of the estate.

The moving party, a self-represented debtor, brought motions to review the orders of two single judges of the Court of Appeal.

At the hearing, she requested an adjournment, which was opposed by the respondent bank and refused by the court.

The court reviewed the materials and found no basis to overturn the previous orders, noting that the proper tests were applied and that the Charter of Rights does not relieve a debtor of her obligations.

The motions were dismissed.

The appellants brought two companion libel actions arising from an article in a corporate newsletter that was posted on a website.

The respondents, Shaw Satellite G.P. and Bell Expressvu Limited Partnership, successfully moved for summary judgment, and the actions against them were dismissed.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motions judge erred by failing to draw an adverse inference from refusals given on cross-examinations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding it was open to the motions judge to decline to draw an adverse inference based on the record.

The appellant abandoned her appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario endorsed the appeal book, noting the abandonment and fixing the respondents' costs at $4,000 all inclusive.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his application for a declaration that a section of a forced road had been assumed by the municipality as a public highway.

The application judge found that historical, sporadic maintenance by the municipality did not demonstrate a clear and unequivocal intention to assume the road.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondent bank's motion to dismiss their action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the corporate appellant had already suffered damages from the alleged breach of contract by November 2008, meaning the limitation period commenced no later than January 8, 2009.

As the action was commenced after the limitation period expired, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery with an imitation firearm, disguise with intent, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying heavily on DNA evidence found on a balaclava and toy gun retrieved from a garbage bin near the scene of the bank robbery.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider the whole of the evidence, reversed the burden of proof regarding his testimonial silence, provided insufficient reasons, and reached unreasonable verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the law regarding the accused's silence and that the circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the convictions.

The appellant appealed a permanent injunction preventing him from interfering with a mutual driveway and sought leave to appeal the costs awarded.

The respondent moved to quash the appeals due to late filing.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal of the injunction order, finding it lacked merit as the appellant had installed a fixed, locked barrier on the driveway.

However, the court dismissed the motion to quash the costs appeal, granted leave to appeal costs, and reduced the motion judge's costs award by $3,000, finding the judge erred in treating a restatement of the claim as an offer to settle attracting substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for robbery and mischief, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that reaffirmed a hybrid detention order.

He argued he should be granted an absolute discharge, claiming he had initially malingered his symptoms and did not suffer from a mental disorder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the appellant suffered from a major mental illness and remained a significant threat to public safety was well-supported by the evidence.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of her claims arising from a property transfer and alleged monies owing, arguing trial unfairness, inadequate reasons, and errors in the rejection of resulting trust and constructive trust remedies.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to restrict cross-examination on a document withheld in breach of a trial management order and that no unfairness resulted.

It further held that the trial judge gave adequate reasons and made factual findings open on the record supporting the conclusions that consideration was provided for the property transfer, no unjust enrichment was established, and the money-advanced claim failed.

The appeal was dismissed with fixed appeal costs to the respondent.