Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellants appealed a judgment dismissing their counterclaim for damages and an injunction against their neighbours.

The appellants alleged that the respondents' construction of a six-hole golf course caused excessive surface water flooding on their property.

The trial judge found no material change exacerbating the flooding and concluded the golf course construction did not cause a nuisance.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the trial judge's findings of fact and dismissed the appeal.

The moving parties (plaintiffs in a proposed class proceeding for privacy breach) brought a motion to quash the defendant hospital's appeal to the Court of Appeal.

They argued the motion judge's order refusing to strike their claim for lack of jurisdiction under the Personal Health Information Protection Act was interlocutory, meaning the appeal should go to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, holding that an order refusing to dismiss or stay an action based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is a final order, as it precludes the defendant from continuing to dispute jurisdiction.

Therefore, the appeal was properly before the Court of Appeal.

The parties, a same-sex couple, entered into a civil partnership in the United Kingdom when same-sex marriage was not permitted there.

After moving to Ontario and separating, the respondent sought a divorce and equalization under the Divorce Act and Family Law Act.

The appellant argued they were not spouses.

The motion judge declared the civil partnership a marriage under the Civil Marriage Act and the parties spouses under the Divorce Act and Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's interpretation consistent with the modern approach to statutory interpretation and Charter values.

The appellants, a law firm and its partners, were sued for damages arising from the allegedly improper appointment of a lawyer as a committee of a client's person and estate, and from the allegedly negligent administration of the client's estate.

The appellants' professional liability insurer argued that the allegations constituted a single claim under the policy because they arose from 'related' errors, omissions, or negligent acts.

The application judge agreed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, finding that the two claims arose from errors, omissions, or negligent acts that were sufficiently different in nature and kind, and therefore were not 'related' within the meaning of the policy.

The appellants, selling shareholders in a family business, appealed the dismissal of their action for breach of fiduciary duty and oppression against the non-selling shareholders and the corporation's professional advisors.

The trial judge had utilized a 'hybrid' trial model following a failed summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants were precluded from challenging the hybrid trial model as they had not appealed the initial trial management order.

Furthermore, the Court upheld the trial judge's finding that no fiduciary duty was owed during the share redemption negotiations, as the relationship between the parties was highly adversarial and marked by distrust.

The substantial indemnity costs award of nearly $2.5 million was also upheld.

The appellant was convicted of historical sexual offences against his stepchildren.

During the investigation, police obtained a general warrant to view and photograph the appellant's anal area to corroborate a complainant's description of a skin tag.

The police executed the warrant ten months after the appellant's initial arrest without re-advising him of his right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal held that this failure violated the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter rights, as the execution of the warrant constituted a distinct detention requiring legal advice.

However, the court found no s. 8 violation, as requiring the appellant to spread his buttocks was a reasonable manner of executing the warrant.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their fraud action based on a release, while the respondents' counterclaim on two promissory notes was sent to trial after a mini-trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to assess the advisability of a staged summary judgment process in the context of the litigation as a whole.

Because the release and the promissory notes were part of the same series of transactions, and credibility was a central issue, both the claim and counterclaim were required to proceed to trial to avoid inconsistent findings and substantive injustice.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granting specific performance of an easement agreement in favour of the respondent.

The parties had signed an 'Easement Summary' to provide road access to the respondent's water-access-only property, but the appellant later refused to finalize the formal easement, demanding additional consideration including a severed lot.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the Easement Summary was a binding preliminary agreement containing all essential terms, that there was no genuine issue for trial, and that specific performance was the appropriate remedy.

The appeal and the motion for leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

Following the dismissal of appeals and motions for leave to appeal regarding the appointment of a trustee for an inter vivos trust, the successful parties sought their costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that the normal loser-pays regime applied to the appeals, rather than costs being paid out of the estate, as the uncertainty regarding the trust's administration had been resolved by the application judge.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful beneficiaries and full indemnity costs to the trustee, payable jointly and severally by the appellants.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a fatal barroom altercation.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding self-defence under sections 34(2) and 35 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury to assess the lawfulness of the victim's assault from the accused's perspective rather than the victim's, and by failing to leave section 35 with the jury.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assaulting a peace officer and intimidating a justice system participant.

He raised a preliminary jurisdictional challenge, arguing that the Crown had elected to proceed summarily on all charges, meaning the appeal should be heard by a summary conviction appeal court rather than the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the record and concluded that the Crown's ambiguous statement that it was proceeding 'summarily' applied only to the hybrid offences, while the indictable offence proceeded by indictment.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal retained jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the preliminary challenge was dismissed.

The appellants purchased a commercial property that was later discovered to be contaminated.

They sued the vendor for failing to disclose the contamination and their real estate lawyer for negligence.

The trial judge dismissed the claims, finding that the purchaser actually knew about the contamination before waiving the environmental condition and closing the transaction, and had instructed the lawyer not to order further reports.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility and findings of fact.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three sexual offences against a 15-year-old complainant.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty on two independent bases: he had sexual relations with a minor without taking reasonable steps to ascertain her age, and he had sexual relations without her consent.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusions or her use of similar fact evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order requiring him to repay $195,538.98 to a joint line of credit and $10,000 to a corporate respondent, arising from funds withdrawn during matrimonial proceedings.

The appellant argued the repayment obligations had not matured and were tied to other outstanding financial issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the repayment obligations had matured based on the clear terms of the signed documents and the availability of funds, and that no triable issue was established.

The appellant appealed a trial decision that found a cohabitation agreement invalid but upheld the validity of subsequent Minutes of Settlement regarding spousal support.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to award no costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the Minutes were negotiated with independent legal advice and were not unconscionable.

Leave to appeal the costs order was also refused, as the trial judge properly exercised her discretion considering divided success and the parties' financial circumstances.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his negligent misrepresentation claims against former directors, officers, and consultants of a corporation in which he invested.

The motion judge found the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the appellant knew the material facts more than two years before asserting the claims and that the proposed amendments advanced new causes of action unconnected to the original pleadings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 9-year sentence for serious offences.

The conviction appeal was abandoned.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by granting 1:1 credit for pre-trial custody instead of 1.5:1 under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in finding loss of earned remission insufficient to trigger enhanced credit, the appellant's extensive criminal record of over 70 convictions would have justified detention under s. 515(9.1), thereby excluding him from enhanced credit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his two murder convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence from his cellphone and workplace computer obtained in violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

He also challenged the Crown's closing address, alleged factual errors in the jury charge, and complained about a summary chart of victim statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 24(2) Grant analysis, which correctly assessed the privacy impact of the computer search as minimal.

The court also rejected the appellant's other grounds, finding no prejudice from the Crown's address, the minor jury charge error, or the evidentiary chart.

The respondent invested $57,000 in a fraudulent investment scheme through the appellant and a third party.

The trial judge found the appellant liable for the loss based on a breach of constructive trust as a trustee de son tort.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by deciding liability on a theory that was not pleaded.

Furthermore, the Court found no evidentiary basis for a breach of trust, as the appellant did not guarantee the investment or participate in any wrongdoing.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent bank approximately $6 million and declaring the judgment survived bankruptcy due to fraud.

The appellant argued the record was insufficient due to inadequate documentary production by the bank, which he claimed was necessary to determine his intent regarding a cheque-kiting scheme.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the summary judgment test and noting the appellant had over six years to bring a production motion but failed to do so until two days before the peremptory hearing.