Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellants appealed an order granting summary judgment dismissing their third party claim against a lawyer.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial because the evidentiary record did not establish any ongoing retainer or solicitor-client relationship between the appellants and the respondent.

A single telephone conversation with the appellants' then-lawyer was found to be merely a request for clarification about notice, not a retainer for legal advice on whether shares could be transferred without unanimous shareholder consent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant challenged the motion judge’s conclusion that his claim on a $50,000 loan was statute-barred.

He argued the loan was for a specific purpose rather than a demand loan, and that the limitation period was tolled by alleged wilful concealment, misrepresentation, and incapacity.

The court held that even accepting the appellant’s evidence, he knew by June 2005 that he had a cause of action, and in any event the first written demand in May 2006 triggered the running of the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from a jury finding that the appellant was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and alleged prejudice arising from the treatment of his name during the criminal process.

Amicus additionally argued that the trial judge should not have explained the consequences of an NCR finding to the jury and that the judge misstated an example under s. 16.

The Court of Appeal held there was ample evidence to support the verdict, no prejudice arose from the treatment of the appellant's name, the charge on consequences was permissible in the circumstances, and the mistaken example was harmless because the other branch of s. 16 was the issue at trial.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for importing cocaine, arguing that the trial judge improperly admitted evidence from a border services officer explaining why the appellant was referred to secondary inspection and improperly instructed the jury on that evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the prior authority relied on by the appellant did not bar admission of an officer’s personal observations and permissible non-expert opinion evidence.

The officer’s use of the term 'indicator' was found to be merely descriptive in context and did not amount to profile evidence or impermissible opinion on knowledge.

The charge to the jury, read as a whole, did not invite the jury to treat the officer’s suspicions as proof of knowing importation.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from the dismissal of his summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that neither proposed ground had strong merit.

The unreasonable conviction argument had not been advanced before the summary conviction appeal judge and the record contained evidence from which the trial judge could infer the impugned conduct persisted longer than observed by Crown witnesses.

The W. (D.) argument also failed, as no reviewable error was identified and the leave request effectively sought an impermissible second appeal on credibility.

The Crown appealed sentence in a criminal matter involving serious conduct in a domestic context.

The Court of Appeal held that substantial deference was owed to the sentencing judge and rejected submissions that denunciation and deterrence had been insufficiently emphasized or that rehabilitation had been overemphasized.

The court further held that the sentence, while perhaps at the low end of the range, was not demonstrably unfit.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and choking in relation to sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

He argued that the verdicts were inconsistent because the trial judge acquitted on one count while convicting on others, and that the judge scrutinized his evidence more strictly than the complainant's.

The court held that the verdicts were not irreconcilable on any realistic view of the evidence and that there was an evidentiary basis for the choking conviction apart from the acquitted incident.

The court also found no unfairness in the trial judge's credibility analysis.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

In a personal injury action arising from a bicycle and motor vehicle collision allegedly caused in part by unlit streetlights on a boundary bridge, a municipal defendant appealed summary judgment dismissing its crossclaim and the action against a co-defendant utility contractor.

The appeal court held that the servicing agreement and the evidence about responsibility for identifying and maintaining boundary-road streetlights were ambiguous and contradictory.

The motion judge erred by treating the parties' common understanding as determinative despite live disputes over contractual allocation of responsibility.

The claims against the contractor were restored for trial.

The Crown appealed from a stay entered after a trial judge held that issue estoppel barred relitigation of possession of cocaine, based on a prior dismissal of a conditional sentence order revocation allegation.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the revocation judge had effectively decided the possession issue in the accused's favour, the revocation ruling was not a final decision capable of grounding issue estoppel in a subsequent criminal trial.

Revocation proceedings are sentencing proceedings, not trials determining guilt for a new offence, and extending issue estoppel to them would be inconsistent with the narrow criminal-law scope of the doctrine and its underlying policy objectives.

The appeal was allowed, the stay set aside, and a new trial ordered on the possession for the purpose of trafficking count.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a civil claim alleging that religious divorce documents had been fraudulently altered to include a waiver of rights to a marriage gift.

The court upheld the trial judge’s credibility findings and rejected arguments concerning corroboration, bias, waiver, and factual error.

The proposed fresh evidence did not relate to the central authenticity issue, could have been obtained with diligence before trial, and would not have affected the result.

The appeal was dismissed, with no appeal costs to one respondent and fixed costs awarded to another.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of his action alleging misrepresentations in connection with the purchase of interests in two closely held businesses, and also challenged partial allowance of counterclaims by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's findings were grounded in credibility, were well supported by the record, and attracted deference.

It rejected the argument that one respondent breached the share purchase agreement by selling an interest he did not own, finding both parties understood the transaction as a sale of that respondent's interest.

It also upheld a damages award reflecting another respondent's continuing ownership interest after the appellant operated and dissolved one company without accounting to that shareholder.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Les appelants ont contesté en appel la conclusion selon laquelle leurs lettres de démission du conseil d’administration d’une fondation étaient valides, plaidant l’influence indue et un complot visant la prise de contrôle de l’organisme.

La Cour d’appel a conclu que le juge des requêtes disposait de tous les faits pertinents, avait examiné les allégations soulevées et n’avait commis aucune erreur manifeste et dominante dans son appréciation factuelle.

La cour a aussi rejeté la demande d’autorisation d’interjeter appel de l’ordonnance de dépens.

Les dépens de l’appel ont été accordés aux intimés sur une base d’indemnité partielle.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding child and spousal support arrears.

The applicant father sought to re-open his previously dismissed appeal based on a recent uncontested order expunging his arrears.

The respondent mother sought to set aside that same uncontested order, which was made in her absence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the father's motion, finding no jurisdiction to revive the dismissed appeal.

The Court treated the mother's motion as an appeal, allowed it, and set aside the uncontested order, directing a full hearing on the merits to determine the support arrears.

The appellant appealed an order adding it as a party to the proceeding.

The Court of Appeal questioned its jurisdiction to hear the appeal, considering whether the order was final or interlocutory.

The appellant argued the order was final due to preconditions in the Insurance Act regarding mediation and arbitration for statutory accident benefits.

The Court held that the order adding the party was interlocutory, as it did not finally determine the questions of law raised by the appellant.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction, with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed convictions for possession of a loaded handgun and marihuana, arguing that police breached his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 9.

The police approached the appellant based on an anonymous tip about a man with a gun.

When the appellant acted evasively and refused to comply with instructions, police detained him and discovered a handgun protruding from his waistband.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the combination of the tip and the appellant's conduct justified the investigative detention, and that the search was not unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari, which sought to quash his committal for trial on four firearms offences.

The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence at the preliminary inquiry to support the conclusion that the appellant had possession of a shotgun found in his bedroom shortly after it was fired outside his residence.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit a jurisdictional error, as there was circumstantial evidence—including the size of the gun, the apartment's configuration, and the appellant's control over his bedroom—from which a jury could reasonably infer his knowledge, consent, and control over the firearm.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and was sentenced to 90 days' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by refusing to allow the sentence to be served intermittently.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by characterizing the appellant's pre-sentence efforts to secure employment and start a business as a ruse to manipulate the court.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was permitted to serve the remainder of his sentence on an intermittent basis.

The appellant appealed convictions for a 'no permit' offence and a 'failure to stop' offence.

At the provincial offences appeal, the prosecutor conceded the appellant had a valid permit and invited an acquittal, and also conceded the fine for failure to stop should be reduced.

The appeal judge peremptorily dismissed the appeal without giving effect to the concessions.

The Court of Appeal found this resulted in a miscarriage of justice, allowed the appeal, entered an acquittal on the 'no permit' charge, and reduced the penalty on the 'failure to stop' charge to a suspended sentence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a psychiatric hospital with conditions permitting him to live in the community.

The appellant argued the Board erred in finding he posed a significant threat to public safety and in failing to grant an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidentiary support for the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat due to his schizophrenia, lack of insight, and resistance to treatment.

The community-based detention order was upheld as reasonable and the least onerous disposition.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, arguing the trial judge failed to consider relevant evidence and erred in his reasoning regarding a house lease and a barn lease.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting it was open to the trial judge to accept the respondent's evidence and to consider the house lease for the purpose of determining the quantum of unjust enrichment.

The appeal was dismissed.