Daniel R. McDonald

The appellant employee appealed the dismissal of his Small Claims Court action for wrongful dismissal.

The employee had refused to perform temporary duties in the shipping department unless he was paid the higher wage rate associated with that position.

The employer treated this as a resignation or, alternatively, just cause for termination due to insubordination.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the employer's request was reasonable and lawful based on company policy and past practice, and that the employee's repeated refusals constituted a repudiation of an essential condition of his employment contract.

The appeal was dismissed.

Ace Marmon appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his wrongful dismissal action against SanMar Canada.

Marmon claimed he was fired without cause, while SanMar asserted he resigned or was terminated for insubordination after refusing temporary shipping duties at his regular pay rate.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors of fact or law by the Deputy Judge.

The court upheld the finding that Marmon's refusal constituted repudiation of an essential employment condition and insubordination, justifying dismissal.

The applicants sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision, arguing the Board made procedural errors by issuing a faulty Confirmation of Filing that did not accurately reflect the Minister's question.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature.

The court held that the applicants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, as they did not request the Board to reconsider its decision under s. 114 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, which would have allowed the Board to address the procedural errors and any resulting prejudice.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment alleging wrongful dismissal and breach of contract, arguing her employment was for a fixed term of one year.

The defendant contended it was an indefinite term.

The court found the employment contract, comprising an email and an attached agreement, clearly established a one-year fixed term.

Consequently, the plaintiff was entitled to damages for the unexpired term without mitigation.

The motion for summary judgment was granted.

The appellant employer appealed a trial decision finding it had constructively dismissed the respondent and awarding damages based on a 16-month notice period.

The employer argued the trial judge erred in taking judicial notice of the mining industry's cyclical nature, finding the respondent was not obliged to accept a recall position to mitigate, setting a 16-month notice period, and determining the termination date under the Employment Standards Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and that the respondent was constructively dismissed upon recall to a substantially different position.

The employer brought a motion for partial summary judgment dismissing a former employee’s claims for unpaid bonuses on the basis that the claims were statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court examined the employment agreement and the employer’s bonus practices, finding the process for awarding bonuses was unilateral, opaque, and not explained to the employee.

The court held that the evidence did not clearly establish that the employee knew or ought to have known he had a claim more than two years before commencing the action.

The employer’s failure to disclose its interpretation of the bonus provisions and relevant sales information could amount to fraudulent concealment preventing the limitation period from running.

The motion for partial summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellant construction trade unions challenged the constitutionality of s. 127.2 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, which allows a 'non-construction employer' to terminate collective agreements and bargaining rights in the construction industry.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board found the provision violated s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Divisional Court reversed this decision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's ruling, finding that s. 127.2 does not substantially interfere with the process of collective bargaining because employees of non-construction employers can still organize under the general provisions of the Act.

The appeal was dismissed.