Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and indecent assault against the complainant, which occurred between 1979 and 1985, as well as his ten-month custodial sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an uncharged incident, failing to give limiting instructions on prior consistent statements, and failing to instruct the jury on an alleged admission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the ten-month custodial sentence was fit and properly reflected the principles of denunciation and deterrence for historical sexual offences involving a breach of trust.

The Crown appealed a global sentence of six years imposed on the respondent for three robberies of taxi drivers and an obstruct justice conviction.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in calculating pre-sentence custody, that the six-year sentence was demonstrably unfit, and that the obstruct justice sentence should have been consecutive.

The respondent conceded the pre-sentence custody error, and the Court of Appeal reduced the credit from 33 months to 11 months.

However, the Court dismissed the remainder of the appeal, finding the six-year sentence was fit given the respondent's youth and rehabilitative prospects, and that the concurrent sentence for obstruct justice was within the trial judge's discretion.

The appellant pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000, fraud for the benefit of a criminal organization, and money laundering arising from a 'grandparent fraud' telephone scam.

He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment and a $500,000 fine in lieu of forfeiture.

On appeal, the court granted enhanced pre-sentence custody credit of 1.5:1, reducing his custodial sentence and resulting in his immediate release.

However, the court dismissed the appeal regarding the fine, finding the sentencing judge correctly concluded the appellant had control over the proceeds of the fraud and properly assessed the fine amount based on the value of the property controlled rather than the actual benefit received.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board following a finding that she was not criminally responsible for uttering threats and assaulting a peace officer.

The Board ordered her detained in a Secure Forensic Unit due to active, untreated persecutory delusions and a significant threat to public safety.

On appeal, the appellant and amicus curiae argued the Board relied on inadmissible hearsay and failed to impose the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board is entitled to consider hearsay evidence such as police occurrence reports, and that the hybrid detention order was necessary, appropriate, and the least onerous option given the appellant's refusal of treatment and lack of insight.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and drug trafficking offences, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 8 Charter application.

He challenged the validity of search warrants executed at his apartment, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the general warrant after excising unreliable informant information, and that the warrant's terms were too broad.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge reasonably accepted the police officer's opinion that surveillance corroborated the informant's information.

The court also held the warrant contained sufficient terms and conditions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a home renovation contractor, appealed his convictions for fraud over $5,000 and theft.

He had persuaded an elderly, vulnerable homeowner to enter into contracts totaling over $300,000 for renovations on a house worth $400,000, grossly overcharging her.

The Court of Appeal upheld the fraud conviction, finding that the overcharging, combined with taking advantage of the victim, constituted 'other fraudulent means'.

However, the court set aside the theft conviction, ruling that because the victim intended to part with her money (albeit induced by fraud), the appellant could not be convicted of both theft and fraud for the same funds.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of first degree murder.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by allowing the accused to lead her lengthy, exculpatory police video statement as part of her defence under the Edgar exception for prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge applied the correct principles and reasonably exercised his discretion in finding the statement was spontaneous and made when the accused was first confronted with an accusation of a crime.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and seven-year sentence for historical sexual offences, including indecent assault and buggery, committed against four complainants between 1968 and 1978.

He argued the trial judge made unreasonable credibility findings and failed to address evidentiary conflicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were reasonable and adequately explained.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, though a lifetime SOIRA order was reduced to 20 years on consent.

The appellant, a court-appointed interim receiver, filed a proof of claim with the respondent trustee in bankruptcy for its fees and disbursements.

The trustee disallowed the claim, and the application judge dismissed the appellant's appeal of that disallowance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an interim receiver cannot bypass the procedural requirement of passing its accounts by submitting unliquidated and non-approved fees to a trustee in the form of a proof of claim.

The appellant, a federal inmate convicted of offences committed prior to the enactment of the Abolition of Early Parole Act (AEPA), appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus application.

He argued that the retroactive abolition of accelerated parole review (APR) violated his rights under s. 11(i) of the Charter.

Applying the companion decision in Canada (Attorney General) v. Lewis, the Court of Appeal held that the abolition of APR appreciably increased the appellant's expected incarceration time, constituting an unjustified variation in punishment.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was declared eligible for the APR regime.

The appellant, a federal inmate convicted of drug offences committed before the Abolition of Early Parole Act (AEPA) came into force but sentenced after, appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus application.

He argued that the AEPA's abolition of accelerated parole review (APR) violated his s. 11(i) Charter right to the benefit of the lesser punishment.

Relying on the companion case of Canada (Attorney General) v. Lewis, the Court of Appeal held that the abolition of APR appreciably increased the appellant's incarceration time, constituting a variation in punishment that violated s. 11(i) and was not saved by s. 1.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was declared entitled to the APR regime.

The respondents committed offences before the Abolition of Early Parole Act came into force, but were convicted and sentenced after.

They successfully applied for a declaration that they were eligible for accelerated parole review under the previous regime, arguing that the retrospective application of the Act violated their rights under s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The Attorney General appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the denial of day parole constitutes punishment and that the retrospective application of the Act unjustifiably violated s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed a trial decision that awarded him $57,566 on a $135,000 loan, arguing he was entitled to the full amount and that the trial judge erred in dismissing fraudulent conveyance claims against the respondents.

The appellant also alleged the trial was conducted unfairly.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge treated the self-represented appellant fairly, made factual findings regarding loan repayments that were amply supported by the evidence, and correctly dismissed the fraudulent conveyance claims due to a lack of evidence regarding insolvency.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $14,256.

The respondents sold trademarks and a customer base to a corporation under a purchase agreement, with the purchase price payable by post-dated cheques.

The appellant, the sole director of the corporation, signed the agreement personally under a clause requiring him to cover any bounced cheques.

After the corporation went into receivership and cheques bounced, the respondents obtained partial summary judgment against the appellant on the personal guarantee.

The appellant appealed, arguing inadequate reasons, lack of a liability finding against the corporation, and that the clause was not a guarantee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the reasons adequate, noting a guarantee is enforceable even if the principal debtor is bankrupt, and concluding the clause clearly constituted a personal guarantee.

The appellants, two commercial truck drivers, were convicted of importing $3.5 million of cocaine after the drugs were found hidden in their trailer at the border.

They appealed their convictions, arguing they were 'blind couriers' and the trial judge erred in his credibility assessments, particularly regarding their knowledge of English and a purported alibi.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions were supported by the evidence.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the sentences from 16 and 14 years to 12 and 10 years, as the original sentences were outside the range for first-time couriers.

The appellant appealed a jury's damages award and a trial judge's costs order arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the trial judge's interventions during cross-examination rendered the trial unfair and that the jury was misdirected on causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the damages appeal, finding the interventions did not compromise trial fairness and the causation instructions were adequate.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, setting aside a $60,000 penalty imposed on the appellant's insurer under the Insurance Act.

The Court found no evidence that the insurer failed to attempt to settle the claim expeditiously or that its participation in mediation was a sham.

The appellant purchased a used vehicle financed by the respondent.

After experiencing issues with the vehicle, the appellant defaulted on payments and returned the vehicle to the dealership.

The respondent sold the vehicle at public auction and obtained summary judgment for the deficiency balance.

On appeal, the appellant argued the dealership made misrepresentations and the respondent failed to provide proper notice of sale under the Personal Property Security Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of a close relationship between the dealership and the respondent to attribute misrepresentations, and concluding that any failure to provide notice did not undermine the right to claim a deficiency absent proof of damages.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference involving his 13-year-old stepdaughter.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, applied different standards of scrutiny to the evidence, and reached irreconcilable conclusions by acquitting him of sexual assault but convicting him of sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach to the evidence, noting her findings were rooted in the record and her reasonable doubt on the sexual assault count did not contradict her satisfaction that the sexual interference count was proven.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant tripped on a municipal sidewalk and fractured her wrist, but did not notify the City within the 10-day statutory period because she initially believed her injury was minor.

After learning her injury would cause permanent impairment, she retained counsel and provided notice four months post-accident.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding no reasonable excuse for the delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the initial lack of awareness of the injury's severity constituted a reasonable excuse.

The Court further held that whether the City was prejudiced by the delay was a genuine issue requiring a trial, as the appellate record was insufficient to make the necessary findings of fact.