Kathryn N.M. van Rensburg

The appellant appealed his conviction for bank robbery, arguing the verdict was unreasonable because it relied entirely on his DNA found on a plastic shopping bag used during the robbery.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting the absence of any other evidence linking the appellant to the crime, such as eyewitness identification or surveillance footage.

The court rejected the Crown's argument that generic physical descriptions could connect the appellant to the robbery, emphasizing that plastic bags are commonplace and reusable.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's order regarding child support, spousal support, and custody arrangements.

The father had declared bankruptcy after failing to pay an equalization payment and costs to the respondent mother.

The motion judge had ordered the father to pay lump sum spousal support equal to the unpaid equalization payment and imposed a charging order on his assets.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the lump sum spousal support and charging order because the motion judge failed to properly consider the implications of the father's bankruptcy and the principles governing lump sum support.

The Court also ordered the mother to pay prospective child support for the daughter residing with the father.

The appellants, concert promoters, sued Bell Media for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and breach of fiduciary duty after Bell refused to sell them radio advertising.

The motion judge struck the claims, denying leave to amend the breach of fiduciary duty claim.

On appeal, the appellants sought leave to amend their claim based on a failure to contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a failure to contract in these circumstances does not qualify as a breach of fiduciary duty, and thus the proposed amendment would not cure the defect.

The appellants, authorized medical marijuana users, sued the respondents after being ejected from a bar because they smelled of marijuana.

The motion judge struck their claim under Rule 21 for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action and as an abuse of process.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in striking the claim for the tort of intimidation, as all elements were pleaded.

The Court also found the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error in concluding the action was an abuse of process based on a misunderstanding of a previous action.

The appeal was allowed in part, reinstating the intimidation claim.

The appellants, a software developer and his company, appealed the dismissal of their counterclaim for wrongful dismissal and unpaid compensation against the respondent trading company.

The trial judge had found the developer was terminated for just cause due to sabotage and competition, and rejected claims for commissions, salary, and bonuses.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the commissions claim and the finding of just cause, but allowed the appeal regarding unpaid salary and declared bonuses, finding the respondent had no right to withhold them.

The Court also reduced the trial costs award, noting a defendant is not entitled to substantial indemnity costs merely for beating its own offer to settle.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the sole issue of whether the 2013 self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code have retrospective application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that it had previously determined in R. v. Bengy that the provisions do not have retrospective effect.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting 911 recordings and the complainant's signed statement to police under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, and in assigning them weight.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's admissibility ruling or her assessment of the evidence's weight.

The parties, two dentists operating through professional corporations, entered into a joint venture agreement that provided for termination on 90 days' notice but was silent on the consequences of termination.

The respondent gave notice of termination and sought to exclude the appellant from the practice and buy out his interest.

The application judge declared the joint venture terminated, excluded the appellant from the practice, and directed that the appellant's interest be sold to the respondent, with financial issues to be resolved separately.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge had jurisdiction and that terminating the appellant's ownership interest was necessary to give business efficacy to the termination provision and the parties' common intention.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge presumed guilt while glossing over inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly addressed the issues and assessed the evidence, and that the appellant was merely attempting to retry the case.

Following a judgment allowing appeals and cross-appeals in part, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale, ordering Charles Sr. to pay Diana $50,000, Charles Jr. to pay Diana $15,000, Lisa to pay Charles Jr. $15,000, and Ford to pay Lisa $15,000.

All additional requests for costs were dismissed.

Two appeals were heard together regarding whether the equitable doctrine of laches can defeat a first party insurer's loss-transfer claim under s. 275 of the Insurance Act.

In both cases, the first party insurers delayed several years before requesting indemnification from the second party insurers.

The Court of Appeal held that the defence of laches cannot be invoked against a statutory loss-transfer claim, as it is a claim for legal relief subject to the Limitations Act, 2002, which no longer contains a laches-saving provision.

Furthermore, even if laches were available, the second party insurers failed to demonstrate acquiescence or actual prejudice.

Lombard's appeal was dismissed and TD's appeal was allowed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering them to pay the outstanding balance on a second mortgage.

They argued the mortgage action should be considered alongside a construction dispute involving the respondent, claiming duress, bad faith, and equitable set-off.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that the appellants were sophisticated parties with independent legal advice, the construction project was completed within budget, and there was no bad faith or fraud.

The appeal was dismissed, and the refusal to consolidate or stay the proceedings was upheld.

The plaintiff expert witness sued the defendant law firm for unpaid fees and subsequently served a Rule 49 offer to settle for $50,000 plus HST 'in full and complete satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim'.

The defendant accepted the offer days before trial and argued the settlement amount was inclusive of costs.

The motion judge agreed, finding the offer unambiguous.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the motion judge erred by adopting a literal interpretation and failing to consider the factual matrix, including the Rule 49 context and the timing of the offer.

The Court concluded the offer did not dispose of costs, entitling the plaintiff to costs under Rule 49.07(5)(b).

The appellant sought to set aside a negotiated family law settlement agreement reached during mediation, alleging duress and failure to comply with the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The respondent successfully moved for summary judgment to enforce the agreement.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court applied the Miglin framework and concluded that the circumstances of the negotiation were satisfactory and the appellant failed to show the agreement departed significantly from the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The respondent investment dealer terminated the contracts of four sales agents when it closed its Thunder Bay office.

The respondent sued for repayment of transition loans that became due upon termination.

The appellants defended the action, claiming misrepresentation by omission regarding the office closure and equitable set-off.

The motion judge granted summary judgment against two of the appellants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in fact and law, and that a fair and just determination required a trial of all claims and counterclaims together to avoid inconsistent verdicts.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside an administrative dismissal of their personal injury action.

The action was dismissed in 2007 due to the inaction of their former counsel, and a motion to set aside the dismissal was not brought until 2013.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice caused by the significant delay, and that actual prejudice to the respondent's ability to defend the action had been established.

The appellant brought a motion for summary judgment against the respondents on an alleged guarantee of a $30,000 loan.

The motions judge dismissed the motion and granted the respondents' cross-motion for summary judgment, dismissing the action against them.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's findings that there was no agreement to guarantee the loan and that, in any event, an oral guarantee would be unenforceable under section 4 of the Statute of Frauds.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sued an employment agency after paying a fee for a promised job that never materialized.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding the respondents credible.

After the initial appeal was dismissed, a television program broadcast an undercover investigation exposing the respondents' deceptive practices.

The appellant moved to re-open the trial to adduce this fresh evidence, but the motion judge dismissed the request.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge's reasons inadequate and holding that the fresh evidence met the test for re-opening the trial as it was cogent, previously unavailable, and could have affected the trial's outcome.

The appellant sued its former lawyer for negligence after he failed to appeal a bankruptcy trustee's disallowance of its secured claim.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the bankrupt had no rights in the disputed funds, meaning the appellant's security interest never attached and it suffered no damages.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred and raised a new 'loss of chance' argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings on attachment and refusing to entertain the new loss of chance argument due to unfairness and lack of evidentiary foundation.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for assault with a weapon and criminal harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's refusal to grant him an absolute discharge.

The Board had ordered a continuation of his conditional discharge based on psychiatric evidence that he would likely stop taking his anti-psychotic medication and resume substance abuse if absolutely discharged, thereby increasing the risk of violent relapse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the significant threat test and that its conclusion was reasonably supported by the evidence.