James C. MacPherson

The appellant, R.K., appealed his conviction for aggravated sexual assault, sexual interference, and breach of recognizance, and his designation as a dangerous offender.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's admission of hearsay evidence (complainant's preliminary hearing testimony and videotaped statement) under the *Khan* test, the adequacy of the *W.(D.)* analysis, the general adequacy of reasons, and the application of the *Kienapple* principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's rulings on hearsay, the *W.(D.)* analysis, or the dangerous offender designation.

The *Kienapple* argument was declined as it was not raised below and had no practical effect.

The appellant, Alexander Shaulov, appealed a decision from a case management judge that effectively removed "Non-LSO parties" from his lawsuit against the Law Society of Ontario.

Shaulov had sued the LSO and other parties after repeatedly failing the barrister exam.

The case management judge had previously struck claims against the Non-LSO parties and stated that to re-plead against them, Shaulov would need consent or leave of the court under Rule 26.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the case management judge's decision was interlocutory, not a final order, and therefore an appeal would require leave to the Superior Court.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal concerning a "Lender Fee" in a multimillion-dollar loan agreement.

The motion judge had ruled that the balance of the fee was an unenforceable penalty clause and granted relief against forfeiture, also suggesting it was not earned as the loan was not advanced.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the Lender Fee was consideration for obtaining the loan commitment, not a stipulated remedy for breach, and therefore the doctrines of unenforceable penalty clauses and relief against forfeiture did not apply.

The court further clarified that the fee was not contingent on the loan being advanced based on the contract's terms.

The appeal was allowed, ordering the balance of the fee to be paid to the lender.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault, appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board (ORB) that directed his transfer from Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH).

The ORB's decision was based on the recommendation of the appellant's treating psychiatrist, who believed CAMH's sexual behaviour clinic was necessary to address the appellant's hypersexuality and concerning behaviours.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the ORB's decision on a reasonableness standard, as established in R. v. Owen, and found that the ORB's analysis and conclusion were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Emmanuel Owusu-Ansah, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and the imposed sentence of life imprisonment with a 22-year parole ineligibility period.

The appeal raised four issues: reasonable apprehension of judicial bias due to repeated interjections, erroneous admission of prior discreditable conduct evidence, incorrect and inadequate jury instruction on provocation, and an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, upholding the admission of prior conduct evidence as probative of motive and context, affirming the jury instruction on provocation, and deeming the sentence fit given the horrific nature of the murder and the appellant's prior domestic abuse convictions.

The appellant, Dalibor Klaric, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's jury instruction regarding sexual assault as an element of constructive first-degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code, specifically concerning the absence of consent.

The Court of Appeal found the instruction, though brief, was carefully tailored to the live issue at trial and the positions of the parties, adequately equipping the jury to decide the case.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Caleb Burgler, appealed his sentence for criminal negligence causing death, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not crediting his unsuccessful rehabilitation attempts and not considering his drug addiction as a mitigating factor.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming that drug addiction is not a general mitigating factor for such crimes and that the sentencing judge appropriately considered the appellant's efforts and ongoing addiction in assessing reoffending risk and public protection.

The court also upheld the probation terms and weapons prohibition as within the sentencing judge's discretion.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breaking and entering a dwelling house and his sentence of two years less a day incarceration.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's finding on identity, which was based on circumstantial fingerprint evidence.

The appellant argued a speculative possibility that his fingerprints were on the jewelry box prior to the robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that speculative possibilities do not need to be disproven.

The sentence appeal argued the trial judge failed to consider rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretion, given the serious nature of the offence, its impact on victims, and the appellant's criminal record.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Trevor Basso, appealed his conviction for sexual assault with a minor and his sentence.

He also sought to admit fresh evidence regarding his intellectual disability and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, finding it would not have affected the trial outcome.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, as the trial judge's findings on the appellant's recklessness regarding the complainant's age were consistent with the mens rea requirements clarified in R. v. Carbone.

While the 12-month sentence was affirmed as fit, the court exercised its discretion to consider the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for sexual assault under s. 271(a) of the Criminal Code.

Drawing parallels with R. v. B.J.T., the court declared the mandatory minimum unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter due to gross disproportionality in hypothetical scenarios.

The remnant of the appellant's custodial sentence was permanently stayed.

The appellant, Christopher Husbands, appealed the life sentences imposed for two counts of manslaughter and other related offences stemming from a 2012 shooting at the Eaton Centre.

The appeal raised four main categories of error: misapplication of social context evidence (IRCA), incorrect test for PTSD link to conduct, misapplication of delayed parole test and failure to remedy Charter breaches, and demonstrably unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the legal principles, including those related to social context evidence (consistent with Morris), mental disorder as a mitigating factor (consistent with Prioriello and Hilbach), and the two-stage Zinck test for parole eligibility.

The court concluded that the life sentences were not demonstrably unfit, emphasizing the seriousness of the crimes, the profound victim impact, and the paramountcy of general deterrence and denunciation in such cases.

The appellant, Luigi Falsetto, appealed a lower court decision that rejected his claim for a purchase money resulting trust over a 50% interest in a property legally titled to his son and former daughter-in-law.

Luigi had provided half the purchase funds and borne half the expenses, intending the property as an investment.

The daughter-in-law was placed on title to avoid a merger of titles under the Planning Act.

The application judge found Luigi intended a gift, but the Court of Appeal found this an error of law and fact.

The Court held that the presumption of resulting trust applied, and the intention to avoid statutory consequences did not negate the actual intention to retain a beneficial interest, especially given the overwhelming evidence of an investment purpose and ongoing financial contributions.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed convictions for various criminal offences, arguing that he was entrapped by police.

The trial judge had previously found him guilty of 11 counts, staying 3 on entrapment grounds, and convicting on 8.

The appeal specifically challenged 5 of the remaining 8 convictions, alleging errors in the trial judge's analysis of both the "opportunity" and "inducement" branches of the entrapment test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's application of entrapment law, including her assessment of police conduct and the appellant's independent actions in committing the offences.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a choking charge, arguing the trial judge erred in handling the complainant's prior inconsistent statement.

The trial judge had acquitted due to doubts about the complainant's reliability.

The Court of Appeal found no material error in the trial judge's use of the statement, noting it was used for inconsistency, not for the truth of its contents.

The court also highlighted that the Crown did not take steps at trial to address the inconsistencies.

Furthermore, the trial judge had multiple independent reasons for doubting the complainant's reliability, including memory issues, drug/alcohol consumption, and inconsistencies regarding alleged injuries.

The appeal was dismissed as the Crown failed to meet the threshold for appellate intervention.

The appellant, F.C., appealed convictions for 12 sex-related offences, raising two grounds: the trial judge's denial of a severance motion and an alleged improper jury charge on the human trafficking offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's holistic application of the R. v. Last factors for severance, nor in the jury instruction on human trafficking, which was deemed sufficient given the factual context and absence of trial counsel objection.

The appellants, a landlord and its beneficial owner, appealed a motion judge's decision that a subrogated action by the landlord's insurer against the tenant for fire damage was barred by the commercial lease.

The motion judge had found that the tenant's contribution to the landlord's fire insurance precluded such an action, despite an indemnity provision, as the lease did not explicitly state otherwise.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the motion judge's interpretation of the lease, his holistic reading of its terms, or his consideration of relevant case law.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted against them on a personal guarantee.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by not explicitly considering the three inquiries proposed in Malik v. Attia for partial summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge implicitly considered all relevant factors, and that partial summary judgment was appropriate as it resulted in cost savings, resolved a significant discrete issue, and avoided inconsistent findings.

The appellants, Metro 1 Development Corporation Ltd. and its sub-tenant Athens, appealed a lower court decision that found Metro 1 in breach of a commercial lease for failing to operate a Tim Hortons restaurant and denied relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the lease, finding no implied term that would permit an alternative food service if a Tim Hortons franchise could not be maintained.

The court also found no error in the refusal to grant relief from forfeiture, rejecting arguments of bad faith by the respondent hospital and clarifying the scope of the duty of good faith in contract law.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, Kalen Schlatter, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The Crown's case included strong circumstantial evidence, DNA, and testimony from undercover officers and a jailhouse informant.

The defence argued a 'third party suspect' and challenged the trial judge's rulings on witness questioning, jury instructions, Vetrovec warning, after-the-fact conduct, and admissibility of undercover agent testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's control of witness questioning, jury instructions, or the Vetrovec warning.

The court also upheld the admissibility of the undercover officers' testimony, finding no breach of the appellant's Charter rights.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended documentary evidence (Uber records, Google timeline, text messages) and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal found that the Uber and Google documents were inconsequential and did not constitute a misapprehension of evidence.

While the text messages did contradict the complainant's testimony regarding the exact time of the assault, the court found this error immaterial to the overall credibility of her narrative, especially given the strong credibility findings made by the trial judge.

The appeals from conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant, Kevin Bacchus, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, stemming from a physical altercation with the complainant.

The appeal raised three grounds: unreasonable verdict, misapprehension of evidence, and error in the use of an audio recording.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, affirming the trial judge's findings.

The court reiterated the high bar for unreasonable verdicts under the Beaudry/Sinclair error and found the alleged misapprehensions immaterial.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.