Gary T. Trotter

Appellants were convicted of production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a trial in Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellants appealed on grounds that evidence seized in breach of their Charter rights (ss. 8, 9, and 10(b)) should have been excluded under s. 24(2), and that the trial judge erred in procedural matters and in accepting co-accused evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the evidence of marijuana odour and a water bill should have been excluded due to a serious and deliberate s. 10(b) breach, the convictions were nonetheless supported by ample remaining evidence, including the appellants' extended presence in a sophisticated grow operation and corroborating testimony from the co-accused.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an egg producer, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its motion to belatedly comply with a 2013 judgment order requiring payment into court.

The appellant had failed to pay the judgment funds into court, failed to bring a motion to add respondents as defendants to a related action, and took no further steps to advance its counterclaim for five years.

When the appellant finally returned to court in 2018, it sought permission to proceed with the counterclaim and amend it.

The motion judge applied the test from Rule 48 (dismissal for delay), placing the onus on the appellant to establish an acceptable explanation for the delay and that respondents would suffer no non-compensable prejudice.

The motion judge found the appellant's explanation inadequate and concluded actual prejudice existed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's legal test or factual findings.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing his claim against the respondent regarding unauthorized charges to his credit card.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's decision.

The court noted that while the respondent's first affidavit contained inaccuracies regarding credit agency collections, these were corrected in a second affidavit before the motion judge.

The appellant failed to adduce evidence regarding two new charges he raised at the initial return of the motion, despite the motion judge adjourning to permit him to do so.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's cost order and dismissed the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant challenged a summary judgment order requiring it to pay HST to the respondent supplier.

The central issue was whether a supplier can issue invoices disclosing HST payable after the supply transaction has occurred, or whether such disclosure must be made at the time of the transaction to comply with section 223(1) of the Excise Tax Act.

The respondent sold unrefined gold to the appellant over a two-year period without collecting or remitting HST.

After a CRA audit, the respondent issued invoices months later demanding payment of the HST.

The court held that section 223(1) is silent on timing and permits post-transaction invoices, affirming the summary judgment.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court judgment dated September 26, 2017.

The appellants challenged the lower court decision, and the Court of Appeal addressed the issue of costs for the motion below.

The parties agreed that the costs determination should be remitted back to the trial judge for decision at a later time, pending clarification of the value of the claims and the effect of any Rule 49 settlement offers.

The appellants appealed a judgment in a motor vehicle accident case where the trial judge admitted liability just before trial and the matter proceeded as a damages assessment before a jury.

The appellants contended that the trial judge failed to address transgressions by respondent's counsel, unfairly summarized evidence in jury instructions, and displayed reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's conduct was fair and balanced, that many complaints were not objected to at trial, and that the allegations of bias did not meet the high threshold required to displace the presumption of judicial impartiality.

The respondents operated a fitness club business through a corporate entity and agreed to sell the business to the appellants through an Asset Purchase Agreement dated October 30, 2015.

The agreement required the purchaser to assume approximately $58,000 in equipment and leasehold improvement loans.

After taking possession and operating the business, the appellants refused to sign the required promissory note, stopped payment on a cheque, and immediately defaulted on lease obligations, triggering the respondents' personal liability.

The motion judge found the corporate purchaser liable for breach of contract and pierced the corporate veil to hold the individual appellants personally liable for fraudulent conduct.

The appellants appealed on three grounds, all of which were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision regarding the date of separation in a family law matter.

The motion judge had ruled that the parties did not reach a final settlement agreement on the date of separation and struck references to settlement communications on the ground that they were protected by settlement privilege and would be irrelevant at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that once the motion judge determined there was no agreement, the settlement communications became privileged and could not be used at trial to establish a date of separation.

The appellants constructed a detached garage on their property pursuant to a building permit issued by the respondent municipality.

During construction, the appellants accessed an unopened road allowance (Ninth Street).

After completion, the respondent took the position that access via Ninth Street was not permitted and blocked the street with concrete barriers.

The appellants sued seeking removal of the barriers, an easement, or damages for breach of promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation, plus punitive damages.

The trial judge dismissed all claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no merit in the appellants' arguments regarding negligence, promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, or punitive damages.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting and sexually interfering with the complainant, his spouse's daughter, over a period when the complainant was between 9 and 11 years old.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: (1) the trial judge misapprehended his evidence regarding a January 2011 assault on the complainant's mother; and (2) the trial judge applied a higher standard of scrutiny to his evidence than to the complainant's.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or her credibility findings.

The appellant was convicted of attempted fraud over $5,000 and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and 30 months' probation.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility findings and analysis of evidence were fair and even-handed.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal based on clarification of the law regarding immigration consequences of conditional sentences by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Tran.

The court substituted the custodial sentence with an 18-month conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction on multiple charges of sexual assault, non-sexual assault, and threatening with sexual violence.

The appellant and complainant had been in a relationship from 2002 to 2009.

The complainant alleged multiple incidents of sexual assault involving demands for anal intercourse and vaginal fisting, which the appellant claimed were consensual.

After a six-day jury trial, the appellant was found not guilty on one sexual assault charge but guilty on all other charges and sentenced to 4.5 years in custody.

The appeal raised issues of trial fairness regarding Crown counsel's improper cross-examination about the complainant's attractiveness and the appellant's sex drive, Crown counsel's closing address, and the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision regarding a failed real estate transaction.

They raised two issues: first, that the motion judge erred by failing to allow credit for rent payments after the respondent failed to close; and second, that the motion judge failed to adjust the purchase price to account for wasted legal expenses.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge erred in finding no authority to make the rent adjustment, the inadequate record supported dismissing that ground.

However, the Court agreed that the motion judge had authority to adjust for wasted legal expenses and that the $10,000 figure was reasonable and established on the record.

The appellant appealed his convictions for importing heroin and possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, as well as sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appellant did not dispute physical possession of 146 grams of heroin delivered by FedEx from India.

His defence was that he believed he was receiving electronics for a fee of $800 as part of an import scheme.

The trial judge rejected this explanation as neither credible nor plausible and convicted him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal on all grounds, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning regarding the actus reus and mens rea of importing, the appellant's knowledge or wilful blindness, the proper drawing of inferences, the burden of proof, and the Crown's cross-examination.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the six-year concurrent sentences fit given the nature and amount of heroin, financial motive, and prior criminal record.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order denying him leave to bring a motion for recalculation of section 7 expenses for his son for the years 2014 to 2017.

The appellant was subject to a prior order prohibiting him from commencing or continuing litigation without leave if in arrears of child support, access cancellation costs, or court-ordered costs.

The motion judge imposed additional conditions before the appellant could bring further proceedings, including payment of a $5,000 costs award, compliance with an insurance order, and reduction of child support arrears to less than $2,000.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's order reasonable and consistent with the prior order.

The appellant appealed her conviction for trafficking heroin and possession of the proceeds of crime, as well as her sentence of 26 months imprisonment.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on three grounds: that the Crown had not proven the case beyond a reasonable doubt, that the trial judge engaged in impermissible speculation rather than permissible inference, and that the trial judge failed to consider contrary evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge's inferences from circumstantial evidence, including intercepted communications, the appellant's brief presence in the target's vehicle, and the possession of cash and heroin, were reasonable and not speculative.

The appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

This appeal concerns the closure of a manufacturing plant and the resulting mass termination of employees.

The central issues relate to the timing of Form 1 notice requirements under the Employment Standards Act, 2000, the effect of overtime hours on working notice, and the validity of termination notices for employees retained beyond the statutory 13-week temporary work period.

The employer gave employees over one year's notice of termination but failed to file the required Form 1 notice with the director until more than a year later.

The motion judge found the employer's entire notice period invalid.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the Form 1 notice requirement arises only at the beginning of the statutory minimum notice period, not when the employer gives notice to employees.

However, the court upheld findings regarding overtime worked in violation of the ESA and the requirement for fresh notice when temporary work exceeds 13 weeks.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Superior Court decision that declared provisions of Bill 5 (Better Local Government Act, 2018) unconstitutional for violating freedom of expression rights under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Bill 5 reduced Toronto's municipal wards from 47 to 25 mid-election.

The application judge found that the mid-campaign change substantially interfered with candidates' ability to communicate their political messages and violated voters' right to effective representation.

The Court of Appeal granted a stay of the lower court's order pending appeal, finding a strong likelihood that the application judge erred in law and that the appeal would succeed.

The court held that Bill 5 does not limit or restrict candidates' messages and that the right to effective representation falls under s. 3 (democratic rights), not s. 2(b) (freedom of expression), and s. 3 does not apply to municipal elections.

The applicant sought an order under section 684 of the Criminal Code appointing counsel to represent him on his appeal of a second-degree murder conviction and life sentence with 12-year parole ineligibility.

The applicant was denied legal aid based on failing to meet financial eligibility criteria.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had sufficient means to fund his appeal, having savings of approximately $12,000 and monthly income of $900, and that it was not in the interests of justice to appoint counsel given the availability of duty counsel assistance through the Ontario Inmate Appeal Duty Counsel Program.

This appeal concerns the interpretation and application of section 4 of the Interest Act to complex commercial loan agreements between ClearFlow Energy Finance Corp. and Solar Power Network Inc. The central dispute involves whether a "discount fee" of 0.003% per day and "administration fees" constitute interest within the meaning of the Interest Act, and whether the loan agreements comply with the statutory requirement to express interest as an annual rate or percentage.

The application judge found that the discount fee was interest, that the loan agreements failed to comply with section 4, and that all interest payable should be capped at 5% per annum.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the discount fee was properly annualized through a formula in the Loan Agreement, that the Loan Agreement complied with section 4, and that the appropriate remedy for non-compliance in the Promissory Notes was to limit only the non-compliant discount fee to 5%, not all interest payable.