Bradley W. Miller

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that held them liable under a guarantee to The Toronto-Dominion Bank.

The central issue was whether an email sent by one of the appellants constituted clear and unequivocal notice to terminate their liability under the guarantee.

The Court of Appeal found that the email, which sought confirmation of no obligation, did provide such notice.

The court distinguished the facts from a prior Supreme Court of Canada decision, noting that the bank had no doubt about the appellants' intent to terminate and did not take actions indicating a continuing relationship after the notice.

The appeal was allowed, reversing the summary judgment against the appellants.

The appellant appealed convictions for various drug-related offences, challenging the trial judge's findings on reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and the legality of a search incident to arrest under section 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, based on confidential informant information and the discovery of drugs in the appellant's car.

The court also upheld the search of a locked container within the vehicle as a lawful search incident to arrest, despite the appellant's assertion of privacy.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault and forcible confinement, appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence, credibility, and application of the burden of proof.

The court upheld the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's implausible account and acceptance of the complainant's evidence, despite minor inconsistencies.

The sentence appeal was allowed only to quash the unconstitutional victim surcharge order, with the balance of the sentence remaining in effect.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued supplementary reasons to its judgment, addressing the disposition and sentence after setting aside the appellant's conviction for possession of oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

Given the appellant had served her original sentence and demonstrated rehabilitation, the court accepted a joint submission to dismiss the appeal, substitute a verdict of guilty for simple possession of oxycodone, and impose an absolute discharge effective from the original sentencing date.

The appellant was convicted of possession of oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in allowing a police officer to give an opinion on the ultimate issue of trafficking and in instructing the jury not to speculate about a missing witness.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in permitting the expert opinion on the ultimate issue, as it was not necessary and risked the jury accepting it without critical consideration of the evidence, particularly the absence of evidence on dosages and consumption rates.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding the error was not harmless.

The conviction was set aside, and the court requested submissions on substituting a conviction for simple possession and an appropriate sentence.

The appellant, Adam Kaup, appealed his convictions for drug possession and trafficking, arguing two main points: that the search warrant for his home was invalid due to insufficient grounds and misleading information in the Information to Obtain (ITO), and that the trial judge erred in finding he had constructive possession of drugs found in the basement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's decision.

The court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the ITO, concluding that it provided sufficient grounds for the warrant when viewed holistically.

Regarding constructive possession, the court affirmed that the trial judge correctly applied the law, considering all circumstantial evidence beyond mere occupancy, and reasonably concluded that the appellant had knowledge and control of the drugs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her constructive dismissal action, which was decided on a Rule 21 motion.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by taking judicial notice of disputed facts and by misapplying pleading rules, effectively treating the Rule 21 motion as a summary judgment motion.

The Court held that material factual issues were in dispute, making a Rule 21 determination inappropriate without evidence.

The Court declined to interpret the Employment Standards Act provisions and associated regulations regarding infectious disease emergency leave (IDEL) in the absence of a proper factual record, remitting the action to the Superior Court for determination.

Mary Thompson, charged with fraud over $5,000, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to a violation of her s. 11(b) right to trial within a reasonable time.

Applying the R. v. Jordan framework, the court calculated the total delay from the information being sworn (May 30, 2019) to the anticipated end of trial (June 24, 2022) as 36.85 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts.

After deducting 61 days for defence waiver and delay, and 134 days for COVID-19 related exceptional circumstances, the remaining delay was 30.44 months, still above the ceiling.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness, and the court found no exceptional circumstances related to the case's complexity to justify the delay.

The application for a stay of proceedings was granted.

The appellant brought a second application for adverse possession of a smaller portion of land after a previous application for the same parcel was dismissed on summary judgment and the appeal was dismissed.

The second application was dismissed on the basis of res judicata and issue estoppel.

The appellant appealed, claiming the subject matter of the current application was not the same.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the earlier action included the smaller portion and that a claimant cannot modify the parameters of their claim within the same boundaries to obtain a different result, as this is contrary to the objective of res judicata and issue estoppel.

The appellant appealed his sentence for possession of a loaded firearm, possession of a firearm while prohibited, and making a false statement.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by exceeding the Crown's proposed sentence without notifying counsel or providing clear reasons, by treating the loaded nature of the firearm as a separate aggravating factor (when it was an essential element of the offence), and by failing to consider the guilty plea as a mitigating factor.

The appeal was allowed, the original sentence was vacated, and a global sentence of four years' custody (as initially proposed by the Crown) was imposed, less pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant, Hafeez Fazl, sought a panel review of a single judge's decision to dismiss his appeal for delay.

He also requested an adjournment, initially for a religious pilgrimage, and subsequently on the grounds of being a party under a disability requiring a litigation guardian, citing a 2019 doctor's note.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the adjournment request due to a lack of proper medical or psychiatric evidence and the absence of any application under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

The panel found no error in the original dismissal of the appeal for delay, noting the underlying action had been dismissed on summary judgment as being "without a scintilla of merit" due to previous litigation on the same issues.

The motion for review was dismissed, with no order as to costs.

The appellant, Armando Scarlato Jr., appealed the dismissal of his breach of contract action on a motion for summary judgment.

He alleged the respondents, Richard Buzbuzian and Jason Monaco, breached an agreement to pay him a commission or finder’s fee for introducing them to a third-party corporation for a proposed IPO.

The motion judge found that emails exchanged did not constitute a contract, lacking essential terms, and alternatively, that the appellant was estopped by a settlement with the third party.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that no contract was formed, emphasizing deference to findings of contractual interpretation as mixed fact and law, and concluding that the term sheet did not remedy the contractual deficiencies.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents.

The appellant sought an adjournment of their appeal and motion to quash due to a breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship and uncertainty regarding new counsel's availability.

The Court of Appeal granted the adjournment, conditional on the appellant paying $7,000 in outstanding costs by a specified date, failing which the appeal would be dismissed.

The appellants sought to appeal the dismissal of their application challenging outdoor gathering restrictions imposed as public health measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, which was initially dismissed for lack of public interest standing.

The Court of Appeal determined that the underlying application was moot because the challenged regulations were no longer in force.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal regarding Mr. Baber's private interest standing, finding that this issue was also moot and that a decision would not resolve any live controversy or bind future hypothetical challenges.

The appellant, a professional accountant and second-time bankrupt, appealed a conditional discharge order requiring him to pay $325,000 to the Trustee.

The application judge found the appellant untruthful, evasive, and in breach of disclosure obligations under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, including failing to disclose businesses, records, property, vehicle sales, and loans/inheritance from his mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the conditional discharge was based on the appellant's conduct and disclosure breaches, not surplus income under s. 68.

The court also addressed improper ex parte communications by the Trustee, finding no miscarriage of justice.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court of Justice order concerning an estate trustee's conflict of interest and a claim for compensation.

The appellant argued that the application judge made palpable or overriding errors in her findings of fact and application of law.

The Court of Appeal found no such errors, affirming the lower court's determination that a conflict of interest prevented the appellant from continuing as estate trustee and upholding the decision on the appellant's compensation claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This decision addresses a request by the respondent (defendant in the original action) to limit the scope of a new trial on liability and damages, which had been ordered by the Court of Appeal in a prior decision.

The court dismissed the request, emphasizing that the evidence and issues were complex, interrelated, and interdependent.

Limiting the trial to specific issues would risk artificial credibility assessments and unreliable fact-finding.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court order appointing a receiver and manager for Go-To Developments Holdings Inc. and related entities, and continuing freeze directions, following an Ontario Securities Commission investigation into alleged securities law breaches, including misappropriation of investor funds by Oscar Furtado.

The appellants challenged the application judge's denial of an adjournment and the admission of Mr. Furtado's examination transcripts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the adjournment denial, especially in light of fresh evidence demonstrating further misconduct by Mr. Furtado.

The court declined to address the admissibility of transcripts as the issue was not raised below.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision to dismiss his application under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The underlying application sought damages for alleged mistreatment by a housing corporation after the appellant was denied a housing subsidy and assessed a rent increase.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the application bore the hallmarks of querulous litigant behaviour and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant challenged a lower court order that struck two versions of his statement of claim (except for a battery claim) and denied him leave to amend it a third time to add a new party (the Union) and a civil conspiracy claim.

The motion judge had found the claims against the Union and the civil conspiracy claim to be statute-barred, and declaratory relief also barred as it was connected to damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the civil conspiracy elements were not pleaded in earlier claims and that the new claims were out of time, even when reading the self-represented appellant's pleadings generously.