Sarah E. Pepall

The appellants, unionized masonry contractors, appealed an order staying their action against the respondents and denying injunctive relief.

The appellants sought to challenge the legality of a Memorandum of Agreement and collective agreements that prohibited independent contractor arrangements with individual bricklayers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the essential character of the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations Board and that the appellants had avenues within the labour relations regime to challenge the agreements.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing he should have received enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown conceded that, following the Supreme Court's decision in Summers, the appellant was entitled to credit at a ratio of 1.5 to 1.

The Court of Appeal varied the period of incarceration to time served, but upheld the 10-year duration of the section 161 prohibition order.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for multiple convictions of cruelty to animals.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence manifestly inadequate given the gravity of the offences, the respondent's criminal record, his probationary status at the time, and his failure to accept responsibility.

The court allowed the appeal, increasing the sentence to nine months' incarceration and varying the prohibition order to prevent the respondent from residing with any animal or bird.

The appellant appealed a life sentence, arguing it violated the parity principle under s. 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code by departing from the established range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly considered the range but was justified in departing from it due to the extraordinary and tragic circumstances of the offence and the appellant's appalling criminal history.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court that dismissed his appeal from a conviction.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding no jurisprudential issues raised and no strong likelihood of success on any proposed grounds of appeal.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposing a short period of incarceration, arguing that a different judge had imposed a conditional sentence for similar charges committed before the appellant absconded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The sentencing judge properly balanced the appellant's changed circumstances against his criminal record, the nature of the offences, and the fact that he had absconded.

The appellant submitted the lowest bid for a highway widening project but failed to declare the value of imported steel, rendering the bid non-compliant.

The Ministry of Transportation investigated, deemed the bid non-compliant, and awarded the contract to the second-lowest bidder.

The appellant sued for lost profits.

The Court of Appeal held that while a Contract A arose upon submission of the bid, the Ministry acted reasonably in refusing to waive the non-compliance.

Furthermore, an exculpatory clause in the tender documents barred the appellant's claim for damages arising from the non-acceptance of its bid.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, a bricklayer, was totally disabled following two falls.

The appellant insurer paid disability benefits for a short period before terminating them based on surveillance evidence, despite medical opinions supporting total disability.

The trial judge found the insurer breached its duty of good faith and awarded contractual damages, $200,000 in punitive damages, and $100,000 in mental distress damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the punitive damages award, finding the insurer's conduct was high-handed and adversarial.

However, the Court reduced the mental distress damages to $25,000, finding the trial judge's award was inordinately high and disproportionate.

The appellant and respondent jointly owned a property and had joint debt with an execution creditor.

After the property was sold under power of sale, a surplus remained.

The appellant had filed a consumer proposal, triggering a stay of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The application judge ordered the execution creditor's debt to be paid from the total surplus before dividing the remainder equally between the appellant and respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the stay of proceedings precluded the execution creditor from recovering against the appellant's share.

The joint tenancy was severed, and the execution creditor's debt could only be paid from the respondent's 50 percent share of the surplus.

The appellant challenged Canada's assent to changes to the royal succession rules, arguing that the continued exclusion of Roman Catholics from the throne violated s. 15 of the Charter and seeking declaratory relief.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the application, holding that the succession rules form part of the constitution of Canada and cannot be amended or overridden by the Charter.

The court further held that the appellant lacked both private standing and public interest standing, and rejected the argument that standing had been admitted through a failure to respond to a notice to admit.

The appeal, including the appeal on costs, was dismissed, with appeal costs fixed at $10,000 all inclusive.

The appellant mother appealed an order dismissing her appeal from a child protection disposition making the child a Crown ward without access.

She alleged numerous palpable and overriding errors relating to the child’s behavioural problems, her parenting abilities, mental health, judgment, and the child’s dietary needs, and argued material evidence had been ignored.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge gave extensive and considered reasons, that any misstatements did not amount to palpable and overriding error, and that the evidence of the infant mental health counsellor had been considered.

Applying a deferential standard of review in child welfare matters, the court found no basis to interfere.

The appellants appealed an order striking their negligence claim against former criminal defence counsel as an abuse of process.

The court held the civil action was plainly a collateral attack on criminal convictions that had remained undisturbed on appeal.

To succeed, the appellants would have had to prove that, but for counsel's negligence, the accused would have been acquitted, thereby re-litigating the criminal charges and undermining the integrity of the adjudicative process.

The court held that allegations of ineffective assistance generally should be pursued by direct attack within the criminal proceeding, not through a separate civil action.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted on the basis of alleged unreasonable delay in a prosecution for child pornography offences.

Applying the Morin framework, the court held that although the Crown's disclosure delay was disproportionate, only five and a half months of the total delay was unreasonable Crown delay, with the balance consisting of neutral intake time, defence delay, and acceptable institutional delay.

The court found the trial judge erred in the assessment of prejudice by failing to distinguish prejudice caused by delay from prejudice arising from the charges and bail conditions themselves, and by underweighting the seriousness of the offences and the public interest in a merits determination.

The appeal was allowed, the stay was set aside, and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that he was deprived of a fair trial due to unfair and inflammatory cross-examination and jury addresses by Crown counsel.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence of alleged juror misconduct based on online comments made after the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while some of the Crown's comments were ill-advised, they did not deprive the appellant of a fair trial when viewed in the context of the entire proceedings.

The court also dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, concluding it did not prove Crown misconduct or compromise the integrity of the trial.

The appellant was convicted of credit card fraud-related offences after police found skimming equipment, encoded gift cards, and a USB key during a traffic stop and subsequent searches.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the searches of his person, vehicle, and USB key violated his s. 8 Charter rights and the evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the pat-down search was lawful, and while the vehicle and USB key searches breached s. 8, the evidence was properly admitted under s. 24(2).

The court also affirmed that a conviction for possessing credit card data under s. 342(3) does not require proof that the data could successfully defraud an issuer.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The respondents' property was damaged by an oil spill after a tenant bypassed the furnace thermostat, causing it to overheat and overflow.

The appellant insurer denied coverage, relying on pollution and mechanical breakdown exclusions, and later argued the respondents failed to file a proof of loss.

The trial judge found for the respondents, concluding the insurer waived the proof of loss requirement and that neither exclusion applied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, upholding the findings that the adjuster's letter constituted a waiver, the mechanical breakdown was caused by external interference rather than an internal defect, and the pollution exclusion required another operative exclusion to apply.

The appellant, an HIV-positive inmate, was placed in administrative segregation due to safety concerns regarding his sexual relations with other inmates.

He applied for habeas corpus, which was dismissed by the application judge despite findings of minor procedural flaws in the segregation review process.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the application judge lacked discretion to deny the writ once a breach of procedural fairness was found.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the procedural flaws did not render the detention unlawful and that the application judge properly exercised his residual discretion to deny the writ.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of discreditable conduct, misdirected the jury on post-offence conduct, and misdirected the jury on the elements of first degree murder, specifically regarding unlawful confinement and sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellants guaranteed a loan made by the respondent to a retirement residence developer.

When the developer defaulted, the respondent sued the appellants on the guarantee and obtained summary judgment.

On appeal, the appellants argued they were released from liability because the loan terms were materially altered without their consent, specifically by converting the fixed-term loan to a demand loan and entering a forbearance agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge failed to consider the totality of the evidence regarding material alterations and applied the incorrect test for prejudice.

The summary judgment was set aside and the matter referred to trial on the defences of material alteration and laches.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for an assessment of his former solicitor's bills under the Solicitors Act.

The application judge found no 'special circumstances' to justify assessing the 12 paid bills, which were rendered over four years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or unreasonable result in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption that payment indicated acceptance of the accounts.