Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant appealed a summary judgment ordering him to pay retroactive and periodic child support.

The monetary amounts fell within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Because the appellant brought the matter to the wrong court and had disregarded the existing support and costs orders, the Court of Appeal declined to transfer the matter and quashed the appeal.

The appellants were convicted of failing to provide the necessaries of life to their three-year-old child, who was found to be malnourished and suffering from untreated open wounds.

They appealed their convictions and six-month sentences, arguing that a failure to provide medical attention does not constitute 'necessitous circumstances' under s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that medical attention is a necessary of life and its deprivation can amount to necessitous circumstances.

The court found no material misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and upheld the sentences as fit given the serious breach of trust.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

At the Board hearing, the appellant's counsel did not contest the issue of significant risk.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the Board erred by failing to discharge its inquisitorial function and make an independent determination that the significant threat threshold had been met.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board was entitled to rely on counsel's acknowledgment, which was supported by the appellant's history and psychological assessments indicating a significant prospect of recidivism.

The appellant appealed his convictions arising from an alleged domestic assault.

At trial, the judge sought corroboration for the complainant's testimony and relied on the opinion evidence of an investigating police officer regarding the complainant's demeanour and injuries, as well as the complainant's prior consistent statements to her daughter and police.

The Court of Appeal held that the officer's evidence improperly ventured into expert opinion and was used to shore up the complainant's credibility.

Furthermore, the prior consistent statements were improperly used for their truth.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed her first-degree murder convictions for the deaths of her two young daughters.

At trial, she raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) due to a mental disorder, arguing she believed killing her children was an altruistic act to save them.

The jury rejected the defence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the concept of 'moral wrongfulness' and in his treatment of the expert psychiatric evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the jury charge, concluding the instructions properly focused on the appellant's capacity to know her acts were morally wrong by societal standards.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari to quash his committal for trial.

He argued the preliminary inquiry judge lost jurisdiction by failing to strictly comply with s. 536(2) of the Criminal Code when taking his election for mode of trial while he was unrepresented.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding of substantial compliance, noting the appellant had prior legal representation and co-accused who elected.

The Court also found no loss of jurisdiction due to s. 536(4.2), which mandates a preliminary inquiry for all co-accused if one requests it.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual touching involving a child complainant over a five-year period.

He was sentenced to nine and three-quarter years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence exceeded the appropriate range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the appellant's position of trust, his related criminal record, and the profound impact on the complainant.

The appellant was convicted under s. 127 of the Criminal Code for breaching an interlocutory injunction prohibiting anti-abortion protests near clinics.

She appealed, arguing the prosecution was an abuse of process due to Crown delay in the civil proceeding, and that s. 127 was unconstitutional on division of powers and Charter s. 7 grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no abuse of process, characterizing the argument as an impermissible collateral attack, and upholding the constitutionality of s. 127.

The appellant appealed her conviction for importing cocaine, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting a challenge for cause based on her work in the sex trade and that the Crown's cross-examination on her notebook was unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the discretionary decision to decline the challenge for cause.

The court also found no unfairness in the cross-examination, noting the notebook was admitted on consent and the trial judge provided numerous cautions to the jury.

The appellant, a convicted drug dealer, appealed a full forfeiture order of his residential property under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The property was heavily fortified and used for commercial cocaine distribution.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the property was a fortified drug property and that full forfeiture was not disproportionate given the nature of the offences, the appellant's extensive criminal record, and his ties to organized crime.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a municipal councillor, brought an action for defamation against other councillors based on statements made during a council meeting.

The defendants moved to strike the allegations, arguing their statements were protected by absolute privilege.

The motion judge held that absolute privilege does not apply to municipal councillors, who instead enjoy qualified privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that Canadian law applies qualified privilege to municipal council speech and declining to extend absolute privilege without a full evidentiary record demonstrating its necessity.

The appellants, trustees of a pension fund, sought leave under the Securities Act and certification under the Class Proceedings Act for a $4 billion class action against Kinross Gold Corporation for alleged misrepresentations regarding two gold mines.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable possibility of success for the statutory claims due to flawed expert evidence, and consequently denied certification for the common law claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the motion judge's assessment of the leave test and concluding that a class action was not the preferable procedure for the remaining common law negligent misrepresentation claims due to the need for individualized inquiries into reliance.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's contempt findings and the associated costs award of $40,000 on a full indemnity scale.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt findings, noting they were supported by the evidentiary record and adverse credibility findings.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding costs, reducing the $40,000 award to $25,000, as the original amount exceeded the respondent's claimed costs and was disproportionate to the appellant's costs.

Other costs rulings were confirmed.

The respondent was arrested during the G20 summit and filed a timely complaint against the arresting officers.

After receiving the investigative report, he discovered that higher-ranking officers may have ordered the arrests, prompting him to file a second complaint outside the six-month statutory period.

The Director of the OIPRD refused to deal with the second complaint, citing the time limit without further explanation.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, finding the Director failed to apply discoverability principles and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Director's appeal, affirming that discoverability applies to the screening of complaints and that the Director's cursory reasons were inadequate and unreasonable.

The appellants appealed an order of the motion judge granting summary judgment and awarding costs to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's reasons for summary judgment or the costs award, noting the costs award was not unreasonable or erroneous in principle.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's discretionary decision regarding the appointment of an umpire for an insurance appraisal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to interfere with the motion judge's discretion.

The court was satisfied that the appointed umpire was appropriately qualified and found no evidence of bad faith.

The appellant hosted a golf tournament at the respondents' golf course.

A guest was injured in a golf cart accident and sued the respondents for negligent course design.

The respondents brought a third-party claim against the appellant for contractual indemnity based on a clause in the event contract.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the respondents.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the indemnity clause did not clearly and unambiguously shift the risk of the respondents' own negligence to the appellant.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision and sought leave to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion, noting it did not meet the test and was not needed to argue the appeal.

On the main appeal, the appellants argued that summary judgment was premature due to missing evidence.

The Court rejected this, finding the appellants failed to take steps to compel production and did not put their best foot forward.

The motion judge correctly applied the tests for summary judgment.

The appeal and leave to appeal costs were dismissed, with costs of the appeal fixed at $85,000.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order regarding spousal support and the dismissal of her civil claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

She argued the trial judge erred in imputing income to both parties.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings on support.

The Court also upheld the dismissal of the civil claims, noting the contract issue had been previously determined and there was insufficient evidence for the emotional distress claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their 14-year-old medical malpractice action for delay under Rule 48.14.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the hearing judge properly applied the two-part test requiring an acceptable explanation for the delay and no non-compensable prejudice.

The court agreed that the appellants failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for a delay of almost 11 years since the delivery of the statement of defence.