Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant landlord appealed a decision finding that a requirement to maintain eight doctors as tenants and a corresponding rent abatement provision in a 1990 commercial lease were not eliminated by a subsequent renewal agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation of the commercial context and language of the agreements.

Applying Sattva, the Court held that deference was owed to the application judge's interpretation.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against the police for negligent investigation.

The appellant alleged the police negligently failed to send a needle for communicable disease testing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis for a negligence claim because uncontroverted evidence showed that testing the needle was impossible or unreliable, meaning no damages flowed from the failure to test.

The appellant, a court-appointed receiver, appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to approve the full amount of legal fees requested on behalf of its counsel.

The motion judge had reduced the fees, finding them disproportionate to the size and complexity of the receivership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the court must ensure compensation is fair and reasonable, focusing on the value provided rather than just the mathematical calculation of hours multiplied by hourly rates.

The motion judge's assessment of the fees as excessive was upheld.

The respondents, former employees and officers of a union local, brought an application before the Ontario Labour Relations Board alleging unfair labour practices.

They requested the vice-chair recuse himself because he had previously acted for one of the respondents in an employment dispute.

The vice-chair declined and dismissed the application for serving no labour relations purpose.

The Divisional Court quashed the decisions, finding a conflict of interest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court erred by applying the test for a lawyer's conflict of interest rather than the test for reasonable apprehension of bias by an adjudicator.

The Court found the presumption of impartiality was not rebutted and reinstated the vice-chair's decisions.

The appellant, a fuel delivery truck driver, was convicted of fraud and theft based on GPS and machine-generated delivery records suggesting he delivered fuel to a third party instead of his employer's customers.

He appealed his convictions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered acquittals, finding the trial judge erred by failing to explain why potentially exculpatory signed delivery acknowledgements did not raise a reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove that the GPS and delivery slip systems were time-synchronized, rendering the records unreliable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of cocaine, as well as his concurrent 21-month sentences.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons and that the verdict was unreasonable because it relied on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient and the verdict reasonable based on the evidence, including an apparent hand-to-hand transaction and the discovery of cash consistent with drug trafficking.

The sentence was also upheld as fit given the appellant's record.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the sole ground that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant an order under s. 530 of the Criminal Code that his trial be held in English.

The appellant sought this order to challenge jurors for language competency under s. 638(1)(f).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that there was no basis for a s. 530 order because the appellant's trial was already scheduled to be held in English.

The appellant sought to initiate a private prosecution against Hydro One Networks.

After a Justice of the Peace declined to permit the prosecution, a Superior Court judge converted the appeal to an application for mandamus but declined to grant relief.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal and brought a motion seeking an interim order requiring Hydro One Networks to deliver hydro bills, an order under s. 683 of the Criminal Code for witnesses to testify, and other procedural relief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no legal basis for the interim order and no basis established for the s. 683 order, but provided directions on time limits for oral submissions on the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking enhanced credit for 20 months of pretrial custody.

The trial judge had only given 1 month of enhanced credit for 44 lock-down days.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Summers, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted 1.5 to 1 credit for the entire 20 months of pretrial custody, reducing the sentence accordingly.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his global sentence of 13 years for attempted murder and breaches of firearms prohibition and recognizance orders.

He argued the trial judge failed to consider his youth, first-time custodial status, and rehabilitative prospects, and that the sentence was outside the acceptable range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that denunciation and deterrence are paramount for gun violence in public places, particularly as the appellant shot at a security guard multiple times while under prohibition orders.

The respondent moved to vary a judgment of the Court of Appeal awarding $8,000 in costs to the appellant following a successful appeal to set aside an administrative dismissal.

The respondent argued that costs should not follow the event because it was not at fault for the delay, and that it had not agreed to the $8,000 quantum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting that the digital recording confirmed the respondent's counsel had agreed to the quantum, and found no reason to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that the respondent tenant's installation of an ATM violated the permitted use clause of their commercial lease.

The lease restricted the premises to use as a fast-food restaurant.

The application judge found the ATM was a business tool to keep costs low and did not change the purpose of the premises.

The Court of Appeal applied the deferential standard of review for contractual interpretation established in Sattva, finding no error of law or mixed fact and law, and dismissed the appeal.

The respondents successfully sued the appellants in a jury trial for negligence after a glass Dutch oven shattered, causing severe injuries.

The jury found the appellants 75% liable for failing to adequately warn of the dangers associated with the product.

On appeal, the appellants argued the claim against one defendant was statute-barred, the jury's causation finding lacked an evidentiary basis, and the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on aggravated damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the limitation period and liability, finding the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the $25,000 aggravated damages award due to an erroneous jury instruction.

Following a successful appeal where the matter was remitted for trial, the Court of Appeal considered the parties' costs submissions.

The court applied the presumption that a successful appellant is entitled to costs and awarded the appellant $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The moving party brought a motion to review an order of Weiler J.A. and to stay a December 2013 order of the Court of Appeal pending an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion as completely devoid of merit and moot, given that leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada had been refused.

The court noted the motion was another vexatious step in a protracted matrimonial dispute and dismissed it pursuant to Rule 2.1.02(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant condominium corporation sought to recover common expense arrears from a defaulting unit owner.

Having failed to register a certificate of lien within the statutory three-month period, the appellant lost its priority over the respondent mortgagee.

The appellant applied under s. 134 of the Condominium Act, arguing the unpaid common expenses constituted damages that could be added to the common expenses, thereby reviving its priority lien.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that classifying unpaid common expenses as damages under s. 134 is contrary to the legislative purpose, scheme, and plain language of the Act, which balances the rights of condominium corporations and mortgagees.

The appellant, a tax preparer, appealed his convictions for two counts of fraud and his sentence of three years' imprisonment and a $448,000 fine.

He argued that his rights under s. 11(b) of the Charter were violated due to a 65-month delay, and that his s. 8 Charter rights were violated during the execution of search warrants at his home and office.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the delay was largely attributable to inherent time requirements and a mistrial caused by the trial judge's illness, and that the seized documents were properly obtained under s. 489(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The sentence was upheld as being within the accepted range for a serious fraud against the public purse.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its 2013 action seeking the return of mining claims and rights forfeited to the Crown in 1974.

The motion judge had dismissed the action on grounds including res judicata, abuse of process, and time limitations, noting the appellant had brought similar actions in 2008 and 2010.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's reliance on res judicata and abuse of process, and noting that the Coutu Gold Mines Limited Act expressly provided that forfeited mining rights were unaffected.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing procedural unfairness regarding a Corbett application and challenging the trial judge's decision to allow cross-examination on a prior conviction for cultivating marijuana.

The Court of Appeal found no procedural unfairness, noting the trial judge properly navigated the issues.

The Court held that the appellant's denial of expertise in operating a marijuana grow-op opened the door to cross-examination on his prior conviction, which had limited but potential value in assessing his credibility.

The trial judge's limiting instructions to the jury were accurate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting his self-defence claim and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the force used was unreasonable was supported by the accepted evidence of an independent witness.

The court also rejected the ineffective assistance claim, concluding that trial counsel's approach was reasonable and the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice or professional incompetence.