Sarah E. Pepall

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their action as an impermissible collateral attack on a decision of the Deputy Director of Titles.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge failed to address the appellants' request for an extension of time to appeal the Land Titles Decision.

The Court noted that one of the appellants had been acquitted of fraud in a related criminal trial, which contradicted the Deputy Director's findings, and that there were concerns about procedural fairness at the Land Titles hearing.

The action was reinstated to allow the appellants to bring a proper motion for an extension of time.

The appellant was seriously injured in a motor scooter accident and suffered brain injuries.

At trial, 16 years later, she provided a different account of the accident than in her statement of claim.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding she had not proven the respondent caused or contributed to the accident, relying in part on defence expert evidence regarding retrograde amnesia.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting the expert evidence, assessing reliability, and applying the standard of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reliance on the expert evidence, assessment of reliability, or application of the balance of probabilities standard.

The appellant appealed a jury's damages award and a trial judge's costs order arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the trial judge's interventions during cross-examination rendered the trial unfair and that the jury was misdirected on causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the damages appeal, finding the interventions did not compromise trial fairness and the causation instructions were adequate.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, setting aside a $60,000 penalty imposed on the appellant's insurer under the Insurance Act.

The Court found no evidence that the insurer failed to attempt to settle the claim expeditiously or that its participation in mediation was a sham.

The appellant was convicted of knowingly violating a condition of his Long Term Supervision Order prohibiting him from viewing pornography, after being caught watching a pornographic program at his half-way house.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by fast-forwarding through parts of the DVD and by applying an objective standard of mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the context of the program and correctly found the appellant had subjective knowledge that he was watching pornography.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault following his participation in a prison riot where he severely injured an unconscious inmate.

He was sentenced to seven and one-half years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge failed to properly apply the principle of parity, given the lighter sentences imposed on co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disparity was justified because the appellant's participation was of significantly greater gravity and moral blameworthiness than that of the other participants.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol level.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding the roadside breath demand was made 'forthwith' under s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, holding that the proposed ground of appeal involved well-established legal principles and a fact-specific inquiry that did not raise a question of law alone of general importance.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder after stabbing two strangers.

At trial, he did not contest the stabbings but claimed he intended to commit suicide.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence indicating he suffered from catatonic schizophrenia at the time of the offences.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it met the Palmer criteria.

Based on the unanimous and uncontradicted opinions of three forensic psychiatrists, the Court found the appellant established the defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and verdicts of not criminally responsible were substituted.

The appellant, an octogenarian with medical issues, appealed his concurrent 12-month custodial sentences for historical sexual assault, interference, and exploitation of a child.

He argued the sentence should be served conditionally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was below the usual range for prolonged sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust, and that denunciation and deterrence required a custodial sentence despite the appellant's medical difficulties.

The appellant appealed a discretionary order deferring the determination of her entitlement to post-retirement spousal support until the respondent's retirement.

The trial judge recognized that the operation of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act could create an inequity, but concluded the issue was best addressed when the parties' means and needs had crystallized.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle given the parties' ages and the time-limited support order already in place.

The appeal was dismissed, though the Court noted the appellant should be protected against unilateral dissipation of the pension prior to retirement.

The appellant was convicted of several counts related to a home invasion and sentenced to 10 years in custody.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his alibi and in accepting the evidence of an unsavoury witness to establish identity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings or consideration of confirmatory evidence, including fingerprints and the timing of the arrest.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 10-year sentence reflected the seriousness of the offence and the appellant's criminal record.

The appellants were convicted in absentia of Highway Traffic Act offences after failing to appear for trial.

The certificates of offence contained discrepancies between the short-form description of the offence and the section number.

The appeal judge upheld the convictions, finding the certificates complete and regular on their face.

On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Crown conceded that the certificates were not regular on their face as required by ss. 9(2) and 9.1(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeals, and quashed the certificates of offence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to defrauding her employer of over $300,000 over 14 months.

She appealed her 10-month carceral sentence, seeking a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The court noted the breach of trust, the duration of the scheme, and concluded the sentence was already very lenient despite mitigating factors such as self-reporting and a guilty plea.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his wrongful dismissal claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant did not accept an amended employment contract and that his dismissal was justified for just cause due to his conduct.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the respondent improperly deducted $6,250 from the appellant's final payment in violation of s. 13 of the Employment Standards Act.

The trial judgment was varied to order payment of $6,250 to the appellant, with costs of the appeal awarded to the respondent due to mixed success.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple offences relating to an armed home invasion robbery.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding sufficient evidence of identity, misapprehended evidence, and erred in law by reversing the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reasonably inferred identity from circumstantial evidence, including the doctrine of recent possession, and did not misapprehend material evidence or misapply the W.(D.) framework.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a judgment assessing damages for an admitted breach, arguing the motion judge applied the wrong test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge applied the correct test and reasonably concluded it was foreseeable the respondent would continue to lend money to the deceased.

The court also upheld the motion judge's analysis regarding section 13 of the Evidence Act.

The appellant, a medical doctor dismissed from a residency program, sued the university and several faculty members for various torts including conspiracy and intimidation.

The motion judge struck all claims against the individual respondents and the intimidation claim against the university, denying leave to amend.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the claims, finding the pleadings failed to distinguish individual acts from corporate acts or plead the essential elements of the torts.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, granting the appellant leave to amend her statement of claim since no prior amendments had been made and the motion judge provided no reasons for denying leave.

The appellant appealed a trial order regarding custody, parenting time, spousal support, and equalization.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's factual findings on custody and the valuation of a shareholder loan for equalization purposes.

However, the court set aside the trial judge's award of $1 per year in spousal support, noting it was unnecessary and unrequested at trial.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of deleting the spousal support order.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for fraud and breach of contract related to a carpet supply and installation contract with a public housing corporation.

The trial judge found the appellants engaged in a deliberate scheme of falsifying invoices and supplying substandard materials, awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages, and full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on liability, compensatory damages, and costs, confirming that a contractual stop-payment clause was not a penalty or liquidated damages provision.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the joint and several nature of the punitive damages award and the punitive damages awarded against the deceased employee's estate, leaving the principal appellant solely liable for the punitive damages.

The appellant, a bankrupt who suffered severe injuries in a motor vehicle accident, appealed a motion judge's order regarding the calculation of his surplus income under s. 68 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The motion judge had included financial assistance payments, statutory accident benefits settlement proceeds, and portions of a personal injury settlement in the appellant's total income, resulting in a surplus income payment obligation and a $15,000 penalty for failing to disclose the settlements.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the financial assistance loan, legal costs, and damages for future care and housekeeping should not have been included in the total income calculation.

The surplus income payment was set aside, but the $15,000 penalty for non-disclosure was affirmed.

The appellant sued the respondent bank for breach of contract and negligence after his cousins fraudulently withdrew over $1 million from his account.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the appellant was bound by a Financial Services Agreement (FSA) that released the bank from liability if errors were not reported within 30 days.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons and misconstrued the FSA.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the verification agreement constituted a complete defence and the appellant failed to exercise reasonable care.

The respondent's cross-appeal on costs was allowed, directing the appellant to pay the trial costs.