Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the circumstances leading to the order were germane to a subsequent proceeding that led to a detention order at Waypoint, which was the subject of a separate appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 4 years and 10 months.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Summers, the parties agreed the appellant was entitled to enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to time served, while noting the original sentence length was otherwise warranted.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside a conviction and ordering a new trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, finding that the trial judge was entitled to rely on evidence that the officer tested the radar device before and after use and was a qualified operator to establish a prima facie case of accuracy.

The court declined to address whether a broader presumption of accuracy should be created for radar guns.

The appellant, an Ontario resident, was injured in a motorcycle accident in British Columbia while a passenger on a motorcycle driven by an Alberta resident.

The appellant sued the driver, his insurer, and her own Ontario insurer in Ontario.

The driver successfully moved to stay the action against him for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, the appellant argued her Ontario insurance contract, which required her to sue her insurer in Ontario, was a presumptive connecting factor giving Ontario jurisdiction over the entire dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that an insurance contract is not a presumptive connecting factor over an extra-provincial tortfeasor, and declined to apply the forum of necessity doctrine as the appellant could pursue her claim in British Columbia.

Following a judgment allowing appeals and cross-appeals in part, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale, ordering Charles Sr. to pay Diana $50,000, Charles Jr. to pay Diana $15,000, Lisa to pay Charles Jr. $15,000, and Ford to pay Lisa $15,000.

All additional requests for costs were dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside a 2005 amending agreement to a separation agreement, declaring the respondent the sole owner of a property, and ordering prospective spousal support.

The respondent cross-appealed on issues including retroactive support, pre-judgment interest, and costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the applications judge's decision to set aside the agreement due to the appellant's significant financial non-disclosure and unconscionability.

The appeal was dismissed in its entirety.

The cross-appeal was allowed only to award pre-judgment interest on the retroactive child and spousal support order.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him to the United States, arguing that extradition would violate his section 7 Charter rights due to risks to his personal safety as a cooperating inmate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister reasonably balanced the risks against the protective measures available in the U.S. prison system.

The Court held that the applicant did not face a level of risk beyond that of most cooperating inmates and that potential placement in a special housing unit would not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and firearm-related offences, as well as his 11-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended medical and gunshot residue evidence, and applied uneven scrutiny to the defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the court upheld the 11-year sentence as fit but granted leave to vary the pre-sentence custody credit to 1.5:1 in accordance with R. v. Summers.

The young person appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement as an aider and abettor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions relating to the main sexual assault in the bedroom, finding the trial judge's factual findings supported the inference that the appellant intended to assist his friends.

However, the Court quashed the convictions relating to an earlier 'tickling incident' because the trial judge failed to provide any analysis of how the appellant aided and abetted that specific assault.

The appeal was allowed in part, with a new trial ordered on the quashed counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and the sentence increasing his period of parole ineligibility.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on intoxication and the required intention for murder.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the relevance of intoxication to mens rea and adequately summarized the defence's position regarding an alcohol-induced blackout.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant slipped and fell on ice and snow on the driveway of a rented residential property.

He sued the landlord and later added the tenant as a co-defendant.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action against both defendants.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against the tenant, finding the claim was statute-barred because the appellant failed to rebut the presumption that he discovered his claim on the date of the accident.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the landlord, finding genuine issues for trial concerning the interplay between the lease terms, the Occupiers' Liability Act, and the landlord's maintenance obligations under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The appellant sought full indemnity costs for his successful appeal and two underlying motions regarding his bankruptcy discharge and the treatment of a personal injury settlement.

The Court of Appeal declined to award full indemnity costs, finding that the Trustee's conduct was not reprehensible and that Rule 49.10 did not apply to grant a defendant substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the appellant partial indemnity costs of $5,000 for the motion before Spence J. and $10,000 for the appeal.

The appellant insurer appealed a declaration that it had a duty to defend the respondent OSPCA in three separate actions alleging malicious prosecution, false arrest, and defamation arising from animal cruelty investigations.

The insurer argued that coverage was excluded by policy clauses regarding willful violation of penal statutes and by the fortuity principle, which precludes coverage for intentional harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the OSPCA Act is not a penal statute, exceeding a search warrant is not a Criminal Code offence, and the fortuity principle did not apply because the policies expressly covered intentional torts like malicious prosecution and the plaintiffs did not plead that the OSPCA intended the specific harm suffered.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the respondents sought costs.

The appellant did not file responding submissions.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the fully successful respondents, fixed at $5,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants were convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

After the jury was discharged, it was discovered that the jury foreman had brought a document containing extraneous information into the jury room.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that the juror misconduct caused a miscarriage of justice, that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on post-offence conduct, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

They also appealed their sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reasonable possibility that the extraneous information affected the verdict, no error in the jury instructions or the dismissal of the directed verdict application, and that the sentences were fit.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order surrendering him for extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges.

The applicant argued that the three-year delay between his indictment and the extradition request, during which his parole in Canada was revoked, rendered the surrender an abuse of process and unjust or oppressive under s. 44(1)(a) of the Extradition Act.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Minister erred in stating that bad faith or improper motive were prerequisites for abuse of process, the surrender decision was ultimately reasonable.

The delay did not amount to an abuse of process, and the Minister did not err in assessing prejudice or the application of s. 64(1) of the Extradition Act.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The plaintiff appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against a police officer and the police services board for disclosing his criminal record to his employer, which allegedly caused his termination.

The plaintiff argued the limitation period did not begin until the defendants acknowledged the disclosure was wrongful.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the two-year limitation period began when the plaintiff learned of the disclosure and his resulting loss, regardless of whether he knew the defendants were legally liable.

The appellants sued their former lawyer for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding his fee estimate, and sued his insurer, LPIC, as an accessory after the fact.

The motion judge struck the claim against LPIC for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and dismissed the action against the lawyer as an abuse of process, finding it was brought to provide leverage in a fee assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that no duty of care exists between an insurer and an adverse party, and that the action against the lawyer was an abuse of process.

The appellant, a unit owner and former director of the respondent condominium corporation, appealed a costs order made against him.

The application judge had ordered the appellant to pay $45,000 in costs but failed to clearly determine whether the appellant had acted in bad faith or was merely negligent, which was critical to determining his entitlement to indemnification under the condominium's by-laws.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the costs order, and remitted the matter to the application judge to clarify the findings and reassess the costs.

The appellant employee deleted and took confidential information upon the breakdown of her employment.

The respondent employer sued and moved for an injunction.

The parties negotiated a settlement, but a dispute arose over whether the agreement included a full forensic sweep of the appellant's devices.

The respondent insisted on the sweep and adjourned its injunction motion, while the appellant claimed the respondent had repudiated the settlement.

The motion judge found a binding settlement without the forensic sweep term and held the respondent had not repudiated it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the respondent's insistence on the term and its steps to preserve the status quo via the injunction did not objectively evince an intention not to be bound by the settlement agreement.