Sarah E. Pepall

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent for unpaid structural consulting services.

The motion judge's endorsement merely stated that there was no genuine issue for trial, without providing any factual findings or legal analysis.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's reasons were so deficient that they did not permit meaningful appellate review.

The court declined to decide the summary judgment motion itself due to unresolved factual disputes and directed the parties to seek an expedited hearing on the merits.

The appellants appealed an order striking their statement of defence and counterclaim for failing to produce an affidavit of documents.

They argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction because the order was purportedly made under Rule 76, despite the litigation continuing under the ordinary procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the order did not refer to Rule 76, and even if it had, it would be a mere technical irregularity that did not deprive the motion judge of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 6 years and 7.5 months for multiple offences including break and enter, robbery, and assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in attributing presentence custody and sought a reduction of the global sentence to 5 years.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge misunderstood the Crown's position regarding presentence custody.

The Court maintained the 6-year global sentence due to the seriousness of the crimes but reduced it by the 7.5 months of presentence custody to make the credit meaningful.

The appellant was employed under a five-year fixed-term contract and was terminated without cause after 23 months.

The motion judge found the early termination clause unenforceable and awarded common law reasonable notice damages subject to mitigation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that where an employment contract is for a fixed term and lacks an enforceable early termination provision, the employee is entitled to the salary and benefits for the unexpired portion of the term.

Furthermore, the court held that there is no duty to mitigate damages arising from the early termination of a fixed-term contract.

The appellant appealed his effective sentence of 16 months following guilty pleas to driving offences and possession of stolen property.

The trial judge had imposed a 9-month sentence (in addition to 7 months of pretrial custody) to allow the appellant to attend the Ontario Correctional Institute, which required a 9-month minimum.

After the appellant was rejected from the program, he appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to the 5 months originally requested by the Crown, noting the appellant's genuine remorse.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision upholding a trust agreement that declared the appellant company's assets belonged to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's credibility findings regarding the agreement's execution.

However, the Court held that the motion judge erred by granting a certificate of pending litigation on his own initiative, as it was neither pleaded nor requested.

The appeal was allowed in part solely to delete the certificate of pending litigation, and dismissed in all other respects.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed.

The tenant's business premises were destroyed by a fire caused by a contractor retained by the landlord.

The tenant's insurer paid the policy limits and brought a subrogated claim against the landlord for the remaining uninsured losses.

The commercial lease required the tenant to insure its property against fire and to name the landlord as an additional insured, but also contained a clause requiring the landlord to indemnify the tenant for damage caused by the landlord's negligence.

The Court of Appeal held that the tenant's covenant to insure constituted an assumption of the risk of fire damage, relieving the landlord of liability even for its own negligence.

The appeal was allowed and the tenant's action dismissed.

The appellant appealed from judgments regarding valid mortgages on which he had been in default for over a year and a half.

He argued there was enough equity in the property to satisfy the debts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the orders below and noting that the equity in the property was irrelevant to the respondent's right to payment and to assert its rights under the security.

The appellant failed to comply with a security for costs order.

The respondent requested that the appeal be dismissed for non-compliance, and the appellant did not oppose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on consent.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision striking her application for declaratory relief as an abuse of process.

The appellant alleged that State Farm wrongly transmitted her confidential medical information outside Ontario without consent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the application was duplicative of the appellant's pending action for statutory accident benefits and circumvented the comprehensive dispute resolution schemes under the Insurance Act and PIPEDA.

The appeal and a motion to adduce fresh evidence were dismissed.

The appellant father sought to relocate with his seven-year-old child from Kincardine to Whitby, relying on a notice provision in a consent order.

The motion judge held that a motion to change was required and dismissed the motion, finding no material change in circumstances.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the proposed move contradicted the schooling and access clauses of the order, necessitating a motion to change.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the father's concerns about the stigma of past false abuse allegations were foreseeable at the time of the original order.

The appeal and leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering the return of a $2,000,000 deposit to the respondent purchaser after a failed commercial real estate transaction.

The dispute centered on whether the respondent fulfilled its contractual obligation to apply in good faith to assume existing mortgages before rejecting the terms offered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's interpretation of the contract and his conclusion that a formal application would have been an exercise in futility.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment, limiting their argument to the submission that the trial judge erred in refusing their request for an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly balanced the interests of the parties and the administration of justice, noting the appellants' history of changing counsel and prior warnings that a last-minute change would not entitle them to an adjournment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant commenced an action in 2001 against the municipality.

After years of inactivity and failure to set the action down for trial, the motion judge dismissed the action for delay in 2015.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in finding inordinate and inexcusable delay, and failed to accommodate him as a self-represented litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the delay was indeed inordinate and inexcusable, raising a presumption of prejudice that the appellant failed to rebut.

The court noted that while self-represented litigants face challenges, they must still familiarize themselves with relevant procedures.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to advance evidence to rebut the presumption of knowledge under s. 5(2) and to overcome the discoverability requirements of s. 5(1)(b) of the Limitations Act.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $7,500.

The appellant commercial tenant suffered property damage from a flood and sued the respondent landlord for the uninsured balance of its loss.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding that the lease required the tenant to maintain all-risks insurance and barred claims against the landlord for property damage.

On appeal, the tenant argued summary judgment was inappropriate, the expired lease terms did not apply, and the landlord retained liability for failing to repair the premises.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that summary judgment is appropriate for waiver of subrogation cases, the overholding tenant remained bound by the lease terms, and the lease shifted the risk of damage from an insured peril to the tenant regardless of the landlord's conduct.

The appellants appealed an order regarding disclosure and examination of garnishees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the order under appeal was interlocutory rather than final, as it did not dispose of the appellants' rights on a final basis.

Costs of $8,500 were awarded to the garnishees on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision that found the respondents successfully exercised a Put-Right option in an asset purchase agreement.

The option allowed the respondents to compel the appellants to purchase their shares for $3.00 a share.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions that the option was part of a bilateral contract, that the respondents substantially complied with notice provisions, and that the failure to provide section 116 Income Tax Act certificates was not a precondition to exercising the option.

The remedy of $600,000 and specific performance was upheld.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs for a motion to dismiss the appeal, which became moot after the appellant abandoned the appeal.

The appellant argued he should be awarded costs because the respondent improperly brought the motion before a single judge rather than a panel.

The Court of Appeal ordered no costs, noting the procedural error by the respondent and the abandonment of the appeal by the appellant.

The appellant was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident involving a leased vehicle.

The appellant sued the driver, the lessees, the legal owner (Daimler Financial), and the beneficial owner (Chrysler).

The motion judge found that Chrysler was an owner under the Highway Traffic Act and vicariously liable, but that both Chrysler and Daimler Financial were lessors under the Insurance Act and entitled to a $1 million cap on liability.

The motion judge also dismissed the appellant's claim that the driver was an unnamed insured under Daimler Financial's excess policy and dismissed the negligent entrustment claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld all of the motion judge's findings, dismissing both the appeal and the cross-appeal.