Sarah E. Pepall

The plaintiffs sued the quarry owner (Miller Group) and the blasting operator (Sernoskies) for damages caused by a fly rock incident.

The plaintiffs and the operator entered into a Pierringer settlement agreement, releasing the operator and restricting claims against the owner to several liability.

The owner cross-claimed against the operator, alleging an implied indemnity agreement.

The motion judge dismissed the owner's cross-claim and its motion for summary judgment against the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the owner's appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to address the threshold issue of whether an implied indemnity agreement existed, which could eliminate the owner's liability entirely.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for determination.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence that an Easement and Lake Water Supply Agreement had been conveyed to the appellant through an Assignment and Assumption of Contracts Agreement and a vesting order.

The motion judge erred in dismissing the action on the basis that the agreement had not been transferred.

The appeal was allowed, the order set aside, and partial summary judgment granted declaring the agreement was conveyed to the appellant.

The appellant appealed an order granting in part the respondents' motion for summary judgment, which struck out several paragraphs of his Statement of Defence.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in striking his defence of truth, which the motion judge found to be a collateral attack on previous factual findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's requests for other relief, including a declaration of bias and a transfer of the matter to Florida.

The respondent invested $57,000 in a fraudulent investment scheme through the appellant and a third party.

The trial judge found the appellant liable for the loss based on a breach of constructive trust as a trustee de son tort.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by deciding liability on a theory that was not pleaded.

Furthermore, the Court found no evidentiary basis for a breach of trust, as the appellant did not guarantee the investment or participate in any wrongdoing.

The appellant partnership appealed a trial judgment dismissing its action and awarding the respondent former partner damages on his counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's calculation of goodwill attributable to the respondent's capital account, his conclusion regarding the equity of subsidiaries, or his calculation of goodwill for retained clients.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action by the motion judge.

The motion judge had dismissed the action because the appellant failed to pay security for costs into court as required by a previous order.

The Court of Appeal found a proper basis for the motion judge's conclusion and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent due to unfounded public allegations against respondent's counsel.

The appellant filed a Notice of Abandonment for the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs of the abandoned appeal to the respondent, fixed at $7,500 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a drug-related offence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to adequately apply the W.(D.) framework to assess the appellant's credibility regarding his knowledge of the presence of cocaine.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed the motion judge's refusal to stay a partial summary judgment until all litigation between the parties was resolved.

The Court of Appeal held that the refusal to stay the judgment was an exercise of the motion judge's discretion and found no basis to interfere.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $7,500.

Following an appeal and cross-appeal, the court determined the quantum of trial costs payable to the cross-appellant, a lawyer who represented himself at trial.

The cross-appellant sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $49,600, while the respondent suggested $1,000.

Applying the principle that self-represented lawyers are entitled to costs for work ordinarily done by retained counsel that results in an opportunity cost, the court fixed the cross-appellant's trial costs at $15,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision setting aside a stay of proceedings for impaired driving charges.

The trial judge had originally granted the stay under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to delay.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the lower courts reasonably attributed a four-month adjournment to neutral delay rather than institutional delay.

The Court also agreed that the prejudice of additional legal fees did not override the public interest in a trial on the merits in a borderline delay case.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a psychiatric hospital with privileges to live in approved community accommodation.

He argued the Board erred by refusing disclosure of materials from his original NCR hearing and by failing to order an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board had no jurisdiction to review the NCR hearing's procedural fairness.

The Court also held the Board's refusal to grant a discharge was reasonable, as evidence supported the finding that the appellant continued to pose a significant risk to the community and required hospital boundaries to maintain stability.

The moving party sought to set aside a chambers order that declined to reverse the Deputy Registrar's dismissal of his appeal for delay.

The chambers judge had denied the motion on the basis that the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the pleading failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action for mental distress damages.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding no error in the chambers judge's conclusion that the tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering cannot be grounded on an alleged omission.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the responding party.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated August 23, 2013.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because a subsequent disposition was issued on February 18, 2014, and the appellant was successfully living in the community in approved housing.

The appellant appealed their conviction and sentence for manslaughter.

The Crown conceded that there was an error in the jury charge regarding party liability for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for manslaughter.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding party liability for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory order for the pre-trial sale of the matrimonial home under the Partition Act.

The respondent challenged the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction, arguing that section 7 of the Partition Act directs such appeals to the Divisional Court.

The panel agreed it lacked jurisdiction as the Court of Appeal but, given the imminent trial date, was designated as a panel of the Divisional Court to hear the matter.

On the merits, the court allowed the appeal and set aside the sale order, noting the motions judge failed to explicitly address whether the sale would prejudice the appellant's rights under the Family Law Act and that a pre-trial sale was practically unnecessary.

The appellant owned a family camp property.

The respondent, her former son-in-law, had occupied, maintained, and improved the camp for over 20 years.

When the respondent refused to allow his son to use the camp, the appellant attempted to revoke his licence to occupy it.

The trial judge found that the respondent had an equitable right to use the camp during his lifetime based on proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment, and granted an exclusive licence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no error in the trial judge's application of equitable principles or his choice of remedy.

The applicant commenced an action against York University, which was struck by a Superior Court judge.

The applicant then brought an ex parte motion before another Superior Court judge to set aside the dismissal, which was denied.

The applicant appealed this denial, but the appeal was dismissed for delay by the Registrar.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal refused to set aside the Registrar's order.

On a motion to review the single judge's decision, a panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no merit to the underlying appeal because the second Superior Court judge had no jurisdiction to set aside the first judge's order.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder by a jury for the shooting death of his former common-law partner.

On appeal, he conceded liability for second degree murder but argued the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge fairly reviewed the evidence and was not required to review every competing inference or all of the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.