Sarah E. Pepall

The applicant brought a motion to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which had dismissed his motion to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of his appeal for delay.

The underlying action was a claim for damages against the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario regarding its investigation of a complaint against his former physician, which had been struck for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to interfere with the single judge's decision, agreeing that the appeal had no merit.

The motion for review was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for unpaid construction work.

The principal issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in refusing to re-open the trial to admit articles of revival for a dissolved corporate defendant, which the individual appellant sought to introduce after judgment was rendered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the evidence could have been discovered sooner with reasonable diligence and that the refusal to re-open the trial was a proper exercise of discretion.

The appellant appealed her 2009 convictions for keeping and being an inmate of a common bawdy house.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Bedford, which struck down the bawdy house provisions but suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year, the parties agreed to adjourn the appeal.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the matter to January 12, 2015, after the suspension period expires, to allow the appellant to rely on the unconstitutionality of the provisions.

The parties executed minutes of settlement requiring the respondents to pay $250,000 in instalments, with a consent judgment held in escrow.

The respondents missed the final $95,000 payment, prompting the appellant to file a writ of execution.

The respondents successfully moved for relief from forfeiture under s. 98 of the Courts of Justice Act, and the motion judge rescinded the consent judgment, granting judgment for $95,000 instead.

The appellant appealed, arguing it should have been allowed to revert to its option to continue the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no live issue that the option could be revived after being exercised.

The respondents moved to quash the appeal on the basis that the appellant sought to appeal an interlocutory order.

The order below dismissed the appellant's summary judgment motion without making any binding determinations of law under Rule 20.04(4).

The Court of Appeal held that the order was not final and quashed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against the respondent doctor following the death of a patient who underwent an axillary-femoral bypass.

The trial judge found the respondent breached the standard of care by using a graft that was 'not recommended' by the manufacturer and failing to obtain informed consent, but concluded the appellants failed to prove causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in his robust and pragmatic analysis of the evidence and correctly concluded that the 'material contribution' approach to causation was inapplicable.

The appellants brought two companion libel actions arising from an article in a corporate newsletter that was posted on a website.

The respondents, Shaw Satellite G.P. and Bell Expressvu Limited Partnership, successfully moved for summary judgment, and the actions against them were dismissed.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motions judge erred by failing to draw an adverse inference from refusals given on cross-examinations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding it was open to the motions judge to decline to draw an adverse inference based on the record.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for robbery with a firearm and related offences arising from a home invasion.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, specifically DNA found on bandanas and a police baton seized from the appellant's apartment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury's verdicts were not unreasonable.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed to make a two-year sentence for weapon possession concurrent rather than consecutive, reducing the net sentence to five years and four months.

The appellant abandoned her appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario endorsed the appeal book, noting the abandonment and fixing the respondents' costs at $4,000 all inclusive.

The applicant, a police officer convicted of drug offences, sought disclosure of the identity of an anonymous tipster who emailed police post-conviction alleging misconduct by the applicant's supervising officers.

The Crown provided a redacted summary but claimed confidential informer and public interest privilege over the author's identity.

The Court of Appeal held that neither privilege applied, as there was no express or implied promise of confidentiality to the unsolicited tipster, and no objective evidence to support public interest privilege.

The Court further held that the Trotta test for production in support of fresh evidence was premature, as the motion was properly characterized as one for directions on the scope of Crown disclosure.

The application for disclosure was allowed.

A dispute arose from the administration and eventual sale of a rental property held in trust where one party held legal title as trustee for himself and another beneficiary.

The trustees failed to maintain financial records over a 13‑year period, leading both sides to rely on competing accounting experts to reconstruct profits.

The trial judge accepted the respondent’s expert report and awarded damages for breach of trust, aggravated damages, and substantial indemnity costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in relying on the respondent’s expert because the assumptions about rental income were inconsistent with the evidence.

The court reassessed damages directly on the record, reducing the award and costs, while upholding aggravated damages and allowing the cross‑appeal of the solicitor on the basis that no duty of care or fiduciary duty was owed to the beneficiary.

The appellant challenged convictions for two counts of defamatory libel arising from sexually explicit communications sent and posted online in the complainant's name after a restaurant service dispute.

The court held the circumstantial evidence, including the origin of the IP address, password-protected internet access, and similarities in writing style, reasonably supported the finding that the appellant authored the communications.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted in part.

While a 90-day custodial sentence remained fit, the court held the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the impact of non-intermittent custody on the appellant's young children and varied the sentence to intermittent service.

The appellant sought leave to appeal an 18-month custodial sentence imposed for an integral, though indirect, role in a home invasion.

She argued the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle governing first custodial sentences and failed to properly assess evidence of rehabilitation.

The court held there was no basis to interfere because the sentencing judge carefully considered the appellant's personal circumstances, first-offender status, and rehabilitative progress.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged an order of the Superior Court of Justice in a criminal matter.

The Court of Appeal, in a brief endorsement, adopted the motion judge's analysis and conclusions and dismissed the appeal.

A Criminal Code publication restriction applicable to the preliminary inquiry evidence was ordered to continue.

The appellant challenged summary judgment dismissing her statutory accident benefits action for non-earner benefits as out of time.

The court held that a clear and unequivocal denial of benefits triggered the two-year limitation period, even though the insurer gave an incorrect legal reason for ineligibility.

The limitation period ran from the initial refusal of non-earner benefits, not from the later termination of income replacement benefits.

The court further held that neither the Insurance Act nor the SABS required the insurer to give renewed notice of a possible entitlement to a previously denied benefit upon termination of another benefit.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant municipality appealed from the dismissal of its application for an injunction enforcing a by-law prohibiting the feeding of bears and from the granting of a counter-application quashing that by-law.

The court held that municipal by-laws are presumed valid and enacted in good faith, and that the onus on a challenger to prove bad faith is high.

The respondent's evidence, focused on the absence of investigation, research, or analysis supporting the by-law, did not establish bad faith and instead improperly invited judicial review of the wisdom of the by-law.

The appeal was allowed, the order quashing the by-law was set aside, a permanent injunction issued, and appeal costs were awarded to the municipality.

A franchisor appealed from summary judgment dismissing its claim against a corporation's sole officer, director, and shareholder after the corporation had been found liable for misappropriating funds remitted for payment of utility invoices.

The Court of Appeal held that the individual was not personally liable under the pre-incorporation contract provisions because the corporation had adopted the agreement by conduct, but he was personally liable because he expressly directed the wrongful diversion of funds and the corporate veil should be pierced under Ontario law.

The court upheld the use of summary judgment, rejected reliance on a transition release obtained in the face of material non-disclosure, and found no binding 2007 replacement contract.

Damages were varied downward to reflect conceded deductions and an additional admitted set-off, and appeal costs were awarded against the corporation and the individual jointly and severally.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States on drug trafficking charges and also sought judicial review of the Minister’s surrender order.

The court rejected the evidentiary and procedural challenges to committal, holding that the proposed credibility evidence was properly excluded and that no error arose from the alleged reliance on an earlier factum.

On the judicial review, the court held that, in the exceptional circumstances, the self-represented applicant should be given an opportunity to make further submissions to the Minister regarding the birth of her child.

The committal appeal was dismissed, the judicial review was adjourned, and bail was continued pending the return of the matter.

The appellant appealed sentence after convictions for break and enter, assault, threats, wounding by stabbing, and breach of release conditions arising from a violent residential break-in.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred by not quantifying presentence custody credit, over-emphasized his extensive criminal record, and imposed an unfit sentence outside the proper range.

The Court of Appeal held that, for a pre-Truth in Sentencing Act charge, failure to express an arithmetic formula for credit was not an error in principle where the sentencing judge clearly took harsh dead time into serious account.

Given the grave facts, lasting harm to the victim, the appellant's entrenched recidivism, and the need for denunciation, deterrence, and public protection, the effective sentence was held to be within range and fit.

A receiver appealed from summary judgment dismissing its claim for indemnity under a trustee's errors and omissions policy after obtaining judgment against the insured trustee for breach of trust.

The court held that the insurer was entitled to rely on the dishonest acts exclusion because the trustee deliberately breached the trusts, knowingly exposed the beneficiaries to risk, and misappropriated trust funds for its own benefit.

The court further held that a prior order assigning to the receiver the 'proceeds from insurance coverage' did not assign the insured's separate cause of action for breach of the insurer's duty of good faith.

The receiver also had no direct good faith claim against the insurer, although it could return to the motion judge to seek directions on any other remedy if the insurer had deliberately frustrated the prior order.