Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant appealed convictions for voyeurism and extortion arising from an internet-arranged sexual relationship and a secret recording of the complainant.

The court rejected the argument that the trial judge's reasons inadequately addressed credibility, holding that a trial judge need not resolve every alleged inconsistency in a witness's statements or conduct.

The court also rejected the submission that the trial judge failed to make the necessary finding concerning the meaning of 'surreptitiously' under s. 162 of the Criminal Code.

Assuming without deciding that the term includes an intent element, the court held the trial judge found the requisite intent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from charges including attempt to obstruct justice, threatening bodily harm, and breach of recognizance.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient because they did not explain how material inconsistencies and confusion in the complainant's evidence were resolved to the criminal standard.

Applying the Supreme Court's sufficiency-of-reasons framework, the court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on all three counts.

The ineffective assistance of counsel ground, based on the decision whether the appellant should testify, was rejected on the fresh evidence record.

The appellant challenged rulings arising from a firearms prosecution, arguing the motion judge erred in accepting the affiant officer's evidence, in assessing the confidential informant information, and in refusing a judicial summary.

The court held the informant was not an anonymous tipster, the firsthand information and police confirmation of outstanding drug charges provided support for the warrant process, and drafting problems in the information to obtain did not undermine the result.

The court also found no error in refusing a judicial summary where the informant's identity could readily be discerned.

Deference was owed to the motion judge's findings, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged convictions arising from a judge-alone criminal trial on the basis of misapprehension of evidence.

The respondent conceded material misapprehensions on two counts but disputed any error on the remaining count.

The court held that a further misapprehension affected the credibility assessment on the first count and, taken cumulatively with the conceded errors on the other counts, rendered the verdicts unreliable.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered on all three counts.

The appellant appealed sentence solely on the basis of the credit granted for one year of pretrial detention.

The court held that the trial judge erred by requiring something 'exceptional' before granting enhanced credit, contrary to the framework in Summers.

Given the appellant's likely eligibility for early release, compliance on bail, good behaviour in custody, and lack of delay, enhanced credit of 1.5 to 1 was warranted.

The sentence was reduced from 30 months to a net custodial sentence of 12 months, with the two-year probation term remaining.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, but the court held the disposition was reasonable, supported by the evidence, and involved no error of law or miscarriage of justice.

Relying on the attending psychiatrist's evidence, the Board had properly found that the appellant continued to pose a significant threat to public safety.

Deference was owed to the Board's risk-management decision, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a three-year sentence for sexual assault and parent procuring sexual activity.

The court rejected arguments that the sentencing judge underemphasized the absence of a criminal record, failed to give adequate weight to personal frailties, misapprehended the procurement offence, or failed to account properly for family hardship.

Emphasizing the appellant's position of trust and authority as a parent and the extended period of offending, the court found no sentencing error and held that the sentence was fit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged an order dismissing a certiorari application arising from a preliminary inquiry committal in a homicide prosecution.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded her limited jurisdiction by choosing between competing inferences reasonably available on the evidence and by preferring the inference favourable to the appellants.

The court also rejected the argument that the evidence was incapable of placing one appellant within the scheme to do violence, holding that any relative weakness in the evidence was irrelevant at the committal stage.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant challenged a penitentiary sentence imposed following a manslaughter conviction arising from failure to provide necessaries of life to a young child who died after severe burns and delayed medical treatment.

The court rejected arguments that the sentencing judge overstated moral blameworthiness, failed to properly weigh remorse, rehabilitation, restraint, and other mitigating factors, improperly relied on a victim impact statement, or imposed a sentence outside the acceptable range.

The court held that the sentencing judge properly focused on the deliberate withholding of urgently required medical care to protect the offender from blame, and that denunciation and deterrence properly predominated.

However, the Crown conceded an error in the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit under s. 719 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed only to increase credit for pre-sentence custody, reducing the effective sentence to nine years and six months.

The appellant and her husband sold their farming business to their son and daughter-in-law.

The appellant sought rectification of the memorandum of agreement and the vendor take-back mortgage, arguing that the purchase price for the real property was incorrectly recorded due to a drafting error.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, holding that the appellant failed to meet the standard of 'convincing proof' and that the parties lacked a common intention.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the ordinary civil standard of proof applies to rectification claims and that the trial judge erred by relying on the respondent's subjective belief rather than an objective assessment of the parties' common intention based on the totality of the evidence.

The deceased died intestate, leaving a spouse and two sons from a previous marriage.

The spouse, acting as administrator, paid the sons a portion of their inheritance but did not finalize the estate.

Years later, a dispute arose over the valuation of the sons' one-third interests in the estate's residue, which primarily consisted of a residence that had significantly appreciated in value.

The application judge valued the sons' interests as of the date of death.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while the preferential share is calculated at the date of death, the residue must be valued at the date of distribution, allowing the sons to share in the property's appreciation.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy appealed a decision allowing 407 ETR to enforce pre-bankruptcy toll debts against a discharged bankrupt by directing the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to refuse to renew the bankrupt's vehicle permit under s. 22(4) of the Highway 407 Act.

The Court of Appeal found no operational conflict between the provincial legislation and s. 178(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, as dual compliance was possible.

However, the Court held that s. 22(4) of the Highway 407 Act frustrated the federal legislative purpose of providing a discharged bankrupt with a financial 'fresh start'.

Consequently, the doctrine of federal paramountcy applied, rendering s. 22(4) inoperative to the extent that it thwarted the fresh start purpose of the BIA.

The appellant, a private school, expelled a student for smoking marijuana in the school residence.

The student and his parents successfully applied to the Divisional Court for judicial review of the expulsion decision under the Judicial Review Procedure Act (JRPA).

The school appealed, arguing the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the expulsion decision was governed by the private contract between the parents and the school, not public law.

The decision lacked a sufficient public dimension to be subject to public law remedies under the JRPA.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant was awarded costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $12,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on historical sexual offences.

The case turned entirely on the trial judge's assessment of the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly applied the W.D. test, concluding that the respondent's evidence left him with a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Inco Limited, appealed a costs order awarding it $1,766,000 following its successful defence of a class action at the Court of Appeal.

Inco argued it was entitled to over $5.3 million and that the trial judge erred by reducing its legal fees and applying a 50 per cent discount under s. 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's determination that the environmental tort class action raised novel points of law and involved matters of public interest.

The court upheld the trial judge's methodical and reasonable costs analysis.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against a former lawyer for negligence, perjury, and obstruction of justice.

The motion judge found the negligence claim was res judicata and an abuse of process, and the other claims were time-barred despite the appellants' claim of newly discovered evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the claims were time-barred, frivolous, and vexatious, and affirmed the award of full indemnity costs due to the appellants' reprehensible conduct.

The appellant, a family doctor, was convicted of sexually assaulting a patient during an examination.

His appeal to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the complainant's 'suspicions evidence' when assessing her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding no clear error of law and concluding the trial judge properly considered all evidence in his credibility analysis.

The appellant appealed from an order dismissing her motion to set aside a default judgment for fraud in relation to a loan.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the appellant failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for her failure to appear, failed to adequately explain her delay in moving to set aside the judgment, and failed to demonstrate an arguable defence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Crown sentence appeal arising from a guilty plea to sexual interference involving repeated digital penetration and one act of unprotected intercourse with a 14-year-old who was a close friend of the offender's daughter.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge misapplied the Gladue framework by failing to connect the offender's Aboriginal background to his moral culpability or the commission of the offence, and by placing undue emphasis on background factors unsupported by the record.

The court further held that the sentence failed to reflect the gravity of repeated, exploitative sexual abuse of a vulnerable child by an adult in a position of trust, and inadequately emphasized denunciation and deterrence.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the sentence was increased from eight months to three years' imprisonment, less credit for post-conviction custody.