Sarah E. Pepall

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding moral damages of $60,000 for breach of the implied contractual obligation of good faith in the manner of dismissal, along with general damages of ten months' salary in lieu of notice and $25,000 for sexual harassment under the Human Rights Code.

The appellants contended the moral damages award should be reduced to $20,000, arguing the trial judge considered irrelevant factors and that the award duplicated the sexual harassment damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the manner of dismissal holistically, including pre- and post-termination conduct that constituted bad faith.

The court held that moral damages and Human Rights Code damages serve different purposes and do not constitute double recovery.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault for anally penetrating a 19-year-old co-worker at a workplace Christmas party without consent.

The trial judge sentenced him to nine months' imprisonment followed by two years' probation.

The appellant, a permanent resident of Canada, appealed on the basis that the sentence was unfit, particularly given that a sentence of six months or more would trigger immigration consequences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, resulting in loss of the right to appeal a removal order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and holding that the trial judge did not err in first determining an appropriate sentence and then considering whether immigration consequences warranted reduction.

A police officer was convicted of sexually assaulting a complainant by performing searches of her while transporting her to a police station.

At trial, the trial judge admitted a prior consistent statement made by the complainant to a female officer at the police station, in which the complainant stated she had already been searched three times.

The summary conviction appeal judge quashed the conviction, finding the trial judge erred in admitting and relying on the prior consistent statement.

The Crown appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the prior consistent statement was admissible under the narrative as circumstantial evidence exception to the rule against prior consistent statements, and that the trial judge properly used the statement to assess the complainant's credibility by considering the context, timing, and spontaneous nature of the complaint.

Hydro One appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice seeking a declaration that the Ontario Provincial Police must provide accident reports containing personal information of drivers and vehicle owners when Hydro One's property is damaged in traffic accidents.

The OPP refused to provide such reports without a court order, citing the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal to receive written submissions on two jurisdictional issues: whether the court could make a declaration interpreting a statute under the Rules of Civil Procedure when there is no actual lis between the parties, and whether the court could make a declaration interpreting FIPPA provisions outside the context of a judicial review of a privacy commissioner's decision.

An appeal concerning the interpretation of a term in an amended Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

The appellant challenged the application judge's interpretation of a contractual provision.

The Court of Appeal applied the deferential standard of review established in Creston Moly Corp. v. Sattva Capital Corp. and found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's findings of fact or interpretation of the impugned provision.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion and dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $8,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable $4,000 to each respondent.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to facilitate terrorist activity and participation in the activities of a terrorist group, and acquitted of possessing explosive substances with intent to endanger life in association with a terrorist group.

He was sentenced to a global sentence of 12 years imprisonment (5 years for conspiracy, 7 years consecutive for participation in terrorist group activities).

The Crown appealed seeking a 20-year sentence and delayed parole eligibility.

The appellant cross-appealed seeking a 5-8 year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of the gravity of the offences, application of sentencing principles including parity and totality, treatment of mitigating factors including rehabilitation and remorse, and determination of parole eligibility.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence for sexual assault and invitation to touching a person under the age of 14 for a sexual purpose.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and addressed all material issues.

The sentence appeal was allowed on the basis that the trial judge imposed a sentence exceeding the Crown's submissions without providing notice or opportunity for further submissions, constituting an error in principle.

The appellate court reassessed the sentence and imposed a global sentence of six years (44 months consecutive to the prior 28-month sentence) rather than the trial judge's six years and four months.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching.

He raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge interfered with defence counsel's cross-examination of the complainant, diverting counsel from relevant lines of inquiry; and second, that the trial judge's reasons were unbalanced, favoured the Crown, and failed to resolve material conflicts in evidence or meaningfully scrutinize the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal rejected both grounds, finding that the trial judge's interventions were appropriate and necessary to ensure fair treatment of the witness and clarity of evidence, and that her reasons were careful, detailed, and balanced.

The appeal was dismissed.

An appeal concerning the disqualification of counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest arising from a lawyer's transfer between law firms.

The lawyer, who had worked extensively on an insurance coverage dispute for the plaintiff, transferred to the defendant's law firm where he would work closely with opposing counsel.

The court addressed whether an ethical screen could adequately protect the former client's confidential information given the intense working relationship between the two lawyers.

The appeal court upheld the disqualification, finding that while the firm had achieved technical compliance with professional guidelines, the spirit of those guidelines was absent and the presumption of inadvertent disclosure could not be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault arising from an attack on the victim in his bedroom.

The appellant was acquitted of attempted murder, unlawful confinement, and assault with a weapon.

The trial judge found the appellant was one of three assailants based on evidence including his association with known assailants before and after the attack, the presence of the victim's blood on the appellant's pants, and corroborating testimony.

The Court of Appeal rejected four grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of one count of break and enter with intent to commit an indictable offence, two counts of break and enter and commit an indictable offence, and three counts of possession of break-in instruments, arising from three Subway restaurant break-ins in Sault Ste.

Marie over five days in July 2012.

The Crown relied on similar fact evidence to connect the appellant to all three incidents.

On appeal, the Court found that the trial judge erred in his use of the appellant's criminal record and made material misapprehensions of the evidence regarding DNA on a balaclava, the appellant's cast on his right arm, and glass particles on his clothing.

These errors were essential to the trial judge's reasoning process and undermined the fairness of the trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for assault with a weapon (a lamp) entered by Justice Jane E. Kelly on May 15, 2012.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: misapprehension of evidence, reversal of the burden of proof, and insufficiency of reasons/unreasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, no reversal of the burden of proof, and that the trial judge's reasons adequately addressed the evidentiary concerns and met the functional requirements for appellate review.

The appeal was dismissed.

An appeal from a conviction for assault causing bodily harm and the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in the conviction.

The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown's concession and set aside the conviction for assault causing bodily harm, substituting in its place a conviction for common assault.

The sentence had already been served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, challenging the lawfulness of his warrantless arrest and subsequent search.

The appellant argued that police lacked sufficient grounds for arrest based on information from a confidential informant, contending there was insufficient information regarding the informant's source of knowledge and that inadequate corroboration was provided.

The appellant also alleged the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof on the Charter s. 8 voir dire.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the test from R. v. Debot and that the totality of circumstances supported reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

Two youths, aged 16 at the time of the offence, were convicted of first degree murder in the execution-style killing of another youth.

The Crown applied to have them sentenced as adults.

The youth court judge allowed the Crown's application and imposed life sentences with ten years' parole ineligibility.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the adult sentences, arguing that the youth court judge erred in concluding that the intensive rehabilitative custody supervision (IRCS) program would not adequately address their rehabilitation needs and that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness had not been properly considered.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the youth court judge had made reversible errors in his analysis of the IRCS program and that the Crown had failed to overcome the presumption of diminished moral culpability.

The court substituted youth sentences with IRCS orders.

A citizen reported criminal activity by neighbours' sons to police, claiming she was promised confidentiality.

The police officer did not disclose that the interview was being videotaped.

The neighbours' sons were arrested, and the citizen's identity and videotaped interview were included in Crown disclosure.

The citizen was subsequently harassed and threatened by the neighbours, leading to post-traumatic stress disorder and relocation.

The trial judge found the police liable for breach of confidence and awarded general damages of $345,000, plus Family Law Act damages.

The appellants appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a promise of confidentiality, that necessary elements for the claim were not established, and that damages were excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings and damage award.

The appellant, trustee of a profit sharing plan, sued the respondents for misappropriation of funds and breach of fiduciary duty.

The appellant alleged that money earmarked for a specific fund was diverted to third-party companies connected to the respondents and not repaid.

The respondents sought to stay the action based on a choice of forum clause in a subscription agreement requiring disputes to be resolved in the Cayman Islands.

The motion judge dismissed the summary judgment motion and stayed the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the action as pleaded did not arise from the subscription agreement or the purchase of shares, but rather from the respondents' misappropriation of funds and breach of fiduciary duty.

Summary judgment was granted in favor of the appellant.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the equalization of net family properties, specifically challenging the valuation of foreign lands in Iran and the calculation of the respondent's net family property.

Prior to the hearing, the appellant brought motions to preclude the respondent from making submissions due to an alleged breach of costs orders and to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the preliminary motions, finding no breach of the costs orders and that the fresh evidence could have been adduced at trial with due diligence.

The substantive appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in valuation and was entitled to draw an adverse inference from the appellant's failure to provide a property valuation.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the Belleville Police respondents for false arrest and false imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellants for possession of stolen property, and that the police were not required to accept the appellants' innocent explanation before laying charges.

The Court also agreed that the intentional tort claims were statute-barred as the limitation period commenced on the date of arrest, and that summary judgment was appropriate as the liability of the Belleville respondents was severable from the other defendants.

The appeal and motion for leave to appeal costs were dismissed.