Sarah E. Pepall

The respondent walked into a police station and confessed to burning down his mother's house, stating he was homeless and wanted to go to jail.

The police officer repeatedly warned him of the consequences and advised him to seek counsel, which he eventually did before giving a full statement.

The trial judge excluded the statement, finding it was involuntary due to the respondent's oppressive personal circumstances and the 'inducement' of jail time, leading to an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in law by finding oppression and inducement absent any police misconduct, and by conflating the voluntariness analysis with the ultimate reliability of the statement.

The young person fired shots into a crowd, injuring three people.

The Crown applied to have him sentenced as an adult.

The sentencing judge dismissed the adult sentence application and imposed the maximum youth sentence of three years, declining to give credit for 15 months of pre-sentence custody to ensure the sentence was of sufficient length to hold the young person accountable.

The young person appealed, arguing that credit for pre-sentence custody is mandatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that youth sentencing judges retain discretion to determine whether and how much credit should be given for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, assault, and uttering a threat to cause death against his domestic partner, receiving a global sentence of seven years.

He appealed his convictions and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of the appellant's silence.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred by treating a lack of remorse as an aggravating factor and by not considering Gladue principles, as fresh evidence showed the appellant had Aboriginal heritage.

However, after conducting its own sentencing analysis applying Gladue principles, the Court concluded the seven-year sentence remained fit given the brutal nature of the domestic violence and the appellant's criminal record.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was committed for trial on a charge of second degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

On a certiorari motion, a Superior Court judge quashed the committal and substituted a committal for manslaughter, finding insufficient evidence of the requisite intent for murder.

The Crown appealed the quashing, and the accused appealed, arguing he should have been discharged entirely.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that the Superior Court judge exceeded her jurisdiction on a certiorari application by weighing the evidence and failing to recognize that there was some evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer the intent for murder.

The committal for second degree murder was restored.

The parties separated after a 20-year marriage during which they built a successful recreational equipment business.

The trial judge ordered the husband to pay $9,584 per month in spousal support, attributing $400,000 in annual income to him based on past corporate profits.

The husband appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by failing to apply the Child Support Guidelines to determine the husband's income and by adopting an unreasonable approach to estimating future corporate profits.

The Court reassessed the husband's income at $214,872 and the wife's income at $109,535, and substituted a spousal support order of $1,500 per month.

The Minister of Revenue appealed an order dismissing its motion to dismiss the respondent's tax appeal and granting a production order.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's order was interlocutory because it did not finally determine the scope of the appeal under the Retail Sales Tax Act.

As the order was interlocutory, jurisdiction to hear the appeal lay with the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for uttering threats and failing to comply with probation, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board imposing a detention order with community living privileges.

He argued the ORB applied the wrong legal test and should have granted a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB applied the correct test and reasonably concluded that a detention order was necessary to manage the appellant's risk, ensure medication compliance, and allow for expeditious return to the hospital if his condition decompensated.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder, aggravated assault, and assault, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to allow cross-examination of the victim on his propensity for violence at the outset of the trial.

The Court of Appeal held the trial judge correctly applied the rule in Scopelliti, finding the request premature as there was no appreciable evidence of the victim's aggression at that stage.

The appeal was dismissed, noting the appellant chose not to renew the application later and ultimately, details of the victim's propensity for violence were put to the jury.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug possession.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, specifically cheques in the appellant's name found in the bedroom where the drugs were located.

The Court of Appeal held that no reasonable jury could conclude the appellant was in possession of the drugs based on the entirety of the evidence, as the absence of evidence left open other plausible theories inconsistent with guilt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his nine-year sentence, arguing it should be reduced to six years based on parity with his co-accused, whose sentence was reduced by the Court of Appeal in a previous decision.

The Court agreed that parity was central to the original joint submission.

While the appellant shared some mitigating factors with the co-accused, such as rehabilitation and cooperation with authorities, other factors did not apply.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the sentence was reduced from nine to eight years.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm, sexual assault with a weapon, theft under $5,000, and breach of probation.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge misunderstood the evidence, improperly took judicial notice regarding the complainant's underwear, and misapplied the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not take judicial notice but rather rejected the appellant's speculative suggestion, and properly applied Browne v. Dunn by noting the defence failed to cross-examine the complainant on their theory.

The appellant appealed his convictions and global sentence of nine years' imprisonment for offences involving multiple victims.

He argued the trial judge erred in using a prior statement, relying on similar fact evidence regarding cell phones, and engaging in inconsistent reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors.

The sentence appeal was allowed solely to correct a mathematical error in the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit, reducing the remaining sentence to 1744 days.

The self-represented appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in his credibility findings regarding various witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declining to re-try the case or interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The court also found no basis to conclude that the sentence was unfit.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 42 months for fraud, arguing it was excessive and had uncontemplated negative immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was not excessive for a major and serious fraud.

The Court also declined to artificially reduce the sentence to avoid immigration consequences, citing Parliament's intent regarding serious crimes committed by immigrants.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction over his trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's jurisdictional argument to be incorrect.

The parties agreed on the costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent costs fixed at $30,000 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider whether his arrest and detention were arbitrary beyond non-compliance with section 495(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Court found no basis in the record to conclude the officer's conduct was arbitrary, noting the appellant was found lying on a median beside a busy roadway and volunteered that he possessed marihuana.

The appellant, a taxi driver, appealed her conviction and one-month sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The trial judge found that the appellant drove away while the rear door was open and an intoxicated passenger was trying to exit, causing the passenger to fall and sustain injuries.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error or misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and held that the sentence was fit.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellants, a police officer and the police services board, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for negligent police investigation of the respondents regarding stolen auto parts.

The trial judge had determined the standard of care without relying on expert evidence and awarded substantial damages.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in departing from the general rule that expert evidence is required to establish the standard of care for a professional, as the investigation was technical and the police conduct was not egregious.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in formulating the standard of care and failing to consider the respondent's committal for trial.

The judgment was set aside except for an agreed award for damaged property.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of guns and drugs and public mischief, arguing that the trial Crown's conduct deprived him of a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown improperly cross-examined the appellant by demanding his 'theory' of the case, which undermined the presumption of innocence.

Furthermore, the Crown improperly telephoned a potential witness from the courtroom and used the resulting hearsay during the cross-examination of a key defence witness.

The Court concluded that the Crown's conduct was sufficiently prejudicial to deprive the appellant of a fair trial, allowed the appeal, and directed a new trial.