Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of methamphetamine for the purposes of trafficking and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to public safety, as well as seeking leave to appeal his sentence.

The conviction appeal raised three grounds: erroneous credibility findings, misapprehension of evidence, and an improper adverse inference from the appellant's right to remain silent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were reasonable, the evidence was not misapprehended, and no adverse inference was drawn from the appellant's silence.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found an error in the structure of the sentence and modified it to three years on the trafficking offence and one year on the weapons offence, both concurrent, less time served of 19.5 months.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a jury trial.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The charge related to anal penetration that followed consensual oral and vaginal intercourse.

The complainant testified she repeatedly and unequivocally told the appellant to stop and resisted his attempts at anal penetration.

The appellant testified he asked for consent after partial insertion and the complainant agreed.

The court found no air of reality to the mistaken belief in consent defence, as the two accounts were fundamentally conflicting and could not be reconciled to support that defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal from a summary judgment dismissing a negligence action brought by the estate and family members of a deceased man who died in a motor vehicle accident.

The motion judge applied the doctrine of emergency to find that the driver, who was engaged in a drug deal, acted reasonably when he drove away while the deceased was attempting to enter the vehicle, resulting in the deceased's death.

The majority upheld the summary judgment, finding no error in the application of the emergency doctrine.

Justice Pepall dissented, arguing that the motion judge failed to properly analyze the elements of the emergency doctrine and that material inconsistencies in the evidence should have precluded summary judgment.

The appellants were convicted of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The central issue on appeal concerned the validity of a search warrant obtained using information from a confidential informant.

The warrant was executed at night and resulted in the seizure of approximately 300 grams of cocaine and $46,000 in cash.

The appellants challenged the warrant on multiple grounds, including the use of the Garofoli step six procedure, the adequacy of the judicial summary of redacted information, whether the confidential informant's tip met the Debot criteria for reliability, and whether the night search was reasonable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the warrant was valid and the search lawful.

The appellant was convicted of theft over $5,000, break and enter, two counts of possession of property for the purpose of trafficking, and one count of possession of property obtained by crime.

He appealed his convictions on grounds that the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) test, applied stricter scrutiny to the defence case, provided insufficient reasons, and misapprehended evidence.

The appellant also argued that two convictions should be stayed under Kienapple as included offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed most grounds of appeal but allowed the appeal in part, staying two convictions as included offences.

An appeal concerning the calculation of a bonus payable to a subordinate debt and equity financing fund upon the sale of a borrower company.

The lower court determined the bonus at $242,552.79 based on net proceeds excluding $55.125 million in debt created through a pre-sale reorganization.

The appellate court reversed in part, holding that the $55.125 million should be included in the bonus calculation as it formed part of the proceeds of sale and was created in violation of the loan agreement's consent requirement.

The court upheld the lower court's rejection of arguments that the bonus contravened the criminal rate of interest, was unconscionable, or was ultra vires the lender's statutory mandate.

The bonus was recalculated at $793,800.48.

Kaymar Rehabilitation Inc. appealed the dismissal of its action against Champlain Community Care Access Centre regarding a 2003 request for proposals for therapy services.

Kaymar challenged the trial judge's interpretation of the RFP documents, arguing that Champlain improperly allowed bidders without therapy services experience to qualify by accepting "professional services" as equivalent experience.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation, finding that the RFP documents clearly permitted such equivalents and that Kaymar had accepted these terms by bidding.

The court also addressed the costs award, reducing it from $1,864,000 to $1,675,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

McDonald's appealed a Superior Court decision that terminated a commercial ground lease due to McDonald's failure to comply with the renewal provision.

The application judge found that because the parties had not agreed on a rental rate at least nine months before the lease expiry, McDonald's was obliged to either refer the matter to arbitration or revoke its renewal notice.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in concluding that North Elgin had properly revoked its waiver of strict compliance with the renewal provision.

The court held that the revocation lacked sufficient clarity and did not provide McDonald's with reasonable notice or an opportunity to cure the defect.

The respondent sought leave to appeal a bankruptcy proposal order.

The court found the appeal moot because the debt to the moving party had been paid in full, eliminating the subject matter of the bankruptcy proceeding.

The court also determined there was no right of appeal under the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The respondent's argument regarding prospective effect of the order was rejected, as counsel for the moving party acknowledged that the relevant provision was spent and could not be relied upon for future indebtedness.

The appellant appealed the order of a motion judge dismissing his motion on the grounds that he lacked standing due to non-compliance with an earlier order by Hebner J. The earlier order required the appellant to pay $17,803 by December 31, 2016, to bring his child support into good standing, failing which his Answer and affidavits would be struck.

The appellant failed to comply with the deadline and did not appeal the order.

Instead, he brought a motion to set aside the order before the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that Hebner J. properly applied the test for striking pleadings and that the motion judge correctly determined the appellant had no standing in the proceeding.

The appellant appealed his convictions for six counts of sexual assault and two counts of assault of a minor victim, as well as his six-year sentence.

The victim alleged that the appellant sexually and physically assaulted her over a two-year period when she was 14-15 years old and he was 44.

The trial judge convicted the appellant on six counts of sexual assault and two counts of assault after finding the victim's evidence credible and rejecting the appellant's denials.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal on conviction: misapplication of the burden of proof, misapprehension of the significance of the victim's diary, and erroneous assessment of the victim's testimony according to standards applicable to young persons.

On sentencing, the appellant argued the trial judge relied on inadmissible evidence and failed to apply the principle of parity.

The appellate court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to vary a Mareva injunction granted in favour of Trade Capital against The Cash House.

The motion judge allowed Maple Trust to seize funds in a specific account under a writ of seizure and sale.

The appellant argued that a temporary stay should have been granted to allow it to trace stolen funds into the account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if a serious issue regarding tracing could be demonstrated, the balance of convenience favoured Maple Trust, which had acted in good faith in obtaining its judgment and pursuing execution.

The appellant's Mareva injunction gave it no proprietary interest in the funds, and there was no basis for the third party to suffer prejudice.

A self-represented litigant appealed eight decisions from the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his actions as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and a vexatious litigant designation under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant's claims related to complaints about interactions with government agencies, law enforcement, and mental health and medical personnel spanning multiple years and incidents.

The Court of Appeal upheld all dismissals, finding the pleadings fell far short of procedural requirements, failed to advance any justiciable cause of action, and exhibited hallmarks of vexatious proceedings including rambling discourse, grandiose damage claims, and repetitious allegations across multiple proceedings.

The appellant husband appealed an order striking his pleading in a matrimonial proceeding concerning equalization of assets.

The motion judge had struck the pleading for non-compliance with disclosure obligations in a consent order.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error by relying on four items not contained in the consent order or the record.

The court set aside the striking order and gave the appellant 30 days to comply with the consent order, particularly regarding an accounting of $300,000 in cash removed from a bank account between 2013 and 2015.

The respondent, Dixie Lee Ontario Ltd., served a notice of appeal out of time and without seeking an extension.

A chambers judge subsequently granted an extension of time to serve and file the notice of appeal.

The moving party brought a motion to review the chambers judge's order.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal unmeritorious, as the motion judge had expressly addressed and rejected the respondent's arguments regarding breach and repudiation of the guarantee contract.

Additionally, the respondent lacked independent status to proceed with the appeal given the terms of a receivership order that had been granted over its assets.

The motion was granted and the extension order was set aside.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judge's decision regarding the ownership of two Mexican condominiums purchased with funds contributed by both spouses.

The appellant claimed he held title to the properties through company shares on resulting trust for the wife in respect of half their value, seeking this arrangement because the properties had declined in value since separation, which would benefit him in the equalization calculation.

The trial judge rejected the resulting trust claim, finding the presumption had been rebutted based on all the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and awarded costs to the respondent.

The appellant corporation sought to demolish a heritage-designated building it owned.

The City of Hamilton rejected the application and sent written notice of rejection to the sole director of the corporation at his residential address rather than to the corporation's registered address.

The appellant argued that the notice was improperly served under section 67(1)(b) of the Ontario Heritage Act, which requires service to the "last known address" of the person.

The appellant contended that the failure to serve at the registered address meant the municipality failed to comply with the statutory service requirement, triggering a deeming provision that would constitute deemed consent to the demolition application.

The application judge found that the city had taken positive steps to give notice and that the notice was actually received by the sole directing mind of the corporation.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision on the unique facts of the case.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to validate the late service of a statement of claim.

Although the claim was issued within the two-year limitation period, it was served more than two years after the six-month service deadline under the Rules of Civil Procedure, causing the limitation period to expire before service.

The appellant argued that the defendant waived the irregular service by delivering a statement of defence and that the motion judge erred in finding prejudice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both arguments, finding no waiver and no error in the motion judge's prejudice analysis.

A utility company and rural municipality disputed cost-sharing for gas pipeline relocation necessitated by municipal drainage works.

The utility sought 35% cost contribution from the municipality under a franchise agreement, while the municipality argued the utility should bear the full cost under section 26 of the Drainage Act.

The application judge held that section 26 of the Act overrode the franchise agreement's cost-sharing provisions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Act does not prohibit contracting out of its cost-allocation provisions and that the franchise agreement's cost-sharing mechanism applies to drainage works undertaken by the municipality.

The appellant imported four Hereford cattle from the United States in 1996, three of which were later discovered to be infected with anaplasmosis due to falsified American health documentation.

The Canadian government quarantined the appellant's herd and ordered the destruction of seven infected cattle.

The appellant received compensation under sections 51 and 53 of the Health of Animals Act.

The appellant subsequently sued the Crown for negligence, claiming damages for business losses and reputational harm.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding that section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act barred the claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that section 9 operates to prevent actions for additional compensation arising from the same factual basis as the compensated loss.