Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against a mortgage broker and lender.

The appellant sought to refinance commercial properties he believed were worth $1.2 million with a $600,000 mortgage.

Two appraisers declined to complete appraisals at the requested valuation.

The lender eventually provided an appraisal showing a value of $600,000-$665,000 and offered revised financing of $390,000, which the appellant rejected.

The motion judge found no cause of action because the property was owned by a corporation, not the appellant, and no damages were caused by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring trial and dismissing the appeal with costs awarded to the respondents.

Appeal from a trial judgment dismissing a negligent misrepresentation claim.

The appellants, a manufacturer of assembly lines, contracted to supply equipment to a German company.

When the purchaser transferred the contract to its Canadian subsidiary, the appellants requested assurances from the parent company.

The respondents provided a letter from their bank confirming project financing and the parent company's guarantee.

When the project failed due to industry collapse, the appellants sued for negligent misrepresentation, claiming the letter was misleading because it failed to disclose that the bank's financing was conditional.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding the representation was true and not misleading, and that the appellants had not reasonably relied on it.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no palpable and overriding error and no denial of procedural fairness.

The appellant sought an adjournment of his appeal from a Superior Court judgment dated February 16, 2017, regarding an application under the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant, an involuntary patient at Brampton Civic Hospital, wished to attend the hearing of his appeal.

The respondent did not oppose the adjournment request.

The court granted the adjournment to a date to be fixed.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order declaring that life insurance proceeds from his deceased father's policy are payable to the father's estate.

The father had originally designated the appellant as a revocable beneficiary in 1998, but in 2006 executed an Assignment Policy Absolute that cancelled all previous beneficiary designations, making the estate the beneficiary.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the father clearly intended the estate to be the beneficiary through the 2006 Assignment and that there was no genuine issue requiring trial.

The appellant failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support his claim.

The appellants were convicted by jury of aggravated assault following an attack on a victim in a parking lot in Barrie.

Both appellants conceded presence at the scene but disputed participation in the assault.

The appellants appealed on multiple grounds relating to jury instructions, including eyewitness identification evidence, aiding and abetting liability, jury questions, the definition of bodily harm, and self-defence.

The Court of Appeal found multiple errors in the trial judge's instructions, particularly regarding the inadequacy of the eyewitness identification caution given the specific frailties in the evidence, insufficient guidance on aiding and abetting, discouragement of jury questions, failure to define bodily harm, and reversal of the burden of proof on self-defence.

The court allowed the appeals and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing its motion for leave to amend the statement of claim to add a lawyer as a party defendant.

The motion judge found that the claim could not succeed on the merits and was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal on the basis that the claim was statute-barred, as the appellant had discovered or should have discovered its potential claim by 2014, more than two years before the motion to amend was brought in October 2016.

The appellant, a self-represented litigant with extensive litigation experience, sought to review a decision by Justice Nordheimer declining to set aside the Registrar's order dismissing his appeals for failure to perfect.

The appellant had filed seven appeals in response to a single order and failed to provide adequate reasons for the delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to review, finding no error in Nordheimer J.A.'s discretionary decision.

The court also denied the appellant's last-minute request for an adjournment based on medical grounds and Charter arguments.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant failed to appear at the scheduled appeal hearing despite being aware of the hearing date.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $5,000, payable to Legal Aid Ontario, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellants appealed from a summary judgment order granting judgment in favour of the respondents in two related actions concerning the sale of a property in Brampton.

The property was sold by the respondent Linda Hill to the appellant Fawzia Mary Mikhail with a vendor takeback mortgage.

The appellant Michael Mikhail guaranteed his mother's obligations under the mortgage.

The appellants defaulted on the mortgage beginning in May 2016, and the respondents issued a Notice of Sale.

The appellants sought to set aside the Notice of Sale and the respondents sought summary judgment.

The motion judge found a valid mortgage, proper notice of sale, and default since May 2016, and granted summary judgment.

The appellants argued they had missed only one payment by accident and quickly indicated willingness to correct the error, asserting the consequences were too severe.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's factual findings regarding the continuing default were supported by the record and that there was no evidence the default had been remedied.

The appellant insurer appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice regarding insurance policy interpretation.

The insurer argued that there was no "Claim" against an "Insured Person" for a "Wrongful Act" nor was there a "Loss" within the policy's definitions.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's interpretation of the governing principles or the policy language, and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent was awarded costs of $16,000.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision in which the respondents successfully recovered funds they had lent to Glocap Management Inc. The appellants argued that they could not be held liable due to their failure to obtain necessary approvals, and raised issues regarding guarantees and material alteration of risk.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the appellants could not rely on their own failures to avoid their obligations, that there was no evidence of unilateral alteration of risk, and that the appellants failed to meet their burden of establishing the quantum of credit they sought.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

Former patients of the Oak Ridge Division of the Mental Health Centre in Penetanguishene brought a multi-party action against two physicians and the Crown for breach of fiduciary duty, battery, negligence, and violations of international law norms relating to torture and cruel treatment.

The patients alleged they were subjected to intensive therapy programmes involving psychological and physical torture between 1966 and 1983.

The motions judge granted partial summary judgment for breach of fiduciary duty and dismissed the defendants' motions to dismiss the action as statute-barred or barred by laches.

The appellants appealed, arguing procedural fairness violations and that the action was time-barred.

The Court of Appeal found the motions judge erred in granting partial summary judgment without proper notice and opportunity for the defendants to respond, and set aside those paragraphs.

The court remitted the matter for trial, finding genuine issues requiring trial on limitation and laches issues.

CUMIS General Insurance Company appealed a trial judgment finding that an unlicensed driver operated the respondent's vehicle without consent, either express or implied.

CUMIS argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in her factual findings and failed to establish the tort of negligent entrustment.

The appellate court rejected all of CUMIS's arguments, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual conclusions.

The court also held that even if negligent entrustment exists in Ontario, it could not be established given the finding of no implied consent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claim for wrongful (constructive) dismissal and related relief.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the employment agreement was frustrated, rejecting the appellant's arguments regarding workplace harassment and his inability to return to work within a reasonable time.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument that he was constructively dismissed due to termination of employment benefits, finding that the benefits terminated on the same date the employment contract was frustrated.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 14.5 years incarceration (plus 6 months time served) for armed bank robbery, carrying a weapon, wearing a disguise with intent, and money laundering.

The trial judge imposed a parole ineligibility order under section 743.6 of the Criminal Code, requiring the appellant to serve at least half the sentence before parole eligibility.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence demonstrably unfit as it departed from the principle of proportionality and resulted from errors in principle, including overemphasis on deterrence and public safety while dismissing rehabilitation prospects despite the appellant's substance abuse and mental health issues.

The court reduced the sentence to 10 years inclusive of time served.

An insolvent mining company, Dianor Resources Inc., had mining claims subject to gross overriding royalties (GORs) in favour of 2350614 Ontario Inc. (235Co).

A receiver was appointed and approved a sale of the mining claims to Third Eye Capital Corporation.

The motion judge granted a vesting order that purported to extinguish the GORs, finding they did not constitute interests in land.

The Court of Appeal reversed this finding, holding that the GORs were interests in land under the test established in Bank of Montreal v. Dynex Petroleum Ltd. The court found the motion judge made three legal errors: failing to examine the parties' intentions holistically, requiring the royalty holder to have entry rights, and mischaracterizing the interest from which the royalty was carved.

The court did not finally determine whether the motion judge had jurisdiction to extinguish the GORs and required further submissions on this issue and on remedies.

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge's finding that the purchaser (241 Ontario) had actual notice of a defect in the power of sale process.

The trial judge had conflated actual knowledge with constructive knowledge, finding that receipt of information suggesting the need for inquiry constituted actual notice.

The appellate court clarified that actual notice requires actual knowledge of the defect itself, not merely knowledge of facts that might prompt inquiry.

The court held that 241 Ontario was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice and could rely on the protections of the Land Titles Act.

The court also found that sections 35 and 36 of the Mortgages Act do not limit the right to rely on registration under the Land Titles Act, and that these provisions provide complementary methods of protecting bona fide purchasers.

The post-sale mortgagees' interests were upheld, and Ginkgo's mortgage was found to be valid.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that granted far-reaching relief to the respondent regarding amounts allegedly owing on a 1994 second mortgage and a 1997 judgment on the covenant.

The Court of Appeal found that the relief granted by the motion judge could not stand.

The court determined that the amounts were duplicated in the judgment, the underlying second mortgage was extinguished by power of sale proceedings, and the debt was extinguished by the bankruptcies of the deceased and one of the defendants.

The court also rejected the finding of fraudulent conveyance and found the claim regarding farm equipment proceeds to be statute-barred.

The only claim that survived was for child support arrears and unpaid costs awards relating to child support.

On appeal from a motion judge's decision to enforce a settlement agreement, the appellants challenged the motion judge's finding that a verbal settlement agreement had been reached between the respondent's counsel and the litigation administrator of the deceased defendant's estate on February 9, 2016.

The appellants argued that the motion judge erred in failing to apply Rule 49.09, in finding there was no genuine issue regarding intent to create a legally binding agreement, and in failing to consider whether the settlement should be enforced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that Rule 49 did not apply as no Rule 49 offers were served, that the motion judge's finding of a binding agreement was supported by detailed reasons with no palpable and overriding error, and that the motion judge had fully considered all relevant factors regarding enforcement.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal in a family law matter concerning spousal support.

The respondent wife sought full recovery costs of $38,642.47, while the appellant husband sought partial costs of $16,264.29.

The Court of Appeal found that the respondent was largely successful on the contested issues on appeal, particularly in resisting the appellant's argument that the application judge erred in awarding spousal support.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the respondent.