Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant appealed his conviction on two counts of possessing heroin for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence of nine years less 48 days.

He challenged the validity of a search warrant for an apartment on the grounds that there were insufficient grounds to support it, arguing the grounds amounted only to suspicion.

The trial judge had dismissed the Charter application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the information to obtain the warrant contained credible and reliable facts supporting reasonable grounds to believe the appellant was trafficking drugs and that evidence would be found in the apartment.

The court found no error in the trial judge's application of the legal test and dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering a conditional discharge with residence requirements and mandatory reporting to CAMH.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, arguing the Board failed to properly consider whether he continued to present a significant risk to public safety.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the Board properly applied the statutory criteria under section 672.54 of the Criminal Code, considered the appellant's psychiatric condition (schizophrenia with profound negative symptoms), his history of offending, and expert evidence that without continued control the appellant would likely fall away from treatment and pose a significant risk of violent re-offending.

The conditional discharge was found to be a reasonable disposition within the Board's discretion.

The appellants, owners of a residential property in Caledon, Ontario, appealed a decision dismissing their application against the Ontario Heritage Trust and a local resident.

The appellants' property is accessible only via a 1 km driveway through parkland owned by the OHT, over which they hold an easement for ingress and egress.

The appellants claimed the easement granted them exclusive use of the driveway and sought to prevent public access by hikers using trails on the OHT property.

The court upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the deed of easement did not grant exclusive use, that public use by hikers did not substantially interfere with the appellants' easement rights, and that an injunction against the publication of a hiking guide was not warranted.

The appellant was charged with possession of various drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

Police arrested him before obtaining a search warrant for his residence, and then denied him access to counsel for almost six hours while they obtained and executed the warrant.

The appellant immediately requested to speak to a lawyer upon arrest but was refused.

The trial judge found a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the police followed an unconstitutional routine practice of denying access to counsel whenever they intended to obtain a search warrant, without considering the specific circumstances of the case.

The court held that the evidence should have been excluded as admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that granted partial summary judgment in favour of the respondent on the issue of non-disclosure of the appellant Neil's interest in a family trust established by his father Solomon.

The motion judge found that Neil had deliberately failed to disclose his interest in the trust to Randi when they entered into a separation agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, finding that the trust indenture had been disclosed to Randi's counsel and financial advisors, and that Randi was deemed to have knowledge of Neil's interest through her counsel.

The court held that Neil's omission from his financial statements could not transform actual disclosure into non-disclosure under section 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The court also found that even if there had been non-disclosure, the asset was not significant as it constituted excluded property under the Family Law Act.

The claims for conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit, and punitive damages against Solomon were also dismissed as they could not be sustained on the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder in the death of his common law spouse following a ten-week jury trial.

He was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years.

The appeal raised multiple grounds including challenges to the admissibility of statements, after-the-fact conduct evidence, prior discreditable conduct evidence, and evidence obtained through search warrant.

The primary focus was on the jury charge, particularly regarding the treatment of circumstantial evidence, the cause of death, and the use of evidence of the appellant's history of violence and abuse toward the victim.

The Court of Appeal found that while certain aspects of the jury charge contained problematic instructions, the overall charge adequately directed the jury on the proper approach to circumstantial evidence and the use of character evidence.

The conviction and sentence were upheld.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's award of costs in favour of the respondents following an unsuccessful trial.

The appellants had brought a claim for misfeasance in public office but discontinued it midway through trial after the trial judge identified that they lacked evidence for an essential element.

They sought to reopen the claim based on fresh evidence, which the trial judge rejected.

The appellants argued that no costs should be awarded due to the respondents' conduct, but this argument was based on the same evidence that had already been rejected in the misfeasance claim.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal costs, finding that the trial judge had properly considered the respondents' conduct and reduced the costs award accordingly.

This appeal concerns a franchise dispute where the motion judge granted partial summary judgment for rescission of a franchise agreement and damages of $964,805.33 against the franchisor.

The central issue was whether the franchisor failed to disclose earnings projections that were allegedly shown to the franchisees at a May 2010 meeting, constituting material non-disclosure under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The appellate court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the rescission judgment and damages award on the basis that the motion judge erred in determining the key disputed factual issue on contradictory evidence without oral testimony.

However, the court upheld the motion judge's determination that the rescission claim was timely, as the limitation period ran from the replacement agreement signed in September 2010 rather than the original agreement signed in June 2010.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing her claims against Minto Group Inc. (her penthouse landlord) and Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP (her lawyers).

The appellant had been defrauded by a man she met online who misrepresented his age, wealth, and background.

She sought damages from various parties, alleging they failed to protect her from the fraudster.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the appellant's claims against both Minto and Faskens lacked merit.

Against Minto, the court found no genuine issue requiring trial on claims for intrusion upon seclusion, breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, or infliction of mental distress.

Against Faskens, the court found that the lawyer had no obligation to conduct background investigations on the appellant's fiancé absent explicit instructions, and that the scope of the retainer did not include such duties.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated September 19, 2017.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder in 2009, sought transfer from Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care to a less secure facility.

Although the parties agreed a transfer was appropriate, the Board majority refused the transfer.

The appellant challenged the decision on grounds of procedural unfairness and failure to impose the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Board, finding that while procedural fairness was maintained and the Board's decision fell within the range of reasonable outcomes, the Board erred by failing to consider ordering an independent psychiatric assessment given the uncertainty surrounding the appellant's diagnosis.

The appellant tenant sued the respondent commercial landlord for damages arising from roof leaks and a non-functioning gas line.

The landlord obtained summary judgment dismissing the action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by failing to resolve material factual disputes regarding when the tenant's obligation to insure commenced and whether the premises were insurable.

The motion judge also committed extricable errors of law in interpreting the 'as is' provisions of the lease by conflating 'Premises' and 'Building' and ignoring a relevant schedule.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment set aside.

The appellant challenged the validity of two wills executed by her deceased husband on the grounds that he lacked testamentary capacity due to chronic alcoholism.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the testator possessed testamentary capacity and knew and approved of the contents of his wills.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in excluding expert evidence and in finding that the testator had capacity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no palpable or overriding error.

The court held that the trial judge properly exercised her discretion as gatekeeper in excluding the expert evidence, which had become increasingly tentative and speculative.

The court also found that the trial judge properly applied the framework for assessing will validity, including the displaced presumption triggered by suspicious circumstances relating to the testator's mental capacity.

Appeal from conviction for two counts of first degree murder.

The appellant killed two friends and attempted suicide, raising a not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) defence.

The trial judge convicted after finding the appellant had the capacity to know that society would regard his actions as morally wrong, despite suffering from a mental disorder.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) misinterpretation of "knowing that it was wrong" under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code; (2) misapprehension of evidence regarding psychotic state; (3) request to recognize diminished responsibility as a partial defence; and (4) request to recognize suicide pact as a partial defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that declared the respondents had a right of way "in, over, and upon" a portion of the appellant's property, including the right to maintain drainage infrastructure (a catch basin and lateral pipe).

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, argued the trial judge erred by failing to provide adequate assistance and by improperly interpreting the scope of the easement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no procedural unfairness and that the drainage infrastructure constituted an ancillary right reasonably necessary to the use and enjoyment of the right of way.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court decision.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $10,000, inclusive of disbursements and relevant taxes.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder at retrial following an earlier appeal that resulted in a new trial.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant arranged for someone, likely Daniel Di Trapani, to murder her husband.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's instructions to the jury, the alternative theory of liability permitting conviction based on an unknown killer, and the treatment of evidence from Teresa Mascia, a Crown witness who was declared adverse and cross-examined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately related evidence to legal issues, the alternative theory had an air of reality, and the treatment of Mascia's evidence, while containing minor errors, did not render the trial unfair.

An employee challenged the enforceability of a termination clause in his employment contract with IBM.

The motion judge found the clause ambiguous and unenforceable, holding that it did not clearly exclude the employee's entitlement to damages at common law.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that when read as a whole, the termination clause was unambiguous and clearly excluded common law damages.

The clause provided for notice or pay in lieu calculated according to a formula, with a failsafe provision ensuring compliance with the Employment Standards Act.

The court found no violation of the ESA and awarded costs to IBM.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition concerning an NCR (not criminally responsible) accused who had been under the Board's supervision since 2005 following a nonviolent offence committed during a psychotic episode.

The Board concluded the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety and ordered his transfer from CAMH to St. Joseph's Mental Health Care.

The appellant challenged both the finding of significant threat and the Board's failure to consider a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's finding that the appellant posed a significant threat but found the Board erred in failing to consider whether a conditional discharge was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition available.

A 16-year-old appellant was convicted of first-degree murder in the death of his 14-year-old cousin.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his statements to police were admitted in breach of section 146(2) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) and section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial judge conducted a voir dire and admitted all statements.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made two fatal legal errors: (1) he improperly shifted the burden of proof regarding detention from the Crown to the appellant, and (2) he erred in concluding that section 146(2) protections did not apply because the appellant's detention related to a different offence (obstruction of police) than the ultimate charge (first-degree murder).

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant was psychologically detained and entitled to the protections of section 146(2), which were not provided.

The statements were therefore improperly admitted, and the conviction was set aside with a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions on 14 counts of fraud arising from his guilty plea.

He asserted that the trial judge failed to provide adequate assistance as an unrepresented person and deprived him of his right to counsel, contrary to s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in refusing further adjournments for retaining counsel and that the trial judge ensured the appellant understood his guilty plea through a full plea inquiry.