Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant was arrested while attempting to facilitate a drug transaction with an undercover officer.

He claimed to be acting as a police agent under the direction and control of a detective.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's O'Connor application for third-party police records, found no air of reality to the police agent defence, and refused to leave it with the jury.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's rulings on the O'Connor application, the air of reality finding, the jury instructions, and the Crown's closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

Four tenants of cottage sites owned by Grant Lake Forest Resources Ltd. challenged significant rent increases imposed when their original tenancy agreements expired and were replaced with new agreements.

The landlord did not provide the required 90-day notice of rent increase under the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

The Landlord and Tenant Board found the increases void and ordered repayment of excess rent.

The Divisional Court upheld this decision.

On appeal, the landlord argued that the new tenancy agreements constituted a new term of tenancy, exempting the increases from the notice requirements.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that the notice provisions apply regardless of whether a new agreement is executed, as long as the parties and premises remain the same.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to certify a class action and dismissing claims against three respondents on the basis that the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action under s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The appellants conceded that the motion judge made no error in law but challenged his application of the principles relating to the duty of care to the facts.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding his reasons correct and concluding that the appellants had pleaded no reasonable cause of action against the respondents.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's assessment of costs.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court that struck out certain allegations in his statement of defence and counterclaim as irrelevant, scandalous, and vexatious under Rule 25(11)(b).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, granting leave to amend the pleadings to include allegations of misconduct relevant to defences against claims for aggravated, exemplary, and punitive damages, as well as potential equitable defences and claims regarding duress, undue influence, or unconscionability.

The court emphasized the need for proportionality and case management.

The costs award was set aside with no costs awarded throughout.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder in the death of his roommate.

The trial judge refused to leave the partial defence of provocation with the jury, finding no air of reality to the defence because the accused had initiated a confrontation while armed, anticipating that the victim could react violently.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that there is no absolute rule precluding the provocation defence merely because an accused initiates a confrontation while armed.

The court found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to apply the contextual analysis required under the provocation defence framework and that the defence had an air of reality and should have been left with the jury.

The appellant appealed from an order striking his pleadings and limiting his trial participation rights in a family law proceeding.

The respondent sought spousal support and equalization of net family property following a brief marriage.

The appellant failed to comply with multiple court orders requiring disclosure of financial information and answers to undertakings and refusals given during examination.

The motion judge struck the appellant's Answer and imposed restrictions on his participation at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal but varied the order to augment the appellant's trial participation rights, permitting him to make an opening statement, cross-examine witnesses, and make closing submissions without requiring leave of the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, sexual interference, three counts of sexual assault, uttering a threat, two counts of failing to comply with a recognisance, and failure to comply with probation.

The charges stemmed from allegations made by three of the appellant's children, all of whom had cognitive deficits.

The trial judge convicted the appellant of all charges except one count of assault causing bodily harm.

The appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of material inconsistencies in witness evidence and inadequate reasons, and also sought leave to appeal his sentence of 10 years' incarceration less 34 months of pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, granted leave to appeal sentence, and allowed the sentence appeal to provide additional credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Chief Adjudicator of the Independent Assessment Process under the Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement appealed two directions issued by the Eastern Administrative Judge.

The first direction prohibited the appellant from participating in three appeals and ordered him to withdraw his facta, finding him insubordinate and in defiance of the supervising courts.

The second direction rescinded the first and appointed an amicus curiae to bring a Request for Direction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside both directions, finding that the appellant was owed procedural fairness and natural justice, which were not afforded.

The court also found the second direction violated the principle of functus officio.

The court held that any future proceedings regarding the appellant's conduct must follow the mandated Request for Direction process and be conducted by a different supervising judge.

The appellant was convicted by jury of robbery, assault causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, uttering a threat to cause death, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and pleaded guilty to breach of recognizance.

The crimes involved the slashing and robbery of a 57-year-old blind male complainant.

Identity was the only contested issue at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his sentence of seven years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's jury charge regarding the alternative suspect defence or the Vetrovec charge.

However, the court found sentencing errors and imposed a stay on the aggravated assault and weapon dangerous convictions pursuant to Kienapple principles, and varied the sentences on the uttering a threat to cause death and breach of recognizance convictions to 18 months and three months concurrent respectively, while affirming the global sentence of seven years less 771 days' credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault based on evidence that the complainant was extremely intoxicated and incapable of consenting when the appellant engaged in sexual activity with her.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider whether the complainant's lack of memory raised a reasonable doubt regarding consent or honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were compelling and based on the totality of evidence demonstrating the complainant's extreme intoxication and incapacity to consent, not merely on the complainant's testimony.

Appeal from conviction for drug-related offences and breach of recognizance.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of evidence seized during a search warrant execution at his residence.

The trial judge dismissed the s. 8 Charter motion based on a redacted information to obtain (ITO).

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding the redacted ITO contained sufficient grounds to support the search warrant.

The court determined that the confidential informant information was insufficiently reliable, with weak credibility assessment, inadequate corroboration, and non-compelling information regarding whether the firearm would be at the searched location.

The court also found the ITO contained misleading language suggesting the target lived at the residence when he did not.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and acquittals were entered on all counts.

An appeal from a trial judgment in which the trial judge found that an employee, who held the position of Assistant Vice President of Campus Services and Building Operations, had misappropriated nearly one million dollars from York University through various fraudulent schemes between 2007 and 2009.

The employee was terminated without cause and paid a severance package of $696,166 with mutual releases after vehemently denying any wrongdoing.

York subsequently discovered the full extent of the misconduct and sued to rescind the severance agreement and recover the stolen funds.

The trial judge found that the employee had fraudulently misrepresented his innocence and that the claim was not barred by the limitations period.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision granting judgment in the amount of $55,555.55 in accordance with a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The appellants claimed the offer had been revoked before acceptance, arguing it was revoked orally at a pretrial conference and subsequently by a second written offer.

The respondent contended the first offer had not been effectively revoked and that acceptance occurred before service of the second offer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that Rule 49 offers can only be revoked in writing, and that the respondent's acceptance of the first offer preceded service of the second offer based on credible evidence and the appellants' failure to provide an affidavit of service.

The appellant sought to appeal an order dismissing his motion for leave to bring a motion to change a final family law order from 2007 concerning child support, spousal support, and section 7 expenses.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain the appeal based on the appellant's long and continuing pattern of wilful default in complying with court orders.

Applying the principle from Dickie v. Dickie, the court stayed the hearing of the appeal until the appellant complied with a recent enforcement order.

The court also awarded costs to the respondent.

The appellant sought an adjournment of the appeal to allow newly retained counsel to review the file and prepare a new factum focusing on the mental impairment issue, which had not been addressed by the trial judge.

The respondent opposed the adjournment but offered alternative conditions including payment of costs thrown away.

The court granted the adjournment on conditions including payment of costs within 14 days, counsel going on record within one week, and filing of a new factum within 30 days.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 14 years imprisonment imposed after conviction on 23 drug and weapons-related offences, including conspiracy to traffic heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine, dangerous possession of weapons, conspiracy to assault, and money laundering.

The appellant raised three issues: (1) that the sentencing judge erred in applying the parity principle by giving him the same sentence as his co-conspirator despite allegedly playing a lesser role; (2) that he should have received enhanced credit for harsh pre-trial custody conditions; and (3) that he should have received credit for time spent on restrictive bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the first two grounds but granted it in part on the third ground, allowing an additional 177 days credit for restrictive bail conditions.

A physician licensed to practice in the United States sought to obtain full licensing in Ontario through the Pathway 4 program.

He was employed by a hospital under a one-year fixed-term contract conditional on successful completion of the program.

Following personality conflicts with members of the cardiac team and a dispute over work assignments, his supervisor withdrew, causing his conditional license to automatically expire and his employment to terminate.

The trial judge dismissed his claims for wrongful dismissal, bad faith conduct, and defamation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the physician was wrongfully dismissed.

However, the court remitted issues regarding quantification of damages, bad faith conduct in the manner of dismissal, and defamation to a new trial due to inadequate reasons from the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed following conviction on multiple charges including sexual assault, assault with a weapon, simple assault, threatening to cause death, mischief, and criminal harassment, as well as guilty pleas to breach of recognizance and breach of probation.

The trial judge imposed a global sentence of nine years less four years credit for time served.

The appellant argued the sentence was demonstrably unfit and sought a reduction of two years.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's approach and noting that sentencing ranges are guidelines, not straitjackets, and that the trial judge had adequately explained her reasons rooted in the facts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of oxycodone for the purposes of trafficking and possession of cocaine, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted the appeal from the trafficking conviction and substituted a conviction for simple possession of oxycodone.

The appeal from the cocaine possession conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and a sentence of time served was substituted in place of the original sentence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following an alleged non-consensual sexual encounter outside a dance.

The trial judge found the appellant guilty based primarily on the complainant's post-occurrence emotional state and an assumption that young women would not consensually engage in sexual activity in the conditions described.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by relying on a behavioural assumption about young women, failing to consider that the complainant was upset before the alleged assault, and failing to resolve material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence or grapple with exculpatory evidence supporting the appellant's version of events.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.